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Aerial view of an international
container cargo ship. In “Ships of State?,”
Christopher R. O’Dea describes how
China COSCO Shipping Corporation
Limited has come to control a rapidly
expanding network of ports and terminals,
ostensibly for commercial purposes, but
has thereby gained the ability to project
power through the increased physical
presence of its naval vessels—turning
the oceans that historically have protected
the United States from foreign threats
into a venue in which China can challenge
U.S. interests.
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FROM THE EDITORS
The Trump administration’s evident determination to reorder fundamentally
the nation’s trade relationships with friends and adversaries alike arguably has
served as a salutary warning to the current Chinese leaders in particular that they
no longer can expect to carry on business as usual with the United States. On
the other hand, it also has had the unintended consequence of obscuring larger
issues in the U.S.-Chinese relationship. China is not just a trading partner that
long has gotten away with sharp practice; it is increasingly clear that the Chinese
aspire to challenge and eventually supplant the United States as the world’s leading power. This case is laid out in authoritative detail in two contributions in this
issue. James E. Fanell, in “China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force
Structure: Pathway to Hegemony,” focuses on the PRC’s massive naval buildup of
recent decades and its implications for China’s increasingly bold global engagement and presence. In “Ships of State?,” Christopher R. O’Dea provides a complementary analysis of the second prong of China’s global maritime strategy, its
so-called Belt and Road Initiative. O’Dea demonstrates that Chinese state-owned
companies have built a global network of ports and associated logistic facilities
and infrastructure, ostensibly for commercial purposes, that seems nonetheless designed to support military power-projection operations over the longer
term as well as to acquire economic and political leverage over host countries. A
largely unrecognized but alarming harbinger of things to come is China’s effective control of the Port of Piraeus in Greece, but this is only one example among
a great many that extend throughout the Indian Ocean to Africa and even Latin
America. Captain James Fanell, USN (Ret.), served most recently as Director of
Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet; Christopher
O’Dea is a Chicago-based international commercial analyst.
As naval combat between major powers becomes less theoretical as a scenario
than at any time since the end of the Cold War, the maritime dimension of World
War II is more worthy of revisiting than ever. In “Operation RHINE EXERCISE,
May 18–27, 1941,” Milan Vego provides a detailed, operational-level analysis of
one of the major encounters at sea between British and German surface forces
in that conflict: the hunt for and eventual destruction of the German battleship
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Bismarck in the North Atlantic in the spring of 1941. Milan Vego is a professor of
joint military operations at the Naval War College.
Be on the lookout: The Naval War College Press is about to publish the second
volume in our John A. van Beuren Studies in Leadership and Ethics. Assembled
by general editor Timothy J. Demy of the NWC faculty, the book will be an anthology of Naval War College Review articles from the last decade on the subject
of leadership and ethics, with some additional material. It will be available from
the Government Publishing Office at www.gpo.gov/.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W309, 330, 333,
334, 335). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401841-2236).
STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION
Statement of ownership, management, and circulation (required by 39 USC 3685, PS Form 3526-R, July
2014) of the Naval War College Review, Publication Number 401390, published four times a year at 686
Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. General business offices of the publisher are located at the
Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of publisher is
President, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of editor
is Dr. Carnes Lord, Code 32, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I., 02841-1207. Name and
address of managing editor is Dr. Robert Ayer, Code 32A, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport,
R.I., 02841-1207. Owner is the Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., 20350-1000.
The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and its exempt status for federal incometax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months. Average number of copies of each issue
during the preceding 12 months is: (a) Total number of copies: 8,348; (b)(1) Requested subscriptions (outside Newport County): 6,469; (b)(2) Requested subscriptions (inside Newport County): 401; (b)(3) Requested distribution outside USPS®: 671; (c) Total requested circulation: 7,541; (d)(1) Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside Newport County): 73; (d)(2) Nonrequested distribution by mail (inside Newport
County): 4; (d)(3) Nonrequested copies by other classes: 38; (d)(4) Nonrequested distribution outside the
mail: 408; (e) Total nonrequested distribution: 523; (f) Total distribution: 8,063; (g) Copies not distributed:
285; (h) Total: 8,348; (i) Percent requested circulation: 94%. Issue date for circulation data: Summer 2018;
(a) Total number of copies: 8,480; (b)(1) Requested subscriptions (outside Newport County): 6,513; (b)
(2) Requested subscriptions (inside Newport County): 400; (b)(3) Requested distribution outside USPS®:
665; (c) Total requested circulation: 7,578; (d)(1) Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside Newport
County): 69; (d)(2) Nonrequested distribution by mail (inside Newport County): 5; (d)(3) Nonrequested
copies by other classes: 34; (d)(4) Nonrequested distribution outside the mail: 472; (e) Total nonrequested
distribution: 580; (f) Total distribution: 8,158; (g) Copies not distributed: 322; (h) Total: 8,480; (i) Percent
requested circulation: 93%. I certify that all information furnished is true and complete.
Robert Ayer, Managing Editor
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is responsible for educating future leaders, developing their
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and enhancing their capability to advise senior leaders and
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer
whose sea-duty assignments have included command
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minnesota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political
science, and received master of arts degrees from the
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

International Seapower Symposium:
Security, Order, Prosperity

once again demonstrated its unique
capability to enhance global maritime partnerships when naval
leaders from more than a hundred nations converged in Newport, Rhode Island,
at the Chief of Naval Operations’ twenty-third International Seapower Symposium (ISS) in mid-September 2018. They met to discuss cooperative strategies
for enhancing global security, order, and prosperity. ISS is the world’s premier
naval gathering, bringing together delegations from maritime services around
the globe to bolster maritime and national security by discussing common challenges and facilitating shared opportunities.
The College was honored to be the location for this extraordinary event sponsored by the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson.
The symposium participants included ninety-seven Heads of Navies or Coast
Guards and the Presidents of nine Naval War Colleges around the world. Keynote
speakers included U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis; Secretary of the Navy
Richard V. Spencer; Admiral Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.); and Peter W. Singer,
strategist and senior fellow at New America.
Secretary Spencer noted: “We seek a true partnership based upon the concept
of shared risks producing shared rewards; a partnership in which no single nation
is the expert, and the ability to lead resides within all of us. When we work together this way, we can produce an equation where 1+1 = 3, and everyone benefits.”
Panelists and speakers at ISS frequently expressed a shared goal to improve
interoperability among the world’s navies, acting on the principle that “we are
stronger together.” Working together in exercises and joint deployments, participating in personnel exchanges and exchange enrollments in schools, and
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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gathering at events such as ISS enhance mutual security, protect the rules-based
order that benefits all nations, and contribute to global prosperity.
In a crisis, the ability to respond quickly and collectively relies on these preexisting bonds among navies and nations. It often is said that you can surge forces
to meet a contingency, but you cannot surge trust and confidence among allies.
“Every day, our allies and partners join us in defending freedom, deterring war,
and maintaining the rules that underwrite a free and open international order,”
said Secretary Spencer.
Oceans that once were the physical and psychological barriers that kept nations apart are now the maritime superhighways that bring nations together.
Strong maritime forces are uniquely suited to help manage the increasing
pace and complexity of change—they make uniquely productive relationships
possible. And they have a long history of behaving in accordance with a wellunderstood and agreed-to set of rules, and of advocating for such behavior.
“ISS-23 is a manifestation of this desire to strengthen the bonds of trust and
confidence among partners, and to explore new opportunities on which we can
collaborate and from which we can learn,” said Admiral Richardson. “Make no
mistake, this desire to sail together in support of our fellow citizens—regardless
of the winds, waves, and weather around us—is the current that has drawn us
here to Newport.”
Panel discussions, presentations, and one-on-one conversations among the
delegates addressed common issues inherent in the maritime domain. These
included combined operations, communication at sea, drug trafficking, piracy,
smuggling, natural disaster relief, and methods of securing free and open ocean
spaces.
The symposium also provided the opportunity to showcase some of the most
modern ships in the U.S. fleet. The amphibious transport dock USS New York
(LPD 21), the guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG 82), the expeditionary
fast transport USNS City of Bismarck (T-EPF 9), and the U.S. Coast Guard cutter
Lawrence Lawson (WPC 1120) hosted visits and social events aboard the ships for
delegates and over one hundred spouses; the latter also participated in portions
of the symposium program.
The first biennial ISS was held here in Newport in 1969. It was designed then,
and continues now, to allow naval leaders from around the world to meet and
discuss common issues and ways to address shared challenges. Previous years’
symposia have resulted in enhanced cooperation in countering piracy, providing
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, coordinating search and rescue at sea
(including submarine rescue), and countering arms/drug/human trafficking and
fishery/pollution violations.
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Long-range planning already has begun for ISS-24, which will take place here
at the Naval War College in 2020. Working seamlessly with our global partners
takes a steady hand on the helm and constant vigilance to remain on course. We
take this responsibility seriously, and there is no more important task as we contribute to the peace and security of our nation and those of our allies.

JEFFREY A. HARLEY

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
(Portions derived from Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kristi Nanco,
“Global Leaders Assemble at 23rd International Seapower Symposium,” America’s
Navy, September 23, 2018, www.navy.mil/.)
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Captain James E. Fanell served for twenty-eight
years as a naval intelligence officer specializing in
Indo-Pacific security affairs, with an emphasis on
China’s navy and operations. His most recent Navy
assignment was as Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Prior
to that he served in a series of afloat and ashore assignments focused on China, as the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence for the U.S. Seventh Fleet
aboard USS Blue Ridge as well as with the USS Kitty
Hawk aircraft carrier strike group, both forward
deployed to Japan. Ashore, he was the U.S. Navy’s
China Senior Intelligence Officer at the Office of Naval Intelligence. He is currently a Government Fellow
with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is also
the creator and, since 2005, the manager of the IndoPacific security forum Red Star Rising.
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CHINA’S GLOBAL NAVAL STR ATEGY AND
EXPANDING FORCE STRUC TURE
Pathway to Hegemony
James E. Fanell

This article is derived from Captain Fanell’s testimony at the hearing before the U.S. House of
Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 17, 2018. The full text
of his original testimony more forcefully reflects his admonitions to the committee, and it is
available online at https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/james_e._fanell_hpsci
_testimony_-_final_-_17may18.pdf.

C

hina’s unilateral expansion into and through the international waters within
the first island chain—or what Beijing now calls China’s Blue Territories—
over the past six years has altered the strategic balance of power dramatically in
the Indo-Pacific region.1 That strategic balance has shifted in favor of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and against America’s security and interests.
In addition to building a modern, blue-water navy, the PRC has taken a wide
range of destabilizing actions that pose an increasing threat to global security.
Among these actions are the construction of naval air stations in the South China
Sea, including on Mischief Reef, which is located within the exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) of the Philippines, a U.S. ally; its declaration of an air-defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea near Japan; its claims of sovereignty
over the Senkaku Islands; and its flat-out repudiation of the authority of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the world’s oldest standing internationallaw arbitral body.2 The threatening actions also include China’s unprecedented
and increasing naval operations in the western Pacific, South Pacific, and Indian
Oceans; the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas; the Arctic and Antarctic; and, finally,
the Atlantic Ocean. These actions are clear empirical indicators of China’s future
malign intentions and actions.
These intentions and actions position China’s military forces, particularly its
navy, air force, missile forces, and rapidly expanding marine corps, as the arbiters
of a new global order—one that stands opposed to U.S. national interests and
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values and those of our friends and allies. China has spent billions of dollars on
a military that can achieve the dreams of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
It is crucial to establish firmly and quickly why the PRC’s rapid, global, and
very expensive naval expansion matters. The CCP is engaged in a total, protracted struggle for regional and global supremacy. This supremacy is at the
heart of the “China Dream.”3 China’s arsenal in this campaign for supremacy
includes economic, informational, political, and military warfare. The campaign
at its heart is opportunistic; we have witnessed already China’s expansion into the
vacuum of a diminishing U.S. presence in East Asia.
If one has not read Xi Jinping’s words and realized the supremacist nature of
the China Dream and carefully watched the nature of China’s rise, then one innocently might ask the obvious question: Why does it matter that the PRC seeks
regional, or even global, hegemony? That is, why does the world not simply
abide a “rising China,” a seemingly benign term so often employed by Beijing’s
propaganda organs and PRC supporters worldwide? After all, fewer would be
concerned if, for instance, a “rising Brazil” or a “rising India” sought regional
hegemony and proclaimed a desire to lead the world into the twenty-first century.
The answer goes to the core of China’s leadership and how it behaves. Under
the CCP, the PRC is an expansionist, coercive, hypernationalistic, militarily and
economically powerful, brutally repressive, totalitarian state. The world has
seen what happens when expansionist totalitarian regimes such as this are left
unchallenged and unchecked. In a world under this type of hegemon, people are
subjects—simply property—of the state, and ideals such as democracy, inalienable rights, limited government, and rule of law have no place.
Clear empirical indicators directly contradict the oft-quoted pledge by China’s
leaders to pursue a “peaceful rise,” one in “harmony” with the rest of Asia and
the world. By its expansionist actions and words, China has challenged the post–
World War II norms of international behavior and, most importantly, the peace
and stability that the Indo-Pacific region has enjoyed over the past seventy years.
For instance, in spite of the country’s having a gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita on par with that of the Dominican Republic, China’s leadership has invested
staggering amounts of national treasure in a world-leading complex of ballistic missiles, satellites, and fiber-linked command centers with little utility but to pursue
military dominance aggressively.* Despite China’s need to keep its children indoors
because of hazardous levels of pollution, a health care system in crisis, toxic rivers,
a demographic time bomb caused by government-directed population expansion
and then forced contraction, and only one-third the GDP per capita of the United
States, Beijing chooses to spend its precious resources on military force buildup.
* For instance, the DF-21D anticarrier ballistic missile was designed by the People’s Liberation Army
specifically to destroy U.S. aircraft carriers in the western Pacific.
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Much of that investment has gone into the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN). The momentum created by the PLAN’s rapid advances in the maritime
domain threatens to do for the rest of the world what the Communist Party has
done for China Proper and its neighbors (Xinjiang and Tibet, Cambodia and
Laos), establishing military, political, and economic domination, to varying
degrees—as the PRC pursues what President Xi calls his China Dream.
The PLAN is China’s point of the spear in its quest for global hegemony. As
of 2018, the PLAN consists of over 330 surface ships and sixty-six submarines—
nearly four hundred combatants. As of May 4, 2018, the U.S. Navy consisted of
283 battle-force ships, including 211 surface ships and seventy-two submarines.4
By 2030, it is estimated the PLAN will consist of some 550 ships: 450 surface ships
and ninety-nine submarines.5 These numbers are a current subject of debate in
the halls of the Capitol and the Pentagon, and it remains unclear whether the U.S.
Navy of 2030 will reach a total of even 355 ships and submarines.
Numbers matter. In the past, it was fair to say that numbers of hulls, or even
tonnage, were not a complete measure of force-on-force capabilities and that
American technology would outweigh the PLAN’s numbers. Today, that argument is no longer credible. From a technological standpoint, the PRC quickly
has achieved parity with USN standards and capacities for warship and submarine production. PLAN ships and submarines do not have to match U.S. naval
capabilities precisely; they only have to be good enough to achieve more hits and
win any given battle. That said, the quality of PRC warships already presents a
credible threat across the Indo-Pacific region today. Consequently, we should be
gravely concerned about America’s ability to deter or defeat the PRC’s naval spear.
We do not have much time left—certainly not until the year 2030, when the
PRC’s navy will be double the size of the U.S. Navy. For reasons laid out below,
the window of vulnerability—the decade of greatest concern—begins in less than
twenty-four months. If some currently unintended event does not provoke a military confrontation before then, we have until 2020—the deadline that Xi Jinping
has given the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready to invade Taiwan. From
that point on, we can expect China to strike.
My detailed assessment of this imminent and ever-increasing maritime threat
follows, as well as my recommendations: the actions our country must take to
avoid geopolitical defeat and a likely naval disaster, the likes of which we have not
experienced since the early, dark days of World War II.
A CHINESE MARITIME DREAM
In 2013, as President Xi Jinping unveiled his China Dream in a speech to the PRC
National People’s Congress, China Central Television (CCTV) aired the weeklong series Shaping China’s Tomorrow, which explored what Chinese people think
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about the Dream. It is noteworthy that CCTV began the series with the story of a
PLAN East Sea Fleet–based executive officer just returned from his third escort
mission in the Gulf of Aden. Lieutenant Commander Shi Lei related that when
he joined the PLAN a decade prior, he never had envisioned sailing so far from
land. But now he believes the PLAN one day will have a blue-water navy whose
sailors can take on any mission on the open sea. Significantly, this CCTV series
vignette symbolizes China’s shift in maritime strategy over the past decade, from
solely a near-seas, active-defense strategy to a national maritime strategy focused
on responsibilities and presence across the global maritime domain. Not surprisingly, it aligned President Xi’s
call for China to become “a
The PLAN is China’s point of the spear in its
strong maritime power” with
quest for global hegemony. . . . China’s increasingly well-publicized naval presence and former president Hu Jintao’s
direction to “resolutely safeoperations throughout Southeast Asia have
contributed to a tectonic shift in this sensitive guard China’s maritime rights
region, a shift toward Beijing and authoritari- and interests, and build China
into a maritime power.”6 Since
anism and away from the United States and
the end of the Ninth Five-Year
its values of democracy and the rule of law.
Plan in 2000, the PRC has
embarked on an ambitious naval-construction program that dramatically has
increased the blue-water operations of the PLAN and the China Coast Guard
(CCG) within the first and second island chains, while substantially increasing
far-seas deployments around much of the globe.7
The theme of China’s national rejuvenation only has strengthened during the
first five years of President Xi’s rule. For instance, at the Nineteenth National
Party Congress of the CCP in October 2017, Xi Jinping stated, “The theme of
the Congress is: remain true to our original aspiration and keep our mission
firmly in mind . . . and work tirelessly to realize the Chinese Dream of national
rejuvenation.”8
Most importantly, realization by Xi and the CCP of the China Dream of national rejuvenation and restoration is linked to, and firmly dependent on, a global
naval capability. The PRC has both the will and the means to push for rapid increases in the PLAN’s order of battle in support of an expanding set of missions to
fulfill the China Dream. Undergirding this thesis are China’s present and future
naval-construction capabilities and capacity; successful, ongoing expansion of
naval operations; and official advocacy for a modern, global, naval force—one
that already is posing a very serious challenge for its neighbors and the U.S. Navy.
This projection of China’s maritime power relies on several assumptions.
First, regardless of potential domestic, political, or economic difficulties, China’s

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1

Winter2019Review.indb 14

20

12/4/18 11:13 AM

Naval War College: Winter 2019 Full Issue

FA N E L L

15

leaders will continue investment “in the Navy, Coast Guard, and maritime industries to more actively and effectively assert its security and economic interests
in the coming decades.”9 Second, China will continue to enjoy a military shipbuilding cost advantage over rivals.10 And third, China will master the technical
advances required to overcome issues arising from the production and incorporation of advanced naval systems—from phased-array radars to nuclear reactors.
While Beijing prefers to achieve its strategic aims through military intimidation rather than combat, as it did at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, it is also clear that
the PRC is prepared to use military force to achieve its strategic goals, as it already
has done—with deadly effect—in the Paracel and Spratly Islands.11 Those goals
are, first, to consolidate the country’s perceived territory, largely in the maritime
domain of the first island chain—a precondition for compelling the submission
of Taiwan—and, second, to exert its influence and power around the globe.
FORCE STRUCTURE EXPANSION AND MILITARY MODERNIZATION
Over the course of nearly two decades, the PLA has benefited from the CCP’s
military modernization effort, the largest by any nation since the end of World
War II. This transformation has not been limited to the procurement of combat
platforms such as ships, submarines, aircraft, tanks, and rockets, but also has encompassed areas ranging from combat-support services to command and control
and civil-military integration.
Throughout these years, the PLA has been charged with the overarching goal
of “realizing the Chinese Dream and the dream of building a powerful military.”12
President Xi has made clear that the CCP has “developed a strategy for the
military under new circumstances, and ha[s] made every effort to modernize
national defense and the armed forces.”13
Military and Command Reorganization
Since taking office, President Xi has restructured the PLA in China’s seven military regions into five theater commands. He also reorganized the Central Military
Commission (CMC) by establishing and subordinating the army’s service headquarters; raising the stature and role of the strategic missile, air, and naval forces;
and establishing a Strategic Support Force (SSF) to integrate space-, cyber-,
and electronic-warfare capabilities.14
Furthermore, by early 2016, President Xi had reorganized and streamlined
the senior echelons of the PLA by discarding “the PLA’s four traditional general departments in favor of 15 new CMC functional departments.”15 To put a
capstone on this transformation, Xi announced that the CMC would now be in
charge of the “overall administration of the PLA, People’s Armed Police, militia,
and reserves,” with the new theater commands (sometimes referred to as joint
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war zones) focusing on combat preparedness. Meanwhile, the various services
would be responsible for the development of programs to man, train, and equip
the force (in the United States, in relation to the National Guard, these are called
the Title 10 authorities).16
Also of significant concern, Xi has placed authority over the CCG under the
CMC. Thus, the CCG, Asia’s largest coast guard, is no longer under the civilian
command of the State Oceanic Administration. It now falls under Xi’s direct
command, through his control of the People’s Armed Police.17
A closer examination of each of the PLA forces is necessary to understand and
appreciate their rapidly expanding capabilities.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy
Since 2000, the PRC has embarked on an ambitious naval-construction program
that dramatically increased the PLAN’s and the CCG’s blue-water operations
within the first and second island chains, while substantially increasing far-seas
deployments around much of the globe.18
With the realization of the China Dream firmly linked to a global naval capability, China’s leaders are on the cusp of achieving their military and economic
goals. They are increasing the PLAN’s order of battle rapidly in support of an
expanding set of global missions to fulfill their China Dream of national restoration and rejuvenation, which will in turn fuel and secure their global economic
expansion through the $1.6 trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Previously
called the One Belt One Road, and before that the Maritime Silk Road, the scope
of the initiative spans eighty countries.19
While official Chinese documents describe the BRI as purely commercial and
a win-win for participants, studies have shown that internal PRC discussion of
the BRI characterizes it as a stealthy conduit of political influence and not only
maritime but also naval expansion.20 Between 2000 and 2014, China committed
$126 billion to the transport and storage sectors.21 These commitments led to
port deals worldwide that provide extensive expansion opportunities. China’s
goals of present and future naval-construction capabilities and capacity; successful, ongoing expansion of naval operations; and official advocacy for a modern,
global, naval force already are posing a challenge for the country’s neighbors and
the U.S. Navy.22
The PLAN’s expansion from 2000 to 2018 far exceeds the buildup in any other
nation’s navy in the post–World War II era, save for the U.S. Navy under President
Ronald W. Reagan during the 1980s. For China’s leaders to achieve their vision
of a rejuvenated and restored China, they need a fleet that can expand China’s
interior lines out into the maritime domain.23 In other words, they need naval,
air, missile, and expeditionary forces that can take China’s regional military
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Concurrent with the PLAN modernization has been the changing pattern of
its operations.
Service, 2014),
pp. 27–29. Instead of continuing its role as a coastal naval force operating
within fifty nautical miles (nm) of China’s coast, today the PLAN has pushed out
into the blue water of the Pacific Ocean and beyond (figures 1 and 2). An examination of PLAN blue-water operations during the past fifteen years reveals that
“China’s ambitious naval modernization has produced a more technologically
advanced and flexible force.” This evolving naval force will provide Beijing with
the capability to conduct a military campaign successfully within the first island
chain (for instance, to take Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands).24
This transformation has required a new force structure, one that has increased
both the number and the type of naval platforms. With respect to far-seas operations, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reported that the PLAN’s
“diversified missions and far seas operations” during the previous decade had
stimulated an operational shift and catalyzed the acquisition of new multimission
platforms.25 These multimission platforms are perfectly suited for naval combat
against naval forces tasked to defend Japan’s southwest islands and Taiwan, and
U.S. naval forces globally as well.26 The PLAN’s ability to confront and deny access to U.S. naval forces regionally is now widely recognized, but its ability to
confront—and defeat—U.S. naval forces globally merits more attention than it
has received.
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In their article “Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The Death and Life
of Surface Fleets,” James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara correctly assert that
the PLAN is “particularly well-suited to seize islands.”27 They hypothesize that
PLAN assault forces will be led by surface combatant strike groups composed of
the service’s premier combatant, the Type 052D Luyang III–class guided-missile
destroyers, along with the Type 054C Luyang II–class guided-missile destroyers,
the Type 054A Jiangkai III–class guided-missile frigates, and the Soviet-built
Sovremenny-class destroyers.
With their superior arsenal of antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs), these surface
action strike groups can provide withering naval gunfire support for an amphibious landing force. They have great range, speed, and survivability. These
combatants also would provide a sea-based air defense that would constrain or
even preclude U.S. or allied air operations near an amphibious operation.28 Given
China’s superior number of advanced surface combatants, “it is far from clear
that the United States retains its accustomed supremacy,” especially in a Taiwan
invasion or Senkaku Islands campaign in which naval warfare will determine
mission success.29
Regarding the Senkakus, PLAN forces have increased their operations in and
around the islands since 2012, in addition to activity by China’s Maritime Law
Enforcement, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) ships, and
the largest civilian fishing fleets on the planet. Prior to 2012, PLAN warships
generally patrolled on the west side of the median line between China and Japan;
since 2012, Chinese warships have been operating for sustained periods east of
the median line. This trend culminated on June 19, 2016, when the Japanese
destroyer Setogiri confirmed that a PLAN Jiangkai I–class frigate had entered the
contiguous zone of the Senkaku island of Kuba.30
Following this pattern, the PRC also has been tightening the noose around
Taiwan over the last two years. In April 2018, the PLA engaged in its largest-ever
attack exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and in the first live-fire exercises there since
2015. In addition, People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) nuclear-capable
aircraft circled the island repeatedly during the month in efforts to intimidate
the Taiwan government and populace. Other PLAAF aircraft circling Taiwan included multiple fighter jets, H-6K bombers, and early-warning airplanes.31 PLA
forces involved in the assault exercises reportedly included some ten thousand
personnel, seventy-six fighter jets, forty-eight naval vessels, a nuclear-powered
submarine, and the PLAN’s aircraft carrier Liaoning (CV 16), which conducted
its first carrier strike group operations in the waters of the Philippine Sea just
east of Taiwan.32
The challenge for the defending force of allied and U.S. warships operating within the first island chain is compounded by China’s ability to bring the
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firepower of all three of its fleets into the sea area around these islands. In addition, China’s naval firepower will come from a densely populated submarine force
armed with supersonic, sea-skimming, 290 nm–range YJ-18 ASCMs, as well as
air-delivered ASCMs from the PLAAF.
With these surface, subsurface, and air forces on hand in the East China Sea,
the PLAN has the capability to conduct a short, sharp war to fulfill its pledge of
taking Japan’s Senkaku Islands. The United States and its allies have insufficient
capabilities in the region and easily could lose a conventional war in the Senkakus
if China strikes first. Taiwan would pose greater challenges for the PRC, but the
PRC now has a significant capability to launch a devastating no-warning attack
on the island democracy.
Further, while the PLAN’s forays by flotillas into European and African waters
have drawn public attention, of greater concern is the PRC’s increasing ability to
sustain those forces from a widening web of PRC-controlled naval logistic bases
from Southeast Asia to the Mediterranean. These ports have been developed for
military purposes, and many will control strategic choke points such as the Strait
of Malacca and the Suez Canal. Most of China’s port deals are for a period of
ninety-nine years or more.33
The commander of U.S. Pacific Forces warned Congress in early 2017 that
China’s naval “presence and influence are expanding,” thanks in large part to the
commercial network created by the BRI. The PRC is using state-owned companies and politically linked private firms to create a network of facilities designed
to provide logistic support to deployed PLAN warships, employing a “first civilian, later military” approach to port development across the region. Chinese
warships already are taking advantage of the dual-use possibilities of commercial
ports, bolstered by laws that oblige Chinese transportation firms working overseas to provide replenishment for navy vessels.34
PLAN Amphibious Forces
Perhaps the most important aspect of any successful Chinese maritime sovereignty campaign involves the act of physically occupying islands within the first
and second island chains. The key to holding these contested islands is the ability
to move forces ashore successfully to seize and hold the ground.
China continues to build and train its naval and amphibious forces in the
art of expeditionary warfare, a skill set easily applied to regional island-seizure
or global force-projection campaigns. In addition to the Taiwan Strait live-fire
exercises alluded to previously, Chinese marines recently conducted amphibious
assault exercises in the South China Sea using amphibious dock landing ships,
air-cushion landing craft, and shipborne helicopters.35 This type of training is
ubiquitous across the East and South China Seas and is the most tangible evidence of the PLA’s preparation to conduct such a mission.
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One facet of President Xi’s transformation of the PLA includes a dramatic
expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Marine Corps (PLAMC) to one hundred thousand personnel—an enormous increase for a nation ostensibly devoted
to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and, in reality, threatened by no
other nation. According to reports in the South China Morning Post, “two special warfare brigades ha[ve] already been incorporated into the PLAMC, raising
the forces’ complement of soldiers to 20,000.”36 These new PLAMC forces will
be dispatched to far-flung installations such as Gwadar, Pakistan, and the new
PLAN base in Djibouti. In these locations, they effectively will threaten America’s
African and South Asian allies and buttress China’s allies operating in these regions, including Russia, Pakistan, and Iran. They also threaten Taiwan and the
Senkakus with potential invasion, as well as islands and countries in East Asia
and Southeast Asia more generally. Growth in PLAMC personnel is necessary to
tip the balance of power in these regions from favoring the United States and its
allies to favoring China’s growing maritime and territorial ambitions.
To provide the amphibious lift needed for this vastly expanded marine corps,
China is producing an increasing number of large, high-end, amphibious warships and is intent on building many more over the near term. According to the
ONI, as of 2015 the PLAN has fifty-six amphibious warships, ranging from a few
World War II–era landing ships to four of the large, modern Yuzhao-class Type
071 amphibious transport dock ships that provide a substantially greater capacity
and more formidable capability than older landing ships.37 The Yuzhao-class ship
is designed for a wide range of island campaigns, including against Taiwan or the
Senkakus or in the South China Sea, and force projection into the Indian Ocean
and globally. It can hold up to four of the new air-cushion landing craft as well as
four or more helicopters, along with armored vehicles and troops.38
Not content with the Yuzhao, China has announced it “has started building a
new generation of large amphibious assault vessels that will strengthen the navy
as it plays a more dominant role in projecting the nation’s power overseas.”39 The
PLAN commander, Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong, reportedly visited the HudongZhonghua Shipbuilding Company in Shanghai in March 2017, where the new
ship, identified as the Type 075 landing helicopter dock, is under construction.40
The Type 075 is much larger than any other amphibious warship previously
built for the PLAN and is suited specifically to an opposed island-seizure campaign and global force projection. It can carry a much larger number of attack
and transport helicopters (as many as thirty) and has the ability to launch six
helicopters simultaneously.41 For a PRC amphibious assault force, this greatly
enhanced heliborne assault capability is critically important. For example, in a regional Senkaku Islands seizure campaign, the closest PLA airfield to the Senkaku
Islands from which the PLA could launch attacking helicopters is more than 180
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nm away. The Type 075 will provide the critical element for the PLA to be able
to project boots on the ground to targeted islands throughout the western Pacific
and pose a credible threat to military targets globally.
At the current rate of amphibious assault ship production, the PLAN and the
PLAMC will be well resourced and ready to take islands within the first island
chain—or objectives as far away from the PRC’s shores as needed—by the early
2020s.
While a detailed PRC shipbuilding plan for the next fifteen years has not been
made public, analysis of available evidence permits extrapolation of the numbers
of ships and submarines China will need by 2030 to achieve its national maritime
goals. The following priorities are my assessment of what is most important for
China’s future naval trajectory and its justification for a 550-ship/submarine fleet:
(1) near-seas active-defense operations, (2) far-seas operations, (3) “goodwill” deployments, (4) surge operations, (5) the BRI, (6) carrier strike group operations,
(7) amphibious assault group operations, and (8) submarine-launched ballisticmissile patrols.42
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force
On November 23, 2013, the PRC abruptly declared an ADIZ in the East China
Sea.43 While Beijing portrayed the ADIZ as being about protecting China’s mainland, the zone represents the importance the regime places on the air domain in
any attempt to take Taiwan or the Senkaku or Spratly Islands.
Since the East China Sea ADIZ declaration, the PLAAF has increased the
scope and scale of flights in and around the Senkaku Islands. In December 2012,
a Chinese maritime surveillance aircraft entered the Senkaku Islands’ territorial
airspace for the first time in fifty years.44 This event, which went unopposed
except for public statements, ushered in an era of expanded PLAAF activities in
the East China Sea, where fighter, airborne warning and control, and signal- and
electronic-intelligence aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles have expanded
their air operations farther southeast toward the Senkaku Islands.45
As a result of this strategy shift, Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) fighters increased their reactions to Chinese aircraft probing Japan’s ADIZ, from approximately three hundred events in 2012 to nearly seven hundred in 2016.46 And
while JASDF reactions to the PLAAF were fewer in 2017, owing in large part to
the CCP’s Nineteenth National Party Congress, the overall increase in PLAAF air
activity directed toward Japan’s airspace caused the JASDF to double the number
of its interceptors from two to four fighter aircraft, a clear indication of Japan’s
concern about the strategic trend line of the PLAAF.47
In addition, the PLAAF has completed an aggressive transition from being an
exclusively territorial air-defense force to one that routinely operates over the vast
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distances of the high seas within the first and second island chains. For instance,
in 2013, the PLAAF began flights into the western Pacific Ocean via the Miyako
Strait and since then has averaged between five and six events per year, with
multiple aircraft.48 The aircraft types conducting flights have included bomber,
fighter, refueling, electronic-intelligence, and airborne early warning aircraft—
attesting to the comprehensive nature of how China would employ airpower to
help secure and maintain its control over the Senkaku Islands.
Adding complexity to the air domain, the PLAAF conducted “its first-ever
exercise over the western Pacific via the Bashi Channel” in late March 2015.49
Despite PLAAF public assertions that these drills were routine and not targeted
against “any particular country, regions or targets,” there is little doubt that PLA
air forces, including the PLAAF and the People’s Liberation Army Naval Air
Force (the PLAN’s naval aviation branch, the PLANAF), entering the Philippine
Sea via the Bashi Channel or the Miyako Strait provide the PLA with considerable
operational and tactical flexibility in any island-seizure attack campaign within
the first island chain.50
The PLAAF announced in mid-September 2016 that it would conduct regular exercises flying past the first island chain.51 True to its word, the PLAAF has
conducted flights through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel, such as on
March 3, 2017, when China sent thirteen aircraft through the Miyako Strait.52
According to the Japanese Ministry of Defense, this was “the largest number of
foreign planes Japan has scrambled jets for since such data first became available
in 2003.”53
The PLAAF also now routinely sends bombers to threaten Japan, Guam, and
other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) allies. In March 2018,
the PLAAF sent six H-6K bombers; one Tu-154; and one Y-8 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft through the Miyako Strait into the
western Pacific to exercise what the PLAAF stated was “long-range operational
capabilities.” In reality, these were attack training profiles for strikes on Guam,
while sending Su-35 fighters on their first combat patrol over the South China
Sea.54 And most recently, on May 11, 2018, the PLA’s Eastern and Southern
Commands dispatched two groups of H-6K bombers, accompanied by KJ-2000
airborne early warning aircraft and Su-35 and J-11 fighters, in clockwise and
counterclockwise patterns from the Chinese mainland through the Miyako Strait
and the Bashi Channel, demonstrating the PLAAF’s ability to operate under
“high-sea conditions” against Taiwan.55
The increasing proximity of Chinese aircraft to the Senkaku Islands is of particular significance. According to Japan’s Ministry of Defense, China has increased
the number of PLAAF aircraft that fly south of 27 degrees north latitude, an unspoken demarcation line that Japan considers to be a defensive borderline.56 JASDF
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1

Winter2019Review.indb 22

28

12/4/18 11:13 AM

Naval War College: Winter 2019 Full Issue

FA N E L L

23

tactical objectives are designed to keep Chinese planes from flying within a minimum protective air umbrella of approximately 60 nm from the Senkaku Islands.
The combined failure of Japan and the United States to defend this line sends
China the message that our resolve to defend the Senkakus themselves may be
weak. The same can be said for our ability to defend the airspace around Taiwan
and, worse still, in the South China Sea.
China easily could begin a campaign to take Japanese islands, Taiwan, or
the islands of the South China Sea by exploiting and surprising local air commanders. Specifically, the PLAAF could launch a large number of fighters and
other aircraft toward Okinawa via the Miyako Strait and up through the Bashi
Channel, with the goal of diverting, diffusing, and degrading U.S. and allied
defensive efforts to establish airspace control. On these islands, an assault by
the main invasion force, either airborne from helicopters or seaborne, would be
conducted concurrently. And both this combined-arms diversion and the main
assault would take place under the cover of one of the most sophisticated missile
and rocket forces on the planet.
Finally, if there was any doubt about the PRC’s intention to develop the capability for global power projection, specifically nuclear power, one need look no
further than PLAAF commander Ma Xiaotian’s December 2016 assertion that
“China is developing next-generation long-range bombers,” expected to be designated the H-20 bomber. This new bomber, according to Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo,
director of the PLAN’s Expert Consultation Committee, would be on par with the
U.S. Air Force B-2 stealth bomber.57 This was reinforced again in May 2018 when
the Xi’an Aircraft Industrial Corporation revealed a mysterious, new-model jet,
rumored to be the PRC’s new stealth bomber.58
People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces
In terms of kinetic fires, and per the Chinese military doctrine of joint-fire strike
campaign, Beijing likely would use its extensive ballistic- and cruise-missile
arsenal, from the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF), PLAAF,
PLANAF, and PLAN, to disrupt U.S. rear-area operations in Japan and throughout the area of operations. Specifically, in a Senkakus or Taiwan attack scenario,
Japan and the United States should expect attacks against military bases on the
main Japanese island of Honshu, the Ryukyus, and Guam, where the majority
of Japanese and U.S. military strength resides. In his article “Has China Been
Practicing Preemptive Missile Strikes against U.S. Bases?,” Commander Thomas
Shugart, USN, convincingly argues that “the greatest military threat to U.S. vital
interests in Asia may be one that has received somewhat less attention: the growing capability of China’s missile forces to strike U.S. bases.”59
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The purpose of these supporting fires, as articulated in joint-fire strike campaign doctrine, would be to coordinate and synchronize antiship ballistic and
cruise missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, air strikes with precision-guided
munitions, and counter-C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) strikes with specialized weapons.
These fires would facilitate the main objective of seizing Taiwan or the Senkaku
Islands and isolating Japanese, Taiwan, and U.S. military forces arrayed across
the region.
However, Beijing’s strategic designs extend well beyond the first island chain.
For instance, in April 2018, the PLARF announced the establishment of a new
DF-26 brigade and its deployment to an undetected site. The DF-26, with a range
of nearly 2,200 nm, is the PRC’s second anticarrier ballistic missile. The first,
the DF-21D, with a range of nearly 1,000 nm, when deployed to Hainan Island,
places the entirety of the South China Sea within weapons range. Ultimately, both
of these “carrier killer” missiles demonstrate the PRC’s commitment to power
projection against the U.S. Navy. Interestingly, the PLARF also noted that “it has
been sparing no effort to foster the capability to conduct nuclear retaliation and
intermediate- and long-range precision strikes and has obtained a succession of
breakthroughs in new weapons’ research and development.”60
Given the recent deployment of the YJ-12B surface-to-surface and HQ-9
surface-to-air missiles to the PRC’s artificial island bases in the Spratlys, it is entirely conceivable that the PRC’s rocket forces could be used in a similar fashion
to deploy ballistic-missile systems to China’s emerging overseas military bases in
Djibouti and Pakistan and elsewhere along the course of the BRI.61
PLA Informatization Department and Strategic Support Force
PLA strategy addresses informatization in both its offensive combat and counterintervention operations. Informatization—“the ability to transmit, process, and
receive information”—is a vital enabler and is at the core of everything the PLA
wants to accomplish. These missions include blue-water naval confrontations,
amphibious assaults to take islands, high-tech missions in space and cyberspace, long-range precision kinetic and nonkinetic strikes, and naval war-at-sea
operations.62
Reforms to the PLA informatization department began in 2015 and are expected to be complete by 2020, when lines of responsibility between it and the
SSF are further delineated. The SSF’s mission reportedly is focused on “strategiclevel information support” for “space, cyber, electronic, and psychological
warfare.”63 One of its main missions will be strategic denial of the electromagnetic
spectrum.64
The SSF is a critical factor for joint operations through this mission of strategiclevel information support. The SSF also has assumed responsibilities for strategic
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information warfare. China’s cyber forces would play a critical role in any counterintervention strategy against the United States, Taiwan, and Japan in any
island-seizure conflict. These same cyber forces will support PLAN operations
against U.S. forces and those of supporting friends and allies globally in other
scenarios. The two organizations responsible for this, the Third Department of
the PLA General Staff Headquarters (3PLA) and the Fourth Department (4PLA),
are both subordinated to the SSF.65
China has invested heavily in countersatellite electronic-warfare capabilities
to force a “no satellite, no fight” environment on the United States. The SSF has
consolidated the management and control over space-based ISR assets. Equally
troubling, it also may have nonkinetic antisatellite capabilities, such as directedenergy weapons.
SSF and the Fight for Public Opinion. In any conflict within the Indo-Pacific
region or globally, the PRC’s fight for public opinion will constitute the second
battlefield, on which it will wage a wide range of political warfare (PW) operations. Accordingly, the overall PW effort, and the SSF’s support for it, requires
special attention.
Guided by the doctrinal principle of “uniting with friends and disintegrating
enemies,” the PRC continuously employs active PW measures to promote its rise
and to combat perceived threats. Its PW operations employ strategic psychological operations (psyops) to propagate the CCP’s narrative of events, actions, and
policies to lead international discourse and influence policies of friends and foes
alike. These PW operations at first may appear to be benign soft-power activities,
but under scrutiny they often include coercive persuasion campaigns intended to
manipulate international perceptions.66
Chinese strategic literature particularly emphasizes the role of psyops, legal
warfare, and public opinion warfare—collectively known as the three warfares—
to subdue an enemy ahead of conflict or ensure victory if conflict breaks out.
According to available literature and experience, it is certain that the PRC will
engage in “hybrid warfare” similar to, but likely more sophisticated than, that
employed in Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. The PRC will augment conventional military operations with nonconventional operations, such as subversion,
disinformation and misinformation (now commonly referred to as “fake news”),
and cyber attacks. The operationalization of psyops with cyber warfare is key to
this strategy.67 China has empowered its psychological warfare forces fully, most
notably at the three warfares base (or 311 base) in Fuzhou. These forces are subordinate to the SSF and integrated with China’s cyber forces.
While the CCP’s effective use of PW operations goes back to the beginning of
the party, its operations—particularly its efforts to build what amounts to fifth
columns overseas, through the CCP’s United Front Work Department—took on
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new impetus with Xi Jinping’s ascension to the leadership of party and government in 2012 and 2013, respectively. The United Front is the CCP organization
that forges domestic and international political coalitions for influence operations worldwide. In Xi’s view, the time had come for a strong and confident China
to move beyond former Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s advice to
hide its assets and bide its time. Delegates to the party Central Committee’s Eighteenth National Congress were lectured on the importance of United Front work,
and the bureaucracy hastened to comply.68
Prior to initiating an offensive or other military confrontation, China will use
worldwide psyops and public opinion warfare as part of a concerted PW campaign. It will employ Chinese United Front organizations and other sympathizers, along with both Chinese and other nations’ mass-information channels such
as the Internet, television, and radio.
The focus of these influence operations will be to support China’s position and
demonize, confuse, and demoralize the United States and its supporting friends
and allies. Internally, this campaign will be important in mobilizing mass support
for the righteous action, while externally the campaign will attempt to gain support for China’s position from those nations undecided about which side (if any)
to support. In addition to standard propaganda, disinformation will be employed,
such as false reports of surrender of national governments or forces, fabricated
atrocities and other violations of international law, and other untrue reports intended to undermine decision-making by the United States and its friends and
allies. Also, United Front organizations, working or in parallel with the PAFMM,
China’s merchant marine, and its massive fishing fleets, may instigate incidents
and other actions that disrupt USN and friendly-force maritime operations.
This PW campaign will continue through the military confrontation and
after—regardless of the success or failure of the operation.
SSF Impact. In a further move that leaves no doubt about the role the CCP envisions for its United Front in the battle for public opinion, on February 17, 2017,
Xi issued a directive to cultivate greater support among the members of the estimated sixty-million-strong Chinese diaspora worldwide. He called for “closely
uniting” with overseas Chinese in support of the Chinese Dream, as part of the
greater efforts and activities of the United Front. Xi stressed that “to realize the
great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must work together with our sons
and daughters at home and abroad. . . . It is an important task for the party and
the state to unite the vast number of overseas Chinese and returned overseas
Chinese and their families in the country and play their positive role in the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”69
Xi and the CCP will exploit these overseas Chinese citizens to weaken military
and political adversaries worldwide and advance the CCP’s political and military
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objectives.70 Prime among these efforts will be lobbying for the establishment of
more PRC military bases.
Ultimately, the purpose of these SSF suborganizations is to ensure the sanctity of national- and theater-level command and control as well as to enhance
the war-fighting effectiveness of each of the individual services. Whether in a
preferred short, sharp regional war to seize islands or in another confrontation
that may take place globally, these invisible forces will provide precise situational
awareness, target identification of opposing forces, network-defense capabilities,
and real-time command and control that will enable the PLA to take and hold
military objectives. They also will work to subvert, discourage, and confuse the
national leadership and operational forces of the United States and its supporting
friends and allies.
As an example of these efforts, in 2014 the PLA established a permanent joint
operations command (JOC) center responsible for integrating the operations of
its army, navy, and air forces. It was the first time such a JOC had been established, and the center was seen as boosting “the unified operations of Chinese
capabilities on land, sea, air, and in dealing with strategic missile operations.”71
When these actions are combined with President Xi’s other PLA reforms, it seems
clear that China’s ability to command and control all its forces and disrupt opposing forces in a military confrontation is well established and practiced.
THE PRC’S GLOBAL STRATEGY AND PRESENCE
China’s expanding naval force structure has allowed it to project power on an
increasingly global scale. On its path to global maritime hegemony, the PLAN
began as a marginally capable, coast-hugging, brown-water force. After American forces departed most of Southeast Asia in the 1970s, China tentatively pushed
out into the blue waters of the South China Sea. By the 1980s, China’s naval forces
began conducting small-scale, routine operations in both the South and East
China Seas. This situation remained static and mostly benign through the 1990s,
but by 2000 the PRC’s strategic goals became clear.
Over the past decade, we have seen the PLAN routinely operate and deploy
warships as far away as the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, Baltic, and
Arctic Seas. In fact, by 2015 China was making moves to acquire berthing in the
Azores—about a third of the way to the U.S. East Coast from Portugal—as well
as operating hydrographic research ships in the South Atlantic—a harbinger of
future PLAN submarine operations in the North Atlantic.
In a reversal of old geopolitical truisms, China’s trade is leading the flag, as
well as vice versa. China has sealed long-term port deals that span the globe,
including in Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Myanmar, the
Strait of Malacca, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, Tanzania, Mauritius,
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Namibia, and Greece. In addition, China currently is negotiating port deals in the
Maldives, Scandinavia, and Greenland.
These ports already have started to provide critical berthing and logistics support to China’s merchant marine and the PLAN, including refueling, provisions,
and maintenance. China’s merchant marine ships, meanwhile, are not regular
commercial-transport ships. Since 2015, they have been required by Chinese law
to be built to military specifications. The year prior, China coordinated many of
its merchant marine ships to push back forcibly against Vietnamese vessels protesting Chinese oil exploration in Vietnam’s EEZ.72
Vital strategic arteries are a focus of PRC control and acquisition planning.
Chinese business interests have heavy influence over the Panama Canal, as evidenced by a milestone treaty signed by Panama and China in 2017. The treaty,
which came into force in May 2018, is designed to promote maritime and port
development by the PRC in Panama.73 Further, the PLAN has berthing agreements in Malaysia near the Strait of Malacca, it operates a military base in Djibouti, which is at a choke point for the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and the commander of the U.S. Southern Command recently testified before Congress that
it is “worth paying attention to” the prospect of the PRC building a naval facility
in the Western Hemisphere.74 At the current rate, this Western Hemisphere PRC
naval facility is not a matter of if, but when.
Of equal concern, influential PRC and Thai political leaders are conducting
advanced planning for a PRC-built canal across the Kra Isthmus of Thailand
that simultaneously would diminish Singapore’s economic and political viability
while cutting travel time by three days compared with transit through the Malacca Strait. Since the Malacca Strait currently handles approximately 40 percent
of global trade flows, this would increase PRC commercial power vastly.75 It also
would fund, justify, and facilitate PLAN naval operations between the Indian
Ocean and the Gulf of Siam. A similar canal has been proposed for Nicaragua.76
Since 2008, China has conducted nonstop antipiracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden. These operations have been a boon for the PLAN’s development as a bluewater naval fighting force and also have provided a portal for Chinese influence
into the Middle East balance of power. For instance, since 2013 the PLAN has
conducted regular deployments of nuclear submarines into the Indian Ocean,
and while submarines, especially nuclear-powered types, are suboptimal against
pirates, they are a highly useful threat against India. The threatening of an emerging U.S. friend and Quad member, India, reveals the actual strategic purpose of
China’s submarine and naval operations in the Indian Ocean region.77 In August
2017, China deployed at least fourteen naval ships in the Indian Ocean.78
The PLAN also has conducted oceanographic research operations in the Indian Ocean, East and South China Seas, and Atlantic Ocean, as well as commercial
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oceanographic expeditions in the Mariana Trench (within Guam’s EEZ), other
parts of Micronesia, Benham Rise (within the Philippine EEZ), and the western
Pacific. China’s naval oceanography often is conducted in tandem with, or under
the guise of, scientific or commercial oceanography, but its real intent is to gain
important data about the undersea domain, principally anything of benefit to the
PLAN elite submarine force.
In 2017, Chinese hydrographic survey vessels were caught mapping the ocean
floor in the Philippines’ territorial waters of the Luzon and Surigao Straits and in
the Caroline Islands of Micronesia. This ocean floor mapping assists the PLAN
subsurface fleet in preparing to break out of the first and second island chains
and into the western Pacific and Atlantic; doing so would leave global shipping,
the continental United States, and all other territories vulnerable to submarinelaunched cruise missile and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) attacks
during wartime.79
In furtherance of these goals, the PLAN has developed a network of sensors
that incorporates ships, submarines, buoys, satellites, and unmanned underwater
gliders. The service’s hunger to acquire this information knows no bounds, as was
demonstrated when a PLAN warship captured a U.S. underwater glider in 2016,
in a brazenly open theft of U.S. military technology.80 The PLAN’s development
of underwater listening arrays and passive sonar will erode, if not outrun, the
current U.S. advantage over the next five to ten years if more U.S. funding is not
made available in this high-priority, strategic area of naval warfare.
Russia-PRC JOINT SEA Exercises
The PLAN also has been conducting joint naval-warfare exercises, named
JOINT SEA by the PRC, with the Russian navy since 2012, when the first exercise occurred in the waters of the Yellow Sea. Since then the scope, scale, and
complexity of the exercises in this series have expanded. Each year the PLAN
has dispatched its warships to the Sea of Japan and the Mediterranean and Baltic
Seas.
In the latest iteration, JOINT SEA 2017, three Chinese and ten Russian warships conducted naval-warfare training for several weeks in the Baltic. This was
the first time the PLAN had operated in the Baltic Sea, and by all accounts its
performance in this joint operation was flawless. This sent a chilling hard-power
diplomatic message to Eastern Europe, as China has never denounced Russia’s
2014 annexation of Crimea from Ukraine, and Estonia frequently complains of
Russian naval and air forces operating too closely to its shores. However, in a
disturbing turn of events, European capitals apparently accepted the Chinese
naval presence as the price to be paid for benefiting from Beijing’s BRI.81
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Tectonic Shifts in Southeast Asia
China’s naval advance in Southeast Asia has been swift in historical terms, but incremental when viewed in the context of America’s blinkered four-year political
cycle. It unfortunately has been met with almost no resistance and, most notably,
by a failure of U.S. resolve to recognize and confront the dangers while the U.S.
Navy still held the preponderance of power. China’s increasingly well-publicized
naval presence and operations throughout Southeast Asia have contributed to a
tectonic shift in this sensitive region, a shift toward Beijing and authoritarianism
and away from the United States and its values of democracy and the rule of law.
Key milestones in the PRC’s maritime and political expansion into Southeast Asia
are outlined below.
In 1974, the PLA attacked and captured Duncan Island in the Paracels, killing
dozens of South Vietnamese soldiers. The United States did nothing to assist its
ally against China, despite having a carrier nearby.82 China subsequently occupied all the Paracels, where it now has twenty naval outposts.83
In 1988, China captured Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands from lightly armed
Vietnamese troops who were standing knee-deep on the shoal in an attempt to
establish a presence. The PLAN murdered all sixty-four soldiers by opening fire
from naval ships with large-caliber deck guns. The Philippines made a diplomatic
protest of this occupation in its claimed EEZ, but the United States took no military action, sending a message of U.S. ambiguity to China and our allies.84
In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, an unoccupied low-tide elevation
within the EEZ of the Philippines. Again, the United States did nothing. China
now has dredged and added naval outposts to all the Spratly islands that it
controls.85
In 2012, the presence of PRC commercial ships at Scarborough Shoal, also
within the Philippines’ EEZ, instigated a standoff that ultimately intimidated the
Philippine coast guard and fishermen away from their ancestral fishing grounds.
The U.S. State Department arguably abetted the PRC’s occupation when Kurt
Campbell, then the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
negotiated a mutual withdrawal of PLAN and Philippine naval assets from Scarborough. The plan was flawed; the PRC immediately reneged, refusing to remove
its vessels from the shoal and thereby establishing itself as the sole naval power
at the shoal. This single event has had the negative consequence of providing
President Duterte of the Philippines with a justification for siding with the PRC
after he came to office. More importantly, this failure to support a treaty ally has
damaged U.S. credibility severely, not only with the Philippines, but across the
entire Indo-Pacific region.
China’s claim of the so-called nine-dash line as its sovereign boundary and
its occupations of the Philippines’ EEZ were ruled illegal in 2016 by the PCA
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in The Hague.86 But the United States took no action to recover lost Philippine
rights, and its ally the Philippines already had given up on the possibility of U.S.
protection.87
The PCA ruling was too little, too late. China now has announced plans to
dredge Scarborough Shoal, just 120 nm from the U.S. Navy’s former deepwater
base at Subic Bay. China’s YJ-12 and YJ-18 ASCMs both have an approximately
290 nm range, suggesting that it would be foolhardy to conduct naval operations
from Subic in the future without first establishing control of Scarborough.
Most significantly, China now has deployed YJ-12B ASCMs to Mischief, Subi,
and Fiery Cross Reefs, despite
While official Chinese documents describe the the PRC’s prior assurances
that it would not militarize
BRI as purely commercial and a win-win for
these facilities. And to comparticipants, . . . internal PRC discussion of
plicate the situation further,
the BRI characterizes it as a stealthy conduit
President Duterte stated in a
of political influence and not only maritime
speech that he believed China
but also naval expansion.
had installed the missiles to
88
protect rather than imperil the Philippines.
There is significant concern that President Duterte’s pro-China policies could
provide a basis for turning Scarborough Shoal into another PRC air and naval
base. Standing up to Beijing would require adept and forceful diplomacy from
Manila, as well as the placement of U.S. Navy and Coast Guard assets at the shoal
to counterbalance similar Chinese assets.
Farther south, China’s accelerated dredging and militarization of its artificial
islands since 2013 violates its promises in the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea, which it signed with ASEAN nations in 2002.89
China’s naval outposts in the South China Sea include berthing for aircraft carriers and submarines, runways sufficient for its military planes, antiaircraft guns,
and—starting in 2018—ASCMs.90
The militarization of these islands, contradicting promises President Xi made
to President Obama, is an increasingly powerful inhibitor of USN operations
in the South China Sea. Counterintuitively, over time China’s militarization of
the South China Sea increasingly has had the impact of forcing U.S. military
commanders to get higher and higher levels of approval before being allowed to
conduct routine operations in the South China Sea. This timidity has escalated to
the point that presidential approval has been required for even simple freedom of
navigation (FON) transits—an approval authority protocol that never had been
required since the inception of the program in 1979.
Also in Southeast Asia, it is important to understand the dramatic tilt that the
Kingdom of Thailand has taken toward the PRC. This tilt, particularly prominent
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since the May 22, 2014, military coup in Thailand, is reflected in unprecedented
Sino-Thai military-to-military training and cooperation. The first Sino-Thai naval exercises were held in the Andaman Sea in 2004 and in the Gulf of Thailand
in 2005. Exercise STRIKE 2007 was the first joint exercise with any nation involving China’s special forces. Exercise BLUE STRIKE maritime drills commenced in
2010, while the first Sino-Thai air force exercises, FALCON STRIKE, took place in
2015. Thai officials have announced that the PRC will build a regional weapons
and maintenance center in Thailand, and in 2017 Thailand purchased the first of
three Chinese submarines.91
The submarine sale has serious, far-reaching implications. Not the least of
these is that the PLAN likely will control a submarine maintenance and training
facility at Sattahip naval base, which could preclude USN use of that important
Southeast Asia naval facility.
Regarding China’s role in Malaysia, former prime minister Najib Razak visited
China in 2014, and by the next year military personnel exchanges and joint exercises occurred between the Malaysian armed forces and the PLAN in the Strait
of Malacca. In 2016, the two countries concluded a major military agreement,
including Malaysia’s purchase of four littoral mission ships (LMSs), accompanied by a statement by the prime minister against the United States. The LMS
purchase was Malaysia’s first major defense deal with China, and it may include a
new Malaysian office of China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Co. Ltd.,
the LMS maker.92
In 2017, Malaysia’s defense minister spelled out the goals of the two countries
as being an institutionalization of their “unique relationship” through a “highlevel defense committee” on military cooperation, intelligence exchange, education, training, and strategic affairs. A “current issues” working group discussed
the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, and terrorism. On his visit to Beijing that
year, the minister oversaw an agreement between Malaysia’s National Defense
University and Peking University.93
Also in 2017, a PLAN submarine docked at Malaysia’s naval base at Kota
Kinabalu; this occurred simultaneously with a Russian antisubmarine warfare
ship docking in the Philippines. Whether intentional or not, these actions sent a
message about the strength of the alliance between China and Russia, along with
a lack of any significant resistance to their influence in the region.94
After the Chinese and Russian visits in 2017, a fellow at the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences opined, “It is normal for Russia to increase the presence of its
force in Southeast Asia as this region cannot be dominated by the U.S. Besides,
Southeast Asia has seen a change in the balance of power. The influences of
China and Russia in the region have heightened while the influence of the U.S.
has declined. What’s more, with the U.S. failing to meet the security demands
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of Southeast Asian countries, more countries in the region will turn to China
and Russia for security.”95 Later in 2017, a PLAN Song-class submarine and a
replenishment ship conducted a port call in Sabah, Malaysia, after conducting
counterpiracy operations in Somalia—which sent another signal of the shifting
sands in the South China Sea.96
Ceding Oceania in the Race for the Equator
As we focus on the PRC’s ability to break the first island chain, we also must be
watching its inroads into the second and third island chains.97 Across the vast
expanse of Oceania, China’s deepening economic and political relationships have
paved the way for port leases and maritime construction efforts that serve the
PRC’s global power-projection vision and threaten U.S. security interests.
China is making a large play for this resource-rich, strategically crucial region,
from the continent of Australia to obscure island nations that most Americans
might not recognize on a map. These are islands and waters that Americans defended, or liberated island by bloody island, from brutal oppression more than
seventy years ago. However, this time the outcome will be determined not only by
U.S. naval and air power but also by who wins over the hearts and minds of local
island populations. The reality at this moment is that massive Chinese investment
to boost island economies is winning the hearts and minds of island leaders and
well-off elites, if not necessarily populaces. Simultaneously, U.S. diplomatic and
economic investment in the islands is often invisible, and sometimes even in
retreat.
As a prime example, Australia, one of America’s closest allies, sold a ninetynine-year lease of its strategic port in Darwin to a financially distressed Chinese company for $506 million in Australian dollars (AUD) in 2015. This sale
occurred despite Darwin’s long and continuing usage by Australian and U.S.
military forces, creating an enhanced security threat for operations and unpredictability of access during a crisis. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated
at the time, “This investment by a Chinese enterprise is a normal business operation that complies with market principles, international rules, and Australian
laws.”98 But the Chinese company, Landbridge Group, was financially distressed
and seeking cheap loans from the Chinese government. To obtain those loans,
the chief executive officer described the port in terms consistent with China’s
state goals, saying that the lease was part of China’s state-coordinated BRI. He
also hired Australia’s former trade commissioner as a consultant for AUD 73,000
per month, raising questions of corruption among Australia’s decision makers
on the deal.99
China’s port in Darwin, Australia, is financially distressed. This is normal for
China’s ports abroad, which are highly unprofitable—unless viewed from the
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optic of China’s national security. Out of fifteen of China’s global port projects
sampled by Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, the authors concluded that “only
six are arguably or potentially profitable.”100 Unsurprisingly, the authors included
Darwin as one of these six ports, as the port could obtain subsidized funding from
the Chinese government only after being linked with the PRC’s BRI. The BRI is
unambiguously a project to promote Chinese global hegemony, both through
political influence and, more concretely, through naval power projection.101
Recent media reports suggest that Australian defense officials are concerned
that China aims to establish a permanent naval base on the Pacific island republic of Vanuatu, a country known for its robustly independent foreign policy.
Vanuatu was the first Pacific nation to join the Non-Aligned Movement in the
1980s, and it has a long-standing commitment to decolonization in places such
as East Timor, West Papua, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia. Some see
Vanuatu as the political capital of Melanesia, since it hosts the secretariat for the
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) of nations. Vanuatu may be forging closer
ties with China because it is being threatened directly by Indonesia as a result
of Vanuatu’s support for West Papuan independence, and at the same time is in
negotiations with France over the disputed territories of Matthew and Hunter
Islands. Although Australia usually is seen as the primary regional security
provider, Melanesian nations such as Vanuatu increasingly see their security
situation as compromised when it comes to Canberra’s policies on Indonesia and
climate change.102
While the Vanuatu government and the PRC currently deny that any plans to
establish such a base are afoot, the PRC initially also denied its plans for the base
in Djibouti.103 China already has built a new wharf on the Vanuatu island of Espiritu Santo, making it one of the largest ports in the South Pacific, and is upgrading the airport and building sports stadia, convention centers, and roads—along
with office buildings for Vanuatu’s foreign affairs staff and the prime minister’s
new office. Vanuatu would be a logical location for China to establish a new
satellite-tracking station and ground-support facility for its Yuanwang space
event support ships.104 Chinese officials stated that they have more aid projects
active in Vanuatu than in any other Pacific country; in return, Vanuatu announced in late 2016 that it would be the first Pacific country to recognize China’s
claims in the South and East China Seas. Since then, other Pacific nations, including Nauru and Papua New Guinea, have followed suit.
At the same time that Chinese investment and diplomacy are spiking in Vanuatu, so too is investment in New Caledonia, where some French officials are nervous about potential violence and the referenda on independence. Across Oceania, the PRC also is showing deep interest in the Federated States of Micronesia,
Tonga, Samoa, and French Polynesia. The interest in French Polynesia stems
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from these islands’ utility not only for support and monitoring (the Yuanwang
ships have made several visits) but also as a refueling and transshipment point
between China and the Americas. Additionally, China sees French Polynesia as a
significant future stepping-stone to growing operations in Antarctica.105
A Chinese company has agreed to invest almost a third of a billion U.S. dollars
to set up an aquaculture project at French Polynesia’s large and remote Hao atoll.
That amount is more than all the foreign direct investment that French Polynesia
received between 2013 and 2016 combined. The atoll used to support a French
military base for France’s nuclear-testing program. While the base has closed,
much of its infrastructure is still intact. This includes the airport, which has a
runway long enough to have been designated an emergency landing strip for the
space shuttle.106 Fiji and other politically complex countries that are diplomatically close to China also might be in Beijing’s sights as possible locations for naval
logistics facilities.107
Chinese influence operations in Oceania also are reflected closer to U.S. territory in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). In CNMI,
just north of Guam, Chinese resort developers, serving PRC economic- and
political-warfare interests, are stymieing U.S. military efforts to develop further
a much-needed training area for amphibious operations, on Pagan Island. This
thus-far-successful “blocking operation” is designed to degrade the readiness of
frontline U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces assigned or transiting there.
This now-well-established pattern to support Beijing’s global ambitions for the
PLAN deserves Washington’s close attention. It starts with Chinese financial aid,
political donations, and investment, along with commercial inroads, and then an
increase in Chinese immigrants, all contributing to influence over local governments. Next, invariably, a PLAN-related military objective emerges. This angle
can range from Chinese military access to ports and airfields to blocking efforts,
as seen in CNMI and throughout Micronesia.108
New Threats in South Asia and the Indian Ocean
In recent years, the PRC has increased its influence and presence in South Asia
significantly. Beijing is acquiring a naval facility near Gwadar, Pakistan, and a
major maritime port facility in the same location on a forty-year lease. The first
containership visited in March 2018, but Gwadar was not built exclusively for
profit; rather, it also was envisioned to be China’s territorial foothold in Pakistan
and to service naval power projection into the Arabian Sea.109
In Sri Lanka, Chinese companies gradually built their influence with arms sales
amid a civil war and allegations of corruption and bribery at the highest levels.
Vanity projects and growing debt predictably followed. From 2005 to 2014, China
provided almost seven billion dollars in loans to Sri Lanka. By 2014, Sri Lanka
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was having difficulty paying them back, and in September of that year it not only
opened four of seven berths at the unprofitable Hambantota port to a Chinese
company on a thirty-five-year lease but also hosted the PLAN warship Chang
xingdao and nuclear submarine Changzheng-2. After an additional insolvency
crisis in 2016, Sri Lanka sold a 70 percent equity stake in Hambantota to Chinese
companies in exchange for forgiveness of a fraction of its debt to China. Chinese
companies took control of the port, with a ninety-nine-year lease, in January
2018. This port likely will see routine use by PLAN combatants early in the next
decade, providing another indicator of the PRC’s success in achieving in the Indian Ocean region its goals for acquiring global power-projection capabilities.110
The Maldives provides another stark example. The country lurched toward
Beijing (and away from New Delhi) with the election of a pro-PRC president in
2013. The fractious aftermath of the hotly contested election led China to deploy
warships in parts of the Indian Ocean to preserve its growing interests.111 Consequently, the PRC has been granted exclusive trade and other access. In light
of the Maldives’ strategic location south of India, this likely will lead to greatly
enhanced PRC maritime surveillance and naval operational support.
The Maldives and Sri Lanka are two of the several Indian Ocean nations
where China is obtaining footholds that could prove decisive in its future maritime strategy in the region. Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Myanmar also are
being lured into China’s BRI. The PRC has a substantial stake in the deepwater
Kyaukpyu port in Myanmar, identified by Chinese officials as one of several port
locations for military supply and industry. In 2015, China’s state media described
Kyaukpyu (Myanmar), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Colombo (Sri Lanka), Aden
(Yemen), and ports in the Maldives as potential industrial hubs to support PLA
military operations.112
While the facilities at Hambantota, Gwadar, and Kyaukpyu are not being used
yet by the PLA, Beijing’s militarization of its man-made South China Sea facilities
and the sudden prospect of a base in Vanuatu demonstrate how quickly dual-use
infrastructure could be turned to military logistic support. The vulnerability of
countries such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Vanuatu to Chinese debt traps associated with these infrastructure projects was highlighted recently by the International Monetary Fund director, who suggested how easily Beijing might tighten
the financial screws to obtain strategic access.113
Also of great concern, the Maldivian political crisis of 2013 exposed the PRC’s
willingness to deploy the PLAN to the Indian Ocean in support of China’s interests, as described by Vivek Mishra:
Even as the crisis was unfolding, Chinese ships sailed to the East Indian Ocean comprising a fleet of destroyers and at least one frigate, a 30,000-ton amphibious transport dock and three support tankers. The Chinese ships later returned to the South
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China Sea on the back of heavy Indian naval scrambling. The incident, however,
underscored the future importance of the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait, used
for entry to and departure from the Indian Ocean, for the Chinese Navy (PLAN) in
the event of a future maritime crisis in the Indian Ocean.114

Expanding Naval Interests in Africa
China has made naval and commercial shipping advances throughout Africa.
These advances accelerated after Xi Jinping’s high-profile 2015 announcement of
plans to invest sixty billion dollars in the continent. China has built or obtained
leases for ports in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti), East Africa (Tanzania), and
southern Africa on the Atlantic Ocean (Namibia).
Most widely reported was China’s July 2017 establishment of a military
logistics base in Djibouti. Here, China began its compromise of U.S. national
security by softening up the government of Djibouti by providing a six-hundredmillion-dollar port terminal for multipurpose use, a four-billion-dollar terminal
for liquefied natural gas exports, a six-hundred-million-dollar deal for two new
airports, and a four-billion-dollar railroad. Chinese officials claimed not to be
planning a military base for Djibouti—similar to the claims they have made
in Vanuatu. But then, in July 2017, China used the influence its commerce had
bought to open the Djibouti Logistics Support Base of the People’s Liberation
Army near Doraleh, Djibouti. Officials then claimed that “the Djibouti base has
nothing to do with an arms race or military expansion.”115
But the same month they opened the base, they were conducting live-fire
exercises using armor, including wheeled tank destroyers and fighting vehicles,
accompanied by infantry assault teams. These exercises had nothing to do with
logistics, antipiracy, or the United Nations; rather, they established a land fighting force in the Horn of Africa. The day after the exercises’ conclusion, Premier
Li Keqiang met the Djiboutian president “to foster economic cooperation and to
build a regional hub of trade and logistics,” according to China’s state media.116
Less than a year after the base opening in Djibouti, by early May 2018, there
had been several incidents involving high-power military laser attacks against
U.S. Air Force (USAF) pilots, a violation of U.S. federal law.117 Two pilots suffered
minor eye injuries from the lasers that emanated from either the Chinese base
at Djibouti or a Chinese naval vessel nearby. This is a tactic resurrected from
the Cold War, when the Soviet Union conducted similar attacks against USAF
pilots.118
In February 2018, the government of Djibouti also alienated the United States
and its allies by terminating the port leases of Dubai’s DP World for the Doraleh
Container Terminal (DCT). China already controlled two of five terminals at Djibouti’s seaport. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) chief since has expressed
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concern that the DCT, which supplies U.S., Japanese, Saudi, and French troops
in Djibouti, could be turned over to China, putting at risk naval supply chains
for the United States and its allies in the region, and possibly threatening USN
access and commercial FON in the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Camp Lemonnier in
Djibouti is the only USN base in Africa. Half the world’s containerized cargo and
four million barrels of oil a day pass by Djibouti.119
The same year—and in stark contrast to the lasing events—the PLAN’s hospital ship, Anwei (Peace Ark), made port calls throughout the entire rim of Africa,
which established important
local contacts and provided
Beijing has demonstrated that it has the
logistic experience and public
shipbuilding capacity, capabilities, untapped
productivity gains, and global requirements to relations benefits to China.
The PLAN mission lasted apsustain the transformational growth in Chinese naval construction and combat capability proximately a hundred days
and covered 13,000 nm. The
through 2030.
ship made port stops in Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, Angola, Mozambique,
and Tanzania.120
China’s naval presence already is progressing southward in East Africa. Tanzania is another illustration of China’s incremental insertion of its navy abroad.
In 2011, the PLAN and Tanzania showed an increasingly close relationship by
conducting joint naval training.121 China used World Bank funding to deepen
and strengthen the port of Dar es Salaam in June 2017, which was a double win
for China, as the PLAN’s largest warships then would be able to berth there and
a Chinese company won a $154 million contract for the rebuild.122
A three-ship PLAN surface action group (a destroyer, a guided-missile frigate, and a supply ship) visited Tanzania in August 2017.123 In November 2017,
China used its growing influence in Tanzania to agree to a new $10 billion port
contract for megaships (those carrying eight thousand twenty-foot equivalent
units [TEUs]) in Bagamoyo, about seventy-five miles from Dar es Salaam.124 The
high cost of the port relative to Tanzania’s small economy threatens to overwhelm
its ability to repay debt to China incurred from port-construction costs. The
port alone could add approximately 20 percent to Tanzania’s debt-to-GDP ratio,
putting it at risk of debilitating concessions in an insolvency crisis, as Sri Lanka
experienced.
In the 1960s, nationalist forces from Namibia visited Beijing to ask for guns
and money in their fight against apartheid. In 1990, when Namibia claimed
independence, China was one of the first to recognize the country diplomatically. With that military, economic, and diplomatic investment flowed a hundred
thousand Chinese immigrants into Namibia by 2016. Chinese corruption of local
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Namibian politicians has led to international suspicion about plans for a potential
PLA base on the Atlantic Ocean.125
In 2014, China Harbor Engineering Company began developing a $344 million shipping terminal in Walvis Bay, Namibia, on the South Atlantic Ocean.
Slated for completion in mid-2019, the terminal will have an artificial peninsula the size of forty baseball fields and two six-hundred-meter berths that
each can accommodate containerized cargo vessels of eight thousand TEUs,
for a total of 750,000 TEUs per year. The plan also includes a $400 million fuel
depot—and rumors of a naval base. At a ceremony for delivery of four ship-toshore cranes in February 2018, China’s ambassador to Namibia stated that with
their delivery, “Namibia’s port in the coastal town of Walvis Bay will become the
most brilliant pearl on the Atlantic Coast of southwest Africa.” He added, “It
can be said that this is the benchmark project for China-Namibia friendly and
pragmatic cooperation, which symbolizes the great attention of our leaders to our
relations and the brotherhood between our people.”126
This port is part of a larger Chinese presence in Namibia. Just forty-three
kilometers (km) north of Walvis Bay is Swakopmund, Namibia, which hosts a
Chinese telemetry station for tracking satellites and space missions. Chinese
construction companies are building a new military academy 324 km northeast
of Walvis Bay. China supplies weapons and training to the Namibian military,
including from Poly Technologies, which also supplies Iran, Syria, and North
Korea.127
About a hundred kilometers northeast of Walvis Bay is the Husab Uranium
Mine, the world’s second largest. China General Nuclear (CGN) owns 90 percent
of the mine, into which it has invested $4.6 billion since construction started in
2013; the Namibian government owns only 10 percent. The mine and a processing plant produce triuranium octoxide (U3O8), a yellowcake for both production
of nuclear energy and weapons manufacture. The mine alone is economically,
and therefore politically, important to the country, as it will increase Namibia’s
GDP by 5 percent, according to its own estimates. Almost all Husab’s yellowcake
production is planned for export to China out of the Walvis Bay port. CGN also
builds nuclear reactors in China for export, and has proposed one for Namibia.
CGN is trying to accelerate the manufacture and design of its nuclear reactor
components. Notably, one of its American consultants was convicted in 2017 for
conspiring to recruit U.S. nuclear engineers.128
By all accounts and indications, the PRC has selected Namibia as a strategic
location, so U.S. national security policy makers should expect the PLAN to
establish a naval base there in support of China’s global aspirations in the South
Atlantic. The next logical area for expansion after Africa and the South Atlantic
is in Europe and the North Atlantic.
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In 2017, China and Mauritius announced “a new strategic partnership” that
included port access and much more. Mauritius is a small island nation to the east
of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. Judging by its own description, the Mauritian government offered itself as a virtual shell country to China.
Minister Lutchmeenaraidoo emphasized that Chinese companies will be able to use
the free port facilities in Mauritius as a basis for adding value to their products and
re-export them under favorable conditions to [African] countries and can rely on
Mauritius’ membership of organisations such as COMESA [Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa], SADC [Southern African Development Community],
IOC [Indian Ocean Commission], and possibly the Tripartite Trade Zone (COMESA,
SADC, East African Community) to reach markets [in the] countries of Southern
Africa and East Africa, a huge market of some 650 million consumers.129

Mauritius is targeting countries such as Ghana, Senegal, and Madagascar for
special economic zones, which they are offering as a sweetener to Chinese investors for government-to-government agreements “as a very attractive possibility
to mobilise investments in these new economic poles.” In exchange, China apparently dangled the opportunity to use Mauritius as an all-Africa hub of investment
and for clearing Chinese currency.130 This dangling of “hub status” to countries
throughout the world is a common tactic of China’s negotiators.
China Approaching American Coasts
This article has noted China’s naval and maritime expansion in terms of both
ports and military basing in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian
Ocean.131 The examples illustrate that China’s ports are not really commercial
ports, as Americans understand the term, because they are unprofitable; their real
purpose is geopolitical and naval expansion.
Similarly, China’s merchant marine is not only a merchant marine but also an
arm of state power on the seas. China used its merchant marine in coordinated
fashion to evacuate Chinese citizens fleeing violence in Libya in 2011 and to
threaten Vietnamese boats in their own EEZ in the 2014 China National Offshore Oil Corporation oil rig incident. This state coordination of commercial
and military assets is a hallmark of China’s BRI—which is creeping ever closer to
American shores.
With the Terminal Link purchase of 2013, Chinese companies purchased 49
percent stakes in Houston Terminal Link, Texas, and South Florida Container
Terminal in Miami, Florida. But China’s maritime tendrils are not limited to
commercial ports.
China already has dispatched warships as far as Alaska. In 2015, the PLAN
made its first trip there, with five ships, apparently seeking to intimidate President Obama when he made the first visit of a sitting president to Arctic Alaska.
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Figure 3. PLAN Shift from “Zone” to “Man-to-Man” Coverage in South China Sea
FIGURE 3
PLAN SHIFT FROM “ZONE” TO “MAN-TO-MAN” COVERAGE IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

14

Locations of each event are approximations based on press reporting.

1.

USS Lassen (Oct. 2015)—FONOP Subi Reef

2.

Stennis Carrier Strike Group (Mar. 2016)—CSG
Ops SCS

3.

USS Curtis Wilbur (Jan. 2016)—FONOPs Triton
Island

4.

USS William P. Lawrence (May 2016)—FONOPs
Fiery Cross

5.

Stennis/Reagan CSGs (June/July 2016)—Dual
CSG Ops SCS

6.

USS Decatur (Oct. 2016)—FONOPs Triton Island

7.

Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group (Feb. 2017)—
CSG Ops SCS

8.

USS Stethem (Apr. 2017)—Routine Operations in
the SCS

9.

USS Dewey (May 2017)—FONOP Mischief Reef

10.

USS Stethem (July 2017)—FONOP Triton Island

11.

USS John S. McCain (Aug. 2017)—FONOP
Mischief Reef

12.

USS Chafee (Oct. 2017)—SBL FONOP Paracel
Island

13.

USS Hopper (Jan. 2018)—FONOP Scarborough
Shoal

14.

USS Mustin (Mar. 2018)—FONOP Mischief Reef

Notes: CSG = Carrier Strike Group, FONOP = freedom of navigation operation; SBL = straight baselines; SCS = South China Sea.

Source: Independent research by author, compiled from press reporting

Source: Independent research by author, compiled from press reporting.

The PLAN’s unexpected rendezvous with him should be seen as strategic messaging, as well as a probable (if spurious) basis for a potential claim on Arctic
resources in the future.132 In 2017, the PLAN again sailed to Alaska, on an apparently uninvited intelligence-gathering mission to monitor U.S. testing of the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile-defense system.
In both instances, PLAN warships operated well within the U.S. EEZ and reportedly near or within U.S. territorial waters. Ironically, as Chinese ships have begun
to operate routinely inside the U.S. and other nations’ EEZs, the PRC vociferously
complains whenever U.S. military ships operate within the South China Sea. As
outlined in figure 3, since October 2015 the PLAN has shadowed nearly every USN
warship that has entered and operated within the South China Sea, shifting from
a “zone” coverage to a “man-to-man” strategy. This shift provides more empirical proof of the PRC’s intent to use its military forces to achieve its strategic goals
through bullying and intimidation, despite assertions of peaceful development.
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Regarding the PRC’s Arctic interests that portend impacts on U.S. territory and
interests, in July 2017 the PRC and Russia agreed to “develop their cooperation on
arctic shipping routes, jointly building a silk road on ice.” And less than a year later
China’s State Council issued the country’s first Arctic white paper and continues
to negotiate the outlines of potential cooperation and collaboration with Russia.133
China is pushing its military well into the Pacific, including to Guam and
Hawaii, and into the Atlantic islands of the Azores. In 2017, the PLAN used
intelligence-gathering ships to shadow joint U.S.-Australia naval exercises off
the coast of Guam.134 China also has employed uninvited intelligence-gathering
ships to spy on the U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises off Hawaii
in 2012 and 2014.
In Brazil, China Merchant Port Holdings purchased a 90 percent stake in Brazil’s most profitable port, TCP Participações SA, for $924 million in 2017.135 In
Brazil’s state of Maranhão, Chinese companies laid foundation stones at the Port
of São Luís in March 2018. A Chinese company holds a 51 percent stake in the
$244 million port. The port will handle ten million tons of cargo, plus 1.8 million
cubic meters of oil products. China’s ambassador to Brazil and the governor of
Maranhão attended the ceremony for the BRI project.136
The PLAN is operating hydrographic research ships in the South Atlantic—a
harbinger of future PLAN submarine operations in the North Atlantic, which
could begin by 2025. While the U.S. air base in the Azores was home to the USAF
65th Air Base Wing and was critical to fighting World War II, the Cold War, and
the Iraq war, by 2015 U.S. personnel there had been reduced to only two hundred,
causing a cash crunch for locals—and providing a major strategic opportunity
for China’s military.137 China made moves to scout berthing in the Azores that
year. A Chinese naval and air base in the Azores would be a third of the way to
the U.S. East Coast from Portugal, providing PLAN ships and submarines and
PLAAF planes a strategic basing location to cover the East Coast of the continental United States.
FUTURE PRC NAVAL FORCE ESTIMATE
What, then, does this vast PLAN maritime mission mean for Chinese naval
construction over the next fifteen years? It means that in twelve years the PLAN
most likely will have twice as many warships and submarines as the U.S. Navy.
It means the PRC will be able to conduct successful naval missions on a scale
that, until recently, was deemed implausible by the most senior leaders of the
Intelligence Community. Beijing has demonstrated that it has the shipbuilding
capacity, capabilities, untapped productivity gains, and global requirements to
sustain the transformational growth in Chinese naval construction and combat
capability through 2030.
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EXHIBIT 1
PLAN 2015—CURRENT PLATFORM
INVENTORY
Platform

EXHIBIT 2
PLAN 2030—FORECAST PLATFORM
INVENTORY

Inventory

Platform

Inventory

Destroyers

26 (21 modern)

Destroyers

34

Frigates

52 (35 modern)

Frigates

68

Corvettes

20 (all modern)

Corvettes

26

Missile patrol craft

85 (60 modern)

Missile patrol craft

111

Amphibious ships

56

Amphibious ships

73

Mine-warfare ships

42 (30 modern)

Mine-warfare ships

55

Major auxiliaries

50+

Major auxiliaries

65+

Total surface combatants

331+

43

Total surface combatants

432+

SSNs

5

SSNs

12

SSBNs

4

SSBNs

12

SSs

57

SSs

75

Total submarines

66

Total submarines

99

Notes: SS = attack submarine, conventionally powered; SSBN = ballisticmissile submarine, nuclear-powered; SSN = attack submarine, nuclearpowered.

Notes: SS = attack submarine, conventionally powered; SSBN = ballisticmissile submarine, nuclear-powered; SSN = attack submarine, nuclearpowered.

Source: Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy.

Source: Author’s calculations based on multiple sources.

The ONI’s most recent study (exhibit 1) reports that the PLAN consists of
over 330 surface vessels and sixty-six submarines.138 Given the increasing PRC
shipbuilding capacity and capabilities outlined above, it is likely that by 2030 the
PLAN surface force could approach 450 hulls and ninety-nine total submarines
(exhibit 2), a growth rate of 30 percent and 50 percent, respectively, compared
with approximately 15 percent for overall 2000–15 PLAN growth.139 This expected force would satisfy the requirements for fleet expansion to meet Beijing’s
“goal of rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.”140
To achieve the China Dream, the PLAN of 2030 will not resemble the PLAN
of 2015. Rather, it will enjoy a global presence characterized by multiple strike
groups, a credible SLBM capability, and an ever-present network of ships at sea.
Thanks to the strength of its naval shipbuilding capacity and its commitment
to national rejuvenation, the PLAN will present an expansive and formidable
challenge—one the United States can ill afford to underestimate or ignore.
THE COMING DECADE OF CONCERN
In his March 2018 speech to the National People’s Congress, President Xi Jinping
stated as follows:
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Since modern times began, to realize the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation has
become the greatest dream of the Chinese nation. . . . With the spirit of fighting the
enemy to the last minute, the resolve of recovering the lost on the basis of selfreliance . . . the Chinese people have made continuous efforts for more than 170 years
to fulfill the great dreams. Today, we are closer, more confident, and more capable
141
than ever before in making the goal of national rejuvenation a reality.

As it relates to the restoration of China’s perceived territory President Xi made
this statement:
It is the shared aspiration of all Chinese people and in the fundamental interests of
the Chinese nation to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and realize China’s complete reunification. In front of the great national interests and the tide
of history, any actions and tricks to split China are doomed to fail. They are certain
to meet with the people’s condemnation and the punishment by the history [sic]. The
Chinese people have the resolve, the confidence, and the ability to defeat secessionist
attempts in any form! The Chinese people and the Chinese nation share a common
belief that it is never allowed and it is absolutely impossible to separate any inch of
territory of our great country from China!142

It is clear that President Xi and the CCP firmly believe that the PRC has not
yet reached national rejuvenation, and therefore they are on a timeline to achieve
this goal. President Xi stated that the CCP “has drawn up a splendid blueprint”
to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”143 And, as with most
blueprints, there is an element of time, which President Xi specifically references
in the following statement: “[A]lthough we have a long way to go, we are left with
limited time and not allowed to be slack. We must not be satisfied with the status
quo, indulge ourselves in ease and comfort, or let delight dispel worries.”144
Given Xi’s clearly articulated goal for the PRC’s great rejuvenation, which includes the restoration of its perceived territory, the obvious question is: How long
will the PRC wait? It is my assertion, on the basis of all available evidence, that
China desires to celebrate the complete restoration of the PRC by the hundredth
anniversary of its establishment, in 2049.
If so, the next logical question is: What will happen if Beijing is unable to
achieve complete restoration via nonviolent means? Or, to put it another way,
regarding such regional disputes as those over the Senkakus and the sovereignty
of Taiwan, what if Japan or Taiwan resists? How long will it be before the PRC’s
rulers believe they have to use military force to achieve their ultimate goal of
national restoration?
The answers to these questions also will help drive the PRC’s timelines for
establishing its global hegemony. The CCP will seek to ensure its uncontested
ability to dominate political, diplomatic, and military discourse globally, not only

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1

Winter2019Review.indb 44

50

12/4/18 11:13 AM

Naval War College: Winter 2019 Full Issue

FA N E L L

45

Figure 4: The Decade of Concern, 2020–30
FIGURE 4
THE DECADE OF CONCERN, 2020–30

We cannot wait forever for a political solution
to Taiwan. – PRC President Xi Jinping, October
2013, at APEC Forum

Source: Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.).

Source: Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.)
in support of its BRI, but also prior to using military force to settle the Senkakus
and Taiwan issues on its terms.
In my estimation, the answer is as early as 2020, but likely no later than 2030—
a period that I have labeled “the decade of concern” (see figure 4).
China very likely has calculated a timeline for when it could use military
force at the latest possible moment and still be able to conduct a grand ceremony
celebrating its national restoration in 2049. A likely template for calculating that
date would be the period from Tiananmen Square to the 2008 Olympics. China’s
leaders remember well that in 1989 the international community largely condemned Beijing’s brutal slaughtering of its own citizens at Tiananmen Square,
yet just nineteen years later the world’s leaders—including the president of the
United States—eagerly flocked to Beijing to attend the opening ceremony of the
2008 Olympic Games. That president later described the event as being “spectacular and successful.”145
What was the strategic message from this event? It reinforced a belief among
China’s leadership that the United States has a short attention span regarding the
use of force. In short, Beijing believes the West can be counted on to forget even
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the most barbarous actions after a roughly twenty-year time span. Given that
logic, the latest Beijing could use military force to restore China’s perceived territory physically would be around 2030. This would then allow for twenty years
of “peace” before Beijing would conduct a grand ceremony to memorialize the
“second 100”—the hundredth anniversary of the PRC. This again leads to the
question: When is the earliest China could use military power?
Given the current environment and readiness of the PLA, such use could start
at any time. However, as referenced earlier, intelligence analysis strongly indicates
that during the past decade the PLA has been given the strategic task of taking
Taiwan by force by 2020. If it is able to do that, it stands to reason that the lesser
task of seizing the Senkaku Islands also would be achievable.
With the decade of concern beginning in 2020, it is my estimation that there
will be mounting pressure within China to use military force to achieve the China
Dream of national restoration by 2049. There will be a loud chorus for the use of
force, which will grow each year and will crescendo in the late 2020s, ending in
a violent clash to seize Taiwan, the Senkakus, and any other area Beijing deems
to be a core interest.
In this decade of concern, an increasingly capable PLAN, as directed by a CCP
greatly emboldened by its power and the lack of resistance to its expansionist
global aspirations, will engage in operations in all the oceans of the world. It is
entirely foreseeable that these PLAN operations will include activities designed to
coerce, intimidate, and ultimately even defeat at sea the United States, our allies,
and our friends.
RECOMMENDATIONS
First and foremost, I believe there must be, as James Holmes recently wrote, a
fundamental transformation in the “culture” of how we deal with China, to one
that recognizes that country as the main threat to U.S. national security, principally because of the strategic trend line that will grant the PLAN the ability to
control the oceans of the world.146
Achieving this cultural change is a national issue, and the effort to do so is
being driven from the top. The new National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy call out the PRC for being a “revisionist power.” Standing
up to Beijing is not irresponsible or irrational, especially given that China’s actions are targeting the United States (and our fleet) despite President Xi’s pledge
that the PRC is devoted to a “community with a shared future for mankind” and
“mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation.”147
Second, the administration should declare unambiguously that U.S.-China
relations have entered a new period of competition, as stated in the NSS, and then
take the steps needed to compete. We must, of course, walk our talk. To this end,
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our strategic communications need to be strengthened greatly and organizations
need to be given specific authority and direction to fight and win on the information battlefield.
America must deal with the PRC now from a position of strength, one from
which we can assert our core interests and principles just as firmly as, if not more
firmly than, the PRC asserts its core interests and principles. This means no more
acquiescing to PRC demands; no more being quiet when the Chinese ignore the
rule of law, as they have done with regard to the July 12, 2016, PCA ruling; and
no more subordinating U.S. national interests to worries about whether we are
provoking China.
Beijing is using incremental strategies and political warfare very effectively to
gain maritime territory, and in the process to destroy the trust of our allies. Washington must be willing to confront Beijing’s bullying even at the risk of military
conflict, especially since Beijing purposefully fosters fear among the Western
academic China-watching community as a tool to manipulate us in our military,
economic, and diplomatic strategies. For instance, as part of our messaging, we
regularly—whenever we wish—should conduct carrier operations anywhere
within the first island chain. In fact, we should increase our presence, with the
adoption of a permanent 2.0 presence in the western Pacific.
Third, this new relationship also means recalibrating our one-China policy,
and very publicly highlighting the U.S. interpretation of the term—what it means
and what it does not mean. To this end, we have to refute, visibly and verbally,
the PRC’s constraints on our relationship with Taiwan. This means discarding
years of constraints our own bureaucrats have imposed. For example, the notion that U.S. warships cannot make the occasional port call in Taiwan needs to
be scrapped; nowhere is this self-defeating prohibition enshrined in any treaty,
agreement, or law. Therefore—after discussion with our friends in Taiwan—
we should make a port call, and we should do it without fanfare or advance
notification.
To disrupt Beijing’s strategic schedule, the United States must keep China
on its back foot, and that requires strategic unpredictability on our part. The
message to China is that freedom of navigation and free access to ports is a core
interest of the United States of America, and we are not going to be constrained
by Beijing’s threats.
Also to this end, we must end the practice of “unconstrained engagement”
by the Department of Defense. Encouragingly, the fiscal year 2019 National
Defense Authorization Act, signed on August 13, 2018, includes a specific policy
barring the PLAN from participating in any future RIMPAC exercises unless the
Secretary of Defense grants a waiver. This constitutes a direct response to China’s
decades of aggressive and expansionistic behavior in the South China Sea. The
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United States is making a clear statement that China’s bad behavior no longer will
be rewarded with such privileges; to do otherwise simply makes a mockery of our
foreign policy positions in Asia, if not around the globe.
Fourth, and closely aligned with the preceding, the administration must proclaim its commitment to a forward-deployed presence, especially for our naval
forces. Not only is this necessary for bolstering the flagging confidence of our
allies; it also sends a clear and unambiguous statement to China. Options can
range from homeporting a second carrier in the western Pacific (i.e., Guam) to
homeporting ships in South Korea.
This visible commitment
America must deal with the PRC now from a to for ward presence also
position of strength, one from which we can
means halting any further reassert our core interests and principles just as duction of U.S. Marine Corps
firmly as, if not more firmly than, the PRC as- forces in Asia. Every time we
serts its core interests and principles.
vacillate in defense of our forward presence we succumb to
the PRC’s PW strategy; in essence, we hand China a victory and perpetuate its
myth that China is in ascension and America in decline.
Fifth, the United States must commit to conducting more-robust and morepublic maritime intelligence operations. While much progress has been made in
improving our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in the
Indo-Pacific region, as reflected by the introduction of the P-8 aircraft, we concurrently have displayed a lack of will to expose the PRC’s aggressive actions in
the maritime domain. This requires the United States to get serious about its strategic communications, in terms of mission, organization, policy, and doctrine.
Why, for instance, during the inaugural deployment of China’s aircraft carrier
Liaoning, did the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, which conducted intelligence reconnaissance flights, fail to provide unclassified pictures of China’s inaugural carrier flight operations in the deep blue sea? This same reluctance characterized our
approach to China’s building of the seven new artificial islands. Why?
The sharing of facts about Chinese activities at sea is not only good for transparency in a democracy but is also smart military strategy, as it imposes reputational costs on the PRC for its military adventurism. Moreover, making such
information widely available would help to counter spurious Chinese narratives
of American actions as being the root cause of instability in the western Pacific.
Both outcomes are in our national interest.
However, we have no unified national policy to develop and execute strategic
communications in this era of competition, and there is no unity of effort. For
example, the funding allotted to the State Department for counter-PW operations has been diverted almost exclusively to countering Russian propaganda,
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with the seemingly conscious exclusion of countering PRC influence operations.
Further, as a rule, neither Department of Defense nor Department of State public
affairs practitioners study PRC influence operations and political warfare at the
Defense Information School or the Foreign Service Institute, as the leadership in
those organizations does not seem to understand the urgency of including such
training in the curriculum.
Sixth, we must return to naval nuclear-deterrence operations. The harsh reality is that China’s nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs, also known as
boomers) now can range all of the United States, including the capital. Given the
presumption that the PRC already has begun SSBN patrols and to mitigate the
risk of a sea-launched nuclear ballistic-missile attack against the United States,
the U.S. Navy must be able to hold at risk all adversarial nations’ patrolling
SSBNs, at all times. To hold at risk means that every time PLAN SSBNs depart
on strategic nuclear patrols, the U.S. Navy must follow them closely enough to be
ready to sink them if they ever attempt to launch nuclear-tipped intercontinental
ballistic missiles toward our shores. Chinese boomers are not so loud that if a
crisis began we would, with high certainty, be able to find them.
This leads to the seventh recommendation—and the proverbial elephant in
the room. All the above recommendations make it obvious that the U.S. Navy
must increase in size. Roger Wicker and Jerry Hendrix’s recent article entitled
“How to Make the U.S. Navy Great Again” states as follows:
From a naval perspective, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is
pursuing a mix of high-end and low-end ships and submarines. This strategy would
allow the PLAN to spread out across the vast Pacific Ocean in sufficient numbers to
locate and interdict U.S. ships. At the high end, China is investing in aircraft carriers,
nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines and large surface combatants equipped
with advanced radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and surface-to-surface
missiles. . . . Backed by a growing arsenal of longer-range and more sophisticated air
and missile weapons, the Chinese navy will have a highly capable and numerically
larger maritime force by the middle of the next decade. If this situation comes to fruition, it could make the projection of U.S. naval power cost prohibitive in the western
Pacific, undermining the credibility of our alliance commitments.148

Given my estimate that the future size of the PLAN will be about 550 warships
and submarines by 2030—twice the size of today’s U.S. Navy—it is clear the U.S.
Navy is at great risk of not being adequately sized or outfitted to meet American
national security commitments in the Indo-Pacific, let alone around the globe.
Therefore, to accomplish all the above missions, to provide a credible deterrent
against PRC hegemony, and to be able to fight and win wars at sea, the U.S.
Navy must get bigger. The evidence that a strategic gap between the U.S. Navy
and the PLAN is on the verge of exploding over the next decade and a half is
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overwhelming. Because of this gap, it seems clear to me that to keep even a modicum of parity with the Chinese the U.S. Navy will require more than 355 ships.
The bottom line is that America needs to get back to being a maritime power
supported militarily by strong allies—something that has been sorely neglected
since the fall of the Soviet Union. Without that accomplishment, expect China
to push us ever farther from Asia. Expect to lose more allies and influence across
the Indo-Pacific. And, ultimately, expect to be seen as globally irrelevant, with
all the negative consequences for our national security interests and the defense
of our values.
We already have slipped. If we fall any further, we may not recover.
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SHIPS OF STATE?
Christopher R. O’Dea

Our Ship of State, which recent storms have threatened to destroy, has
come safely to harbor at last.

B

CREON, IN SOPHOCLES’S ANTIGONE

acked by substantial financing and political support, China COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited (COSCO) emerged from the container shipping
industry’s recent turmoil with one of the largest fleets of commercial vessels in
the world and control of a rapidly expanding network of ports and terminals.
This article argues that this expansion is a new and distinctly Chinese approach
to maritime development and asks whether the state-owned shipping company
has become the flagship of China’s ambition to become a global maritime power.
Chinese maritime and logistics firms, supported by state-subsidized capital deployed overseas, quickly are becoming a leading edge of China’s global
influence. In recent years, Chinese state-owned
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that are controlled directly by the port’s parent company or indirectly through
companies associated with China’s strategic port owners through formal shipping alliances.
This commercial drive complements a well-documented naval expansion by
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) since at least the 1980s.1 The framework for Chinese naval policy in what China calls the “far seas”—the waters
beyond the “first island chain”—has been examined comprehensively.2 Models
of China’s potential basing requirements to support overseas naval operations
also have been assessed, as have the use and organization of Chinese maritime
law-enforcement resources.3
This article argues that the port and shipping transactions of the People’s
Republic of China are a major vector of a government policy to achieve global
maritime power and commensurate political influence without resorting to, or at
least while mitigating the risk of, a direct confrontation with the United States or
other nations with global maritime interests. The commercial-strategic linkages
and state support for Chinese port and shipping ventures resemble a twenty-firstcentury version of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) (Dutch East
India Company). Chinese SOEs are today, as the VOC was in its time, notionally
commercial enterprises that operate globally with the full financial and military
backing of their home state. In this view, the vessels that connect these ports into
an integrated network of commercial power are “ships of state,” functioning as
instruments of Chinese national strategy while they sail as commercial carriers
of manufactured goods and commodities.
China’s unique and assertive approach to maritime development has been described as the construction of military-relevant facilities rather than overtly military bases. As implemented in the “near seas,” the rapid construction of airfields
and harbors on reefs in the South China Sea has enabled China to assert effective
control over contested areas, in accordance with its idiosyncratic maritime-rights
doctrine. As Chinese strategists turn their attention to the far seas, Chinese stateowned companies are developing ports around the world that can accommodate
the very large containerships designed to create economies of scale in seaborne
transportation. These facilities offer China a larger, more reliable logistics network with potential military applications related to the protection of overseas
Chinese citizens and economic interests.4
The first part of this article examines the recent rapid increase in Chinese
port and shipping investments, focusing on transactions that COSCO has undertaken, in particular its acquisition of a controlling stake in a privatized port
entity in Piraeus, Greece. Achieved through a series of investments and privatization transactions carried out over nearly a decade, this has resulted in a Chinese
state-owned company—one that is viewed as the primary logistical supporter of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

Winter2019Review.indb 57

63

12/4/18 11:13 AM

58

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1

the Chinese navy—having the ability to exercise maritime-development powers
granted by the national government of an EU member state. This section also
includes a review of how China exercises state control or influence through the
agency of state-owned companies carrying out transactions and forming commercial alliances, as well as an assessment of the strategic implications of China’s
approach to building a maritime commercial network that appears to be aligned
with Chinese national security aims.
The second section of the article discusses key trends in the global shipping
and logistics business and how stresses in those sectors have given rise to conditions conducive to China’s acquisition campaign. The primary focus is on the
consolidation of global container shipping lines into the COSCO-dominated
Ocean Alliance and two competing container shipping alliances; this encompasses an examination of how Chinese regulators used the country’s antitrust law
to block a proposed alliance of Western shipping lines that could have challenged
China’s efforts to acquire and consolidate maritime power. This section continues with a look at how Chinese state financial entities fund the development of
China’s maritime network through strategic investments in non-Chinese companies and how Chinese state regulatory support of key transactions helps expand
the network and formalize links between Chinese state companies engaged in
the expansion campaign. A detailed analysis of the port, terminal, and shipping
activities of CMA CGM, a French shipping and terminal company based in Marseille, illustrates how Chinese state regulatory action and state financial support
played a role in CMA CGM becoming a member of the Ocean Alliance.
The global logistics industry is moving toward an integrated system in which
land-based terminals hold increased importance as exchange points between
ships and rail and road networks. In the emerging commercial shipping regime,
marked by excess capacity in container shipping and increasing competition
among ports for business from ever-larger containerships, it is essential for survival that companies control both shipping lines and well-equipped land terminals at suitably located port sites. This shift toward an integrated system favors
concentration of maritime commerce at certain large hub ports; automation at
every stage of the global supply chain; and, most importantly, control of the port
territory and port authorities that decide how to develop ports. Ports themselves
are potentially valuable, but the sector has become increasingly competitive
since the financial crisis, largely owing to the high cost of modernizing facilities
or building new terminals, and both institutional investors that own port assets
and port operators have sold numerous assets to Chinese entities, with a notable
acceleration of Chinese purchases around the world during 2017.
The third section raises several considerations arising from China’s progress so far and offers a perspective on the emerging risks to the open maritime
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domain posed by China’s state-backed investments in ports and shipping assets.
While there are clear signs of unease about Chinese expansion—magnified by
recent overt military action near one port—most resistance so far has been expressed through civil administrative channels; examples include allegations of tax
law violations and the raising of diplomatic concerns about the transparency of
Chinese purchases. The limited nature of these protests—focused as they are on
narrow, if important, topics—has left China able to pursue its maritime expansion without sustained opposition on a global basis.
CHINESE PORT AND SHIPPING INVESTMENTS
COSCO Spearheads Chinese Port-Investment Activity
While several Chinese SOEs are involved with overseas port and shipping development, COSCO has developed the most extensive involvement across the
industrial sectors that make up the modern supply chain, and thus it commands
all the building blocks of commercial maritime power. COSCO’s economic and
technological capabilities are commercial, but as an SOE it acts under the supervision and, to some degree, the direction of the Communist Party of China
(CPC). COSCO has been at the forefront of state-led efforts to expand the geographic range of China’s outbound investments in overseas ports and related
infrastructure, first under the Go Out policy, beginning early in the twenty-first
century, then continuing as China adopted economic policies that have become
more strategic and assertive in terms of implementation and more expansive in
terms of geographic scope. The One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative was announced in a series of speeches in September and October 2013 in which Chinese
president Xi Jinping described the initiative’s Silk Road Economic Belt across
Central Asia and the Maritime Silk Road across the Indian Ocean. The Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) superseded OBOR during 2016 as China steered away from
using the word “one” to describe an international economic policy that it claimed
was intended to generate benefits not only for China but also for the countries
that received funding from Chinese state entities or the lending institutions
and investment funds that were established to finance BRI projects.5 There is
no agreed-upon definition of what qualifies as a BRI project.6 While this article
will use the BRI moniker to refer to China’s approach to international economic,
regulatory, and financial matters, its primary focus is to describe the pattern of
Chinese investment in commercial seaports and related logistics, transportation,
and electric-power assets, and to assess the practical diplomatic and security
implications of China’s development of a global port network.
While COSCO has received increasing Western media coverage since it gained
formal control of the Greek port of Piraeus in 2016, one of the predecessor companies that was merged to form COSCO began to operate a terminal in Piraeus in
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2009, far predating China’s adoption of the BRI. The company enjoys significant
direct financial support from Chinese state financial institutions, including the
China Development Bank.
COSCO’s current competitive strength in the global shipping and port business
stems in part from Chinese antitrust regulators’ actions that prevented competing
shipping lines from forming an alliance during the depths of the container shipping crisis of the past several years, a prohibition that underscored the unique
nature of merger review in China and the importance of national industrial policy
in decisions pertaining to the competitive position of Chinese SOEs.7 That intervention into the structure of the global container-shipping industry—ostensibly
justified by the desire to maintain competition on the ocean trade routes between
Southeast Asia and Europe—contributed significantly to creating the conditions
in which COSCO has been able to emerge as the leading company in a commercial shipping alliance that now controls the majority of those routes.
Excess capacity and long-term declining revenue in the container-shipping
and terminal industries have created market conditions in which Chinese firms
or Chinese-backed entities, supported by centrally allocated credit from China’s
state financial institutions, can acquire assets from owners unwilling or unable
to make the substantial capital investments required to modernize port facilities.
During the last ten years, capacity growth in container shipping has outstripped
demand growth except for 2010–11 and 2016, when low net-capacity growth
resulted from the scrapping of older ships and delayed deliveries; in addition,
the proportion of the global container fleet that was idle was high, at 7 percent
at the end of 2016. The resulting shift toward larger vessels to gain economies of
scale has created financial pressure on ports to upgrade facilities to accommodate
megaships so as to remain viable as stops on primary shipping routes. While
container transport volume is forecast to grow in line with global gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rates in the short to medium term, container volume grew
at twice the rate of GDP from 2007 to 2016, so excess capacity is likely to remain a
negative factor for port and shipping revenue.8 This has presented Chinese SOEs
with an opportunity to create one of the most extensive maritime networks in
the world, by acquiring strategically located port assets, providing the capital to
build or upgrade commercial terminals, and then directing container traffic to
those ports through shipping lines that are controlled directly by the port’s parent
company or indirectly through companies associated with Chinese port owners
through formal shipping alliances.
During the past three years, Chinese firms and Chinese-financed entities have
increased dramatically the amount of capital deployed to acquire or invest in port
assets. One investment bank that tracks Chinese state investments found that
during the year that ended in June 2017 Chinese companies announced plans to
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expend $20.1 billion buying or investing in nine overseas ports, representing a
steep increase from the estimated $9.97 billion that Chinese entities invested in
foreign port projects during the year that ended in June 2016. These assets have
included port-operating concessions, actual seaports, and container and other
cargo terminals. The importance of the maritime route from China across the
Indian Ocean and on to the Mediterranean shows clearly in the newly announced
investments.9 Among several Chinese SOEs involved in this activity, the primary
actor is COSCO, which has undertaken some of the most strategically important acquisitions of port authorities, shipping lines, and related assets along the
Asia–EU route, including transactions that have transformed the port of Piraeus
in Greece from a struggling cruise port into a major containerport now serving
as the western terminus of China’s Maritime Silk Road.
The purpose of each of these transactions is couched in the optimistic nomenclature of win-win economic development and bilateral friendship typically employed to describe projects under the BRI. However, the speed and scope of the
acquisition campaign, combined with the centralization of control in a handful
of SOEs and allied non-Chinese companies, raise fundamental questions about
the nature and purpose of the network China is building.
It is important to note at the outset that the commercial maritime campaign
that COSCO and other Chinese SOEs are undertaking is distinguishable from the
BRI. While announcements of Chinese overseas investments now routinely recite how any given project will advance the aims of the BRI, the funding of SOEs
involved in the establishment of the global port and shipping network increasingly is coming from China’s main long-term development banks rather than the
institutions that have been set up to evaluate and finance infrastructure projects
under the BRI. While pricing information about most transactions is opaque, in
some cases shipping consultants have questioned the high valuations at which
COSCO has acquired certain assets, suggesting that obtaining those assets is a
matter of achieving strategic national security goals rather than a financial investment that will be required to deliver market-based returns. The sustained nature
of the port-buying campaign, coupled with extensive cooperation agreements
between COSCO and other Chinese SOEs in port and rail construction, auto
manufacturing, and port operation, suggests that the initial objective of building
a global port network under Chinese control is to secure commercial sites that
will afford China a reliable system for transporting Chinese imports and exports.
However, the simultaneous investment in power-generation and -transmission
assets, inland transportation routes, and telecommunications infrastructure
in port host countries—the financing of which creates economic influence for
China—suggests that the expanding Chinese commercial maritime network is
the foundation for future deployment of the country’s naval forces.
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Since the National Development and Reform Commission formalized the BRI
in an action plan in March 2015, the policy has evolved. It has been stretched
to accommodate new geographic regions beyond the original Indo-Pacific and
Central Asian areas, as well as projects that were initiated under other development programs.10 Most importantly, the Nineteenth National Congress of
the CPC in October 2017 amended the party’s constitution to make the BRI
a national objective, a move that constitutes a “Chinese state strategy” in the
making, in which top-down directives of the CPC would exert more pressure
on Chinese banks, state-owned companies, private companies, and business operators to make investments abroad in a manner that reflects Beijing’s strategic
objectives.11 Official Chinese policy documents and analyses of China’s maritime
infrastructure investments in the Indo-Pacific region from state- and CPCaffiliated publications indicate that Chinese analysts routinely prioritize China’s
national security interests over the objective of mutually beneficial economic
development—contradicting ostensible Chinese policy. Chinese analysts argue
that the BRI’s Maritime Silk Road component can help ensure Beijing’s access
to vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and they view port investments
as vehicles by which China can cultivate political influence to constrain recipient countries and build dual-use infrastructure to facilitate Beijing’s long-range
naval operations. Similarly, the behavior of Chinese companies involved in port
projects indicates that these investments are not driven principally by the concept
of win-win development—as Beijing claims—but rather that the investments
appear to be calibrated to generate political influence, stealthily expand China’s
capability to project and sustain military presence, and create advantageous
strategic environments for China in the various regions where port and logistics
investments are undertaken.12
This article does not attempt to evaluate whether any given project meets the
elastic criteria of the BRI, but instead will look at the actual pattern of transactions globally that Chinese SOEs have undertaken to acquire assets in the port,
shipping, terminal, and related businesses and the current available evidence of
how those assets are being managed, then pose the following practical strategic
question: What kind of network do these assets constitute?
Strategic Considerations with Respect to Chinese Shipping and
Port Investments
Available evidence suggests that the network China is building could form the basis for a pattern of commercial maritime influence—and potentially a global trading system—very different from the one that has prevailed since the end of World
War II, and from which China benefited as it industrialized over that time. These
transactions, collectively, reflect a distinct Chinese model of acquiring power
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through maritime commercial investment centered on ports—a model that seeks
to mitigate China’s historic strategic transportation vulnerabilities, project Chinese influence into economic and maritime realms now almost exclusively under
U.S. control, and influence host countries to support Chinese interests. Already,
one port host country has blocked EU criticism of China’s human rights record at
a United Nations body, suggesting that China can influence the position of a nation in which COSCO, China’s primary state-owned shipping company, has made
major investments.13 COSCO also has taken steps to move to China some board
meetings and decision-making for recently acquired assets domiciled in the EU.
These developments illustrate the strategic nature of China’s campaign of
investment in ports and shipping. As detailed below, this has included gaining
meaningful quasi-governmental power over port development in other nations.
This campaign seems designed not only to help Chinese state-owned companies
survive the ongoing stress in the global shipping and construction industries
by managing excess shipping capacity but also to disadvantage competitors. In
critical cases, China has increased pressure on companies that compete with its
state-owned shipping and port entities by using Chinese regulatory power to prevent competitors from taking actions to rationalize their cargo-carrying capacity.
Chinese government lenders also have provided capital to certain competitors to
finance major purchases from Chinese shipyards. In effect, China is extending
commercial influence from its factory regions, where products are made, outward through the global supply chain that delivers those products. In terms of
building influence in a world highly dependent on global trade, having control
or significant influence over the facilities required for the distribution of goods
produced in China affords Chinese companies more leverage than they would
obtain if they controlled only ocean transport and shipping costs.
The use of alliances as a method of achieving influence in the shipping industry is notable. Since being formed from two predecessor state-owned shipping
companies, COSCO has become the dominant line in one of the three containershipping alliances that have formed to cope with the decline in container volume
since the financial crisis of 2008. Alliances are a hallmark of a maritime approach
to grand strategy, typically being one part of a multilateral approach in which
trade is conducted among voluntary members under a uniform set of rules that
apply to relations among all members.14 While most of China’s agreements to
acquire or develop ports are concluded on a bilateral basis rather than under
general rule sets, China has adopted an alliance approach in the port sector—for
example, with the organization in 2016 of the China-Malaysia Port Alliance, an
effort to consolidate Malaysian logistics capabilities into a regional hub. The alliance, which encompasses twenty-one ports, includes Malacca, where China is
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investing ten billion dollars to build a deep-sea port that is expected to surpass
Singapore and become the largest in the region when it is completed in 2025.15
For China, the SOE-led port-expansion campaign provides strategic capabilities that help mitigate the dependence of the country’s economy on global shipping that transports manufactured export goods and raw-material and energy
imports through a few narrow maritime passages such as the Strait of Malacca,
the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Suez Canal. Given that most
sea-lanes ultimately remain largely under U.S. control, the sea has become an
important realm of global competition between the United States and China, yet
China lacks the capacity to ensure the security of its essential interests, such as
oil-shipping routes across the Indian Ocean. This means that China’s overseas
supply chain long has been exposed to security threats, in particular strategic
threats from Western countries, a situation that poses a threat to the Chinese
national economy and constitutes a strategic weakness that cannot be ignored.16
China’s navy is expected to defend major SLOCs against disruption at critical
choke points, but SLOC protection requires the ability to sustain maritime presence in strategic locations in hostile conditions for extended periods. China’s
concern about SLOC protection has expanded in step with the expansion of the
country’s economic connections, generating increased discussion of the potential
for overseas naval bases.17 The need for a port network under Chinese control to
mitigate these risks has been recognized. It recently was linked to the concept of
a Maritime Silk Road by Liu Cigui, former director of the State Oceanic Administration. Liu has written that port facilities are the foundation of sea-lane security,
requiring China to establish sea posts to support and resupply ships traveling and
securing ocean routes, by either building or leasing facilities.18
An Emerging Chinese Model of Twenty-First-Century
Port Development and Control
The pattern of investments constitutes a new and distinctly Chinese approach to
maritime development. The emerging Chinese model encompasses developing
dock and terminal facilities, securing control of port-investment and -development
decisions, integrating terminals with shipping assets under direct or allied Chinese control, enhancing or constructing land-based transportation routes, and
achieving economic and political influence within host countries. The decision
to pursue this model never was declared or announced; instead, awareness of
it emerged after a series of transactions occurred. While each transaction attracted routine coverage by shipping and financial media, the progression of
COSCO’s involvement with Piraeus Port—from terminal operator to controlling
shareholder of the publicly traded port-operating company—only recently has
engendered detailed academic and policy analysis. A recent analysis of COSCO’s
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situation in Piraeus concludes that it constitutes a new “Greek prototype” of port
governance that “implies the losing of any public sector power to intervene in
what is the institution responsible for the oversight of strategy and the development of modern ports”—that is, a port authority.19
COSCO itself was formed by the $8.7 billion merger of two state-owned
Chinese shipping conglomerates, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company
(COSCO), and China Shipping (Group) Company. Chinese regulators approved
the merger in December 2015 and it became effective in February 2016. The deal
spanned almost every aspect of the shipping and maritime industries, including
containerships, dry-bulk ships, tankers, liquefied natural gas (LNG) ships, and
other specialized vessels; shipyards and ports; and leasing, finance, insurance,
and other shipping services. Requiring seventy-four transactions to combine
subsidiaries of the two companies, the merger was one of the most complex in the
recent history of China’s capital markets.20 Postmerger, the overall group is known
as China COSCO Shipping Corporation Ltd. It is headed by Xu Lirong, chairman
of the board and party secretary of China COSCO Shipping, who previously was
chairman of the board and party secretary of China Shipping (Group) Company.
Wan Min, previously managing director of COSCO Container Lines Ltd. and
president of COSCO Americas Inc., led the merger transaction and then served
as a director of the board, president, and deputy party secretary of the combined
company, referred to herein as COSCO.21
In summary, the principal direct transactions of COSCO or its predecessor
companies since 2008 include the following:
• Establishment of the Piraeus container terminal at Piraeus Port in 2009
• Acquisition of a controlling stake in Piraeus Port Authority SA in 2016
• Acquisition of a 40 percent stake in a joint venture with AMT Terminals to
build and manage a new terminal at Vado Port in Vado, Italy, in 2016
• Acquisition of a 35 percent stake in the Port of Rotterdam’s Euromax terminal, an automated container terminal that began operating in 2010, for $143
million
• Acquisition of a 15 percent stake in Shanghai International Port Group
(SIPG), which is controlled by its majority owner, the State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC),
in 2017
• Acquisition of a 51 percent stake in Noatum Port Holdings SLU (NPH) in
Valencia, Spain, from a fund managed by JP Morgan Asset Management in
2017
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• Acquisition of the entire equity capital stock of Orient Overseas International Ltd. (OOIL) of Hong Kong, in a joint purchase undertaken with SIPG
in 2017
• Acquisition in September 2017, for $42 million, of the 76 percent it did not
own already of the APM Terminals Zeebrugge container terminal, with a
capacity of one million twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEUs), in Belgium’s
second-busiest port; it previously was owned by a unit of Maersk Group, a
COSCO competitor
While these are not the only transactions COSCO has undertaken recently,
they are the investments that, taken together, embody COSCO’s expansion strategy in the Mediterranean region, which is the most advanced in terms of the
scope of assets acquired and the control of decision-making achieved. Chinese
SOEs or allied entities have made similar investments elsewhere, including the
following: in Brazil, a hydroelectric plant, and elsewhere in Latin America, a key
terminal and a shipping line; in Singapore, a major shipping line and container
terminal operator; in Sri Lanka, a major port; and in the United Arab Emirates,
terminal facilities.
This type of expansion has progressed furthest in Greece. In 2014, Chinese
premier Li Keqiang visited Piraeus, home of the country’s largest port. He stated
that China would be a “long term” investor to build the port into “a gateway of
China to Europe.” By June 2016, COSCO had gained control of the Piraeus Port
Authority SA (PPA), the publicly listed company that the Greek state created
to oversee the Port of Piraeus. Although Greece is an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development country, COSCO achieved this objective
through the use of techniques typically employed in port transactions in developing countries. The success of this approach reflects the weak state of the Greek
economy and the disarray and lack of clarity in the governance of Greek port assets, despite the Greek government’s twenty-year effort to improve the efficiency
of the country’s ports.22
In 2016, COSCO was the only one of six parties to submit a bid in the final
stage to acquire 67 percent of the shares of PPA; the Greek parliament approved
the purchase in July 2016. This gave COSCO control of a public company listed
on the Athens stock exchange in 2003 as part of Greece’s decades-long effort
to revitalize its seaports. (The Greek state retained 74.14 percent of the shares
of PPA at the time of the stock exchange listing.) The most valuable asset from
PPA is a contract from the Greek state to operate Piraeus Port for forty years in
exchange for an annual concession fee of 2 percent of the port’s gross revenue.
Greece granted the contract to PPA in 2001 when it created corporatized, stateowned port companies to develop Piraeus and Thessaloníki.23
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The 2016 sale constituted a “master concession” form of privatization of the
state-owned port company; it enabled the private investor, COSCO, to act as
owner, regulator, manager, and operator of the entire port. Although in this
model ownership of the land is not transferred and the state retains the right to
terminate the concession (under certain conditions), the private concessionaire’s
discretion effectively supplants public control over the port. Master-concession
privatizations usually are found only in developing countries, and thus are rare
for European ports.24 Greece opted to grant a master concession because of the
severity of the economic problems facing the country in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis. COSCO offered €368.5 million, with €280.5 million payable immediately for a controlling 51 percent stake in PPA, and another €88 million for
the remaining 16 percent of the shares, to be deposited in an escrow account. The
additional shares are to be transferred when COSCO completes the €350 million
in investments it has committed to make within a decade, with the majority to
be spent on improving infrastructure for cruise ships and passengers and €55
million on upgrading ship-repair facilities at the port.25 On completion of the
transaction, the Greek state will retain approximately 8 percent of the equity in
PPA, with private investors composing the remaining shareholders.26
The acquisition of the stake in PPA consolidated COSCO’s control over a port
in which it had been investing since 2009. In 2009, Piraeus Container Terminal
SA (PCT), a subsidiary of a COSCO predecessor company, won a contract to
operate PCT Pier II and to build and operate a new section of the port, Pier III.
Volume at the Piraeus container terminals under COSCO’s management has
increased significantly. Even as Greek GDP fell by 25 percent from 2010 to 2015,
Piraeus Port overall became the eighth-largest containerport in the EU, whereas
previously it had not been among the EU’s fifteen largest. The increase stemmed
almost entirely from COSCO’s PCT operations. In 2010, PCT held a market
share of 45.3 percent of Greek container volume; PPA, the remaining publicly
operated terminal pier at Piraeus, held a 34 percent share; and Thessaloníki Port
held an 18.1 percent share. Five years later, in 2015, the PCT market share had
nearly doubled, to 81.5 percent, while the PPA and Thessaloníki shares decreased
to single digits (7.9 and 9.4 percent, respectively). The increase was attributable
mainly to transshipment traffic—that is, movement of goods through the port
terminals on the way to destinations in the EU via state-owned rail systems that
were completed subsequent to COSCO’s assumption of operating the PCT assets. This transshipment traffic represented business from multinationals such
as Hewlett-Packard that signed contracts with PCT to transfer containerized
intermediate products to distribution and assembly centers in the EU.27
Subsequent to the approval of its acquisition of the PPA stake, COSCO has
continued to assert control over Piraeus Port, leading in one instance to a conflict
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between COSCO and the Greek state over governance of the port company. At
the annual meeting of PPA in July 2017, the Greek state fund holding a 23.14
percent stake in the company opposed COSCO’s proposal to amend an article
of the company’s charter so as to include continental China and Hong Kong
among permitted locations for PPA board meetings. According to Greek business media reports, the Greek state requested the meeting be extended to allow
Greek state legal counsel to examine concerns that holding board meetings in
China might constitute a de facto change of the company’s domicile. The Greek
state ultimately voted against the amendment, but the change was made; COSCO
controls a majority of the company, and major Greek and foreign institutional
investors with stakes in PPA voted in favor of the change. A total of 82.8 percent
of shares were represented at the meeting, and of those represented, 62 percent—
including those held by shareholders such as Lansdowne Partners and BlackRock, and Greek fund-management companies Delos and Alpha Trust—voted to
include China and Hong Kong among possible board meeting locations. Greek
media reports indicate that the state is continuing to study the matter to clarify
which country’s legal system would prevail over decisions made in China or
Hong Kong.28
The conflict over governance of Piraeus Port came shortly after other actions
suggesting that COSCO plans to exert strong control over key assets in its expanding maritime network. Shortly after acquiring a shareholding stake in SIPG,
COSCO in June 2017 announced two agreements involving COSCO, PPA, and
the Port of Shanghai, intended to increase the volume of container traffic from
China to the EU. COSCO chairman Xu and SIPG chairman Chen Xuyuan traveled to Piraeus to execute the agreements. The shipping and port executives were
accompanied by a CPC delegation led by Han Zheng, a member of the Political
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee. Politically, the framework agreement and memorandum of
understanding (MOU) between COSCO and SIPG underscore the significance of
Piraeus in China’s strategic maritime network and the willingness of China’s top
leadership to develop the Greek location. In COSCO’s announcement of the new
arrangements, Han said the pact was responsive to the instructions of President
Xi Jinping to make Piraeus a key component of the BRI by building the port into
the largest site in the Mediterranean for the integrated shipping of containers
through land and sea transport routes. The announcement pledged that the CPC
Shanghai Municipal Committee and the Shanghai municipal government would
support the development of COSCO “so that this SOE can make full use of its
advantages and better serve and implement national strategies.”29 Illustrating the
importance of the commercial maritime network to China’s national strategy,
Han was named one of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee
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of the CPC at the Nineteenth National Congress of the CPC in October 2017, and
in March 2018 was appointed executive vice-premier of the State Council, a role
that is likely to include oversight of the National Development and Reform Commission, the agency responsible for China’s long-term economic-development
strategy and industrial policy.30 The economic aspects of the agreement between
PPA and SIPG concentrate on cooperation on funding, port building, training,
and technical assistance; this agreement also contemplates consolidation of joint
planning for promotion campaigns aimed at increasing the use of the two ports
to raise use of their cargo-handling facilities, including by jointly negotiating with
shipping companies to increase traffic on regular routes between Piraeus and
Shanghai.31 Also in June, COSCO signed separate agreements with the Shanghai
municipal government aimed at increasing COSCO’s involvement in building
out Shanghai’s shipping and logistics capabilities, expanding construction of
ports and logistics terminals in foreign countries targeted for connection to the
Yangtze River Economic Belt, and continuing the reform of SOEs and assets by
encouraging linkages among port and shipping companies. Demonstrating one
aspect of the connectivity for which the BRI calls, the PLAN’s Naval Task Group
150, consisting of the missile destroyer Changchun, missile frigate Jingzhou, and
supply vessel Chaohu, made a four-day visit to Piraeus in July, just weeks before
the deployment of PLAN sailors to China’s port in Djibouti removed any doubt
about whether China intended to use the African facility as a military base.32
TRENDS IN GLOBAL SHIPPING
Foundations of Global Container-Shipping Alliances
COSCO’s announcements have made increasingly clear the company’s intent to
exercise control over its investments in port properties by using the economic
leverage that the company’s alliances provide. In announcing its controlling
investment in the Spanish port company NPH, COSCO cited the now-standard
claim that the acquisition was partly a measure to implement the BRI, but added
that the transaction marked significant progress toward the group’s further improving its overseas port network; strengthening the control and management of
its ports and terminals; and, more importantly, bringing into full play the synergies between the group’s port assets and the container fleet of China COSCO
Shipping Corporation, which it identified as “the ultimate controlling” entity of
COSCO Shipping Ports Limited, and the Ocean Alliance.33 As COSCO Shipping
Ports became the controlling shareholder of NPH, the company announced that
it would “further optimize its presence in Europe and rest of the world,” and
after completion of the transaction, COSCO stated, Noatum’s ports in Valencia
and Bilbao would “enjoy business support from the Ocean Alliance, including
COSCO Shipping Lines.”34
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The Ocean Alliance is one of three consortia that major shipping lines formed
in 2016 in response to the decline in container traffic and shipping rates following the 2008 financial crisis. The alliances became operational in April 2017.35
The Ocean Alliance is made up of COSCO; CMA CGM SA of France; Evergreen
Line of Taiwan; and Orient Overseas Container Line, based in Hong Kong. The
other two alliances are the 2M Alliance, made up of the Danish Maersk Line and
Switzerland-based MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA; and THE Alliance,
made up of the German line Hapag-Lloyd, the Taiwanese line Yang Ming, and
three Japanese companies—Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Nippon Yusen Kaisha Line, and
the K Line. THE Alliance was to have included Hanjin Shipping before the bankruptcy and demise of that South Korean carrier.
An analysis of the new alliances by shipping industry consultancy Drewry
shows that the Ocean Alliance emerged as the winner of the industry reshuffling,
with its members having a total of forty loops spread across seven east–west trade
routes; THE Alliance has thirty-two services and 2M has twenty-five. Each alliance also has a standing lineup of port calls, voyage frequency, and speed. The
primary basis of the Ocean Alliance’s commanding position is its seven services
offered from Asia to the Middle East and the Red Sea; THE Alliance offers only
one and 2M offers none on that route. A similar situation holds for service from
Asia to the west coast of North America: the Ocean Alliance offers thirteen,
THE Alliance eleven, and 2M just five. In the eastern Mediterranean, the three
alliances make forty-two port calls across nineteen ports, with most receiving
just one or two; Piraeus is the busiest, with seven calls. Valencia, in Spain, where
COSCO recently acquired control of the port authority, is served most frequently
of the thirteen ports receiving alliance ships in the western Mediterranean, receiving ten weekly calls from alliance ships. In total, the Ocean Alliance plans to
deploy about 350 container vessels, with an estimated total capacity of 3.5 million
TEUs.36
The business and maritime media portray the process that gave rise to these
three configurations of the world’s largest shipping companies as an organic one,
but this elides the significant part that Chinese antitrust regulators played in
determining which shipping lines could cooperate with each other, and thereby
the memberships of the shipping alliances that went into effect in 2017. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in 2014 applied the Anti-Monopoly
Law (AML) adopted in 2008 to block the proposed formation of an alliance
(known as P3) of Maersk Line, MSC Mediterranean Shipping, and CMA CGM,
on the grounds that by going beyond the scope of vessel-sharing arrangements
common in the industry the proposed alliance would enhance significantly the
market power of the members and have an anticompetitive effect on shipping
routes from Asia to Europe.37 The MOFCOM action spawned intensive analysis
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of Chinese competition law and the allocation of powers among MOFCOM, the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. The Chinese AML requires MOFCOM
to take industrial policy concerns into account when exercising supervision of
mergers and business combinations, and, although industrial policy alone was
not the motivation for MOFCOM’s decision, legal experts view MOFCOM’s prohibition as a striking example of China’s application of the law, meriting a place
on the top-ten list of major events in the global shipping industry; it was one of
only two proposed transactions that the agency had blocked as of September
2016, underscoring that national economic concerns played an important role
in the decision.38 China’s attention to the potential competitive impact of the
proposed shipping alliance on Chinese entities reflects the country’s policy of
“industrial capacity cooperation.” The NDRC has held press briefings to promote
the export of Chinese industrial capacity, equipment, technology, and standards
as an element of BRI agreements, extending a diplomatic concept that Premier Li
introduced in 2015 as an element of SOE reforms.39
A French Connection Bolsters COSCO’s Shipping Alliance
China’s prohibition of the P3 alliance surprised the participants and the shipping
industry.40 But the decision only delayed the consolidation of the containershipping industry; the latest major step in that process came with the formation
late in 2016 of three shipping alliances aimed at better managing excess container
capacity, a problem exacerbated by the bankruptcy of the South Korean line
Hanjin. China COSCO Shipping became the dominant company in the Ocean
Alliance, which notably includes France’s CMA CGM, previously a proposed
member of the scuttled P3 group.
The current CMA CGM was formed from Compagnie Maritime d’Affrètement
(CMA), founded in 1978 by French shipping entrepreneur Jacques Saadé, and
Compagnie Générale Maritime (CGM), a French state-owned company that the
French state privatized in 1996 by awarding operation of CGM to CMA. The two
companies formally merged in 1999.
CMA CGM has operated in China since it opened an office in Shanghai in
1992.41 The company’s ties to China have broadened and deepened over the past
several years. In 2013, as part of an effort to restructure its debt, CMA CGM sold
49 percent of its container terminal subsidiary Terminal Link to China Merchants
Holdings International for €400 million.42 Competitive pressures on global shippers increased, as reflected in the unsuccessful attempt to form the P3 alliance in
2014. The linkage between China and CMA CGM deepened in 2015 when the
Export-Import Bank of China (CEXIM) agreed to provide CMA CGM with up
to a billion dollars in loans or export credit insurance to finance the company’s
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future purchases of vessels and containers from Chinese suppliers. Historically,
CMA CGM had ordered most of its containers from the Chinese group CIMC,
and in 2015 it began to take delivery from Chinese shipyards of some of the
world’s largest containerships, starting with three 18,000-TEU vessels, which at
the time were the largest ever built by Chinese shipyards. Simultaneously with
receiving the CEXIM financing, CMA CGM entered into a strategic partnership
agreement with China Merchants Holdings to evaluate infrastructure and portrelated logistics projects jointly. A public event to mark the agreements, held
at CMA CGM’s headquarters in the French port city of Marseille, included the
attendance of Chinese premier Li Keqiang in an official capacity to meet with
France’s then–foreign minister Laurent Fabius. At the time, CMA CGM claimed
to be the first company to sign an agreement with a Chinese company to pursue
investments under the BRI.43
The collaboration between CMA CGM and Chinese companies has increased
and broadened since 2015, in shipbuilding, terminal operations, and port investment. In the third quarter of 2017, CMA CGM signed a letter of intent with
two Chinese shipyards (Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard and Shanghai Waigaoqiao
Shipbuilding) to build nine 22,000-TEU containerships, the largest vessels to
date. South Korea’s three large shipbuilders—Hyundai Heavy Industries, Samsung Heavy Industries, and Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering—also
bid for the $1.44 billion contract. The decision evoked considerable surprise in
the shipbuilding industry because South Korean companies previously had built
most large containerships, and CMA CGM’s awarding of the order indicated that
China was making substantial progress at building ultralarge container vessels
with the latest navigation, communication, and environmental- and energymanagement capabilities. Shipbuilders are suffering a prolonged decline in new
orders, leading to the closure of many yards. Shipping analysts consider the new
ships that CMA CGM has ordered to be high value–added vessels. They will have
dual-propulsion systems that can operate on either LNG or fuel oil and will meet
stricter international regulations on emissions, indicating to sources in the shipbuilding industry that Chinese shipyards’ technology and price competitiveness
have caught up to or surpassed those of South Korean shipyards.44
In January 2017, CMA CGM’s terminal unit, CMA Terminals Holdings,
signed an MOU with COSCO Shipping Ports in which each company committed
to increase businesses and services at ports and terminals where Ocean Alliance
vessels make port calls. The French company issued a statement that both entities
wished to create more opportunities in global port investment and operations,
but did not provide further details on the agreement. Nonetheless, the agreement builds on CMA CGM’s international expansion of its terminal operations,
an effort that is supportive of COSCO’s strategy. In 2016, CMA CGM paid $2.4
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billion to acquire Neptune Orient Lines (NOL), a Singapore-based shipping and
terminal operator that was the largest shipping company listed on the Singapore
Exchange. Acquiring NOL gave CMA CGM market leadership on transpacific
routes to the west coast of North America, a competitive advantage now enjoyed
by the Ocean Alliance, in which it is a member.45 With the NOL transaction,
CMA CGM relocated its Asian headquarters from Hong Kong to Singapore,
where the PSA Singapore Terminal is the world’s second-largest containerport
(after Shanghai), handling nearly thirty-one million TEUs in 2016. PSA Singapore is the largest terminal operation of PSA International Pte. Ltd., a subsidiary
of Temasek Holdings, the Singapore state sovereign wealth fund. The relocation
highlighted the increasing strategic importance of Singapore as the commercial
shipping industry consolidates into a few large groups seeking to maximize efficiency by running ever-larger vessels between a declining number of ports with
automated terminals and logistics connections. In early 2017, five major shipping
lines relocated their operations to Singapore from Port Kelang in Malaysia; with
large container vessels already berthed in Singapore, customers could eliminate
the added time and cost of shipping goods for ocean transit the additional six
hundred kilometers to Port Kelang.46 Subsequently, CMA CGM declared its intent to make Singapore its primary Asian hub, and it initiated a joint venture with
PSA that uses container yard automation technology to serve the megavessels of
CMA CGM with some of the fastest container-moving rates in the industry.47
COSCO is closely involved in the development and deployment of port- and
terminal-automation technologies. Qingdao New Qianwan Container Terminal
at Qingdao International Port (QIP) in northern China became Asia’s first fully
automated container terminal—using automation for both crane-ship operations
and the movement of containers from dock to yard—with its servicing of the
13,386-TEU COSCO France on May 11, 2017. COSCO in January had increased
its shareholding in QIP to 18.4 percent by acquiring a 16.8 percent stake as part
of a strategic accord to develop the port into a major hub in northeastern China.
According to shipping publications, QIP officials have claimed in broadcasts for
the China Global Television Network that the automated terminal reduces labor
costs by 70 percent and increases efficiency by 30 percent, because automated
cranes and driverless trucks operate day and night.48 Shanghai International Port
in December 2017 began operation of what would be the world’s largest automated terminal, the Yangshan Deep-Water Port, designed ultimately to handle
6.5 million standard containers per year.49
Perhaps the most significant role of CMA CGM in China’s maritime expansion is the company’s position as a member of the consortium that won the bid
to acquire a 67 percent controlling stake in the publicly listed port company that
holds the concession from the Greek state to operate the port of Thessaloníki. The
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CMA CGM subsidiary Terminal Link has a 33 percent stake in the consortium,
with 47 percent being held by German investment firms Deutsche Invest Equity
Partners GmbH and the remaining 20 percent by Belterra Investments Ltd.50
Although Greek media reported concerns over Belterra’s possible Russian ties,
the consortium completed the purchase in March 2018 and has garnered local
support, with the Foundation for Economic & Industrial Research, a nonprofit
research organization established in 1975, reporting that business from Piraeus
and Thessaloníki could increase Greek GDP by up to €5.6 billion annually.51
CHINA’S PROGRESS—SO FAR
China’s Maritime Expansion: Unprecedented Aggressiveness
Chinese expansion in the shipping and port sectors not only is accelerating in
pace; it also is occurring with an unprecedented aggressiveness. The primary entities engaging in the expansion operate under a radically different set of assumptions from their non-Chinese competitors, and are able to act more decisively and
take on greater financial risks than can firms operating without the full credit
and political support of their home state. In the view of Neil Davidson, the senior
analyst for ports and terminals at Drewry, “Chinese players are more comfortable
with risk than the established international operators right now, and have a geopolitical strategy rather than a purely financial one. They are snapping up assets
and opportunities and have the appetite and financial clout to take many more in
the coming years.” COSCO, which already has enhanced its competitive position
significantly, is projected to add more port terminal-operating capacity than any
other global terminal operator over the next five years, in large part because of its
acquisitions of Noatum and the container terminals owned by recently acquired
Orient Overseas.52
While its activities are the most extensive—covering shipping, ports, terminals, and transport network development—COSCO is not the only Chinese
state-owned company actively acquiring ports and related assets. Chinese entities made more than half of all acquisitions by global/international terminal operators in the year ending in mid-2017.53 While COSCO was the primary actor,
other transactions were undertaken by China Overseas Port Holdings and China
Merchants Port Holdings (CMPH); the latter added “Port” to its name in 2016
to reflect the company’s reorientation toward acquiring and developing ports
around the world.54 CMPH is the largest publicly listed port operator in China
in terms of container throughput, with a market share of roughly 33 percent in
2016; like COSCO, CMPH owns part of Shanghai International Port Group, with
a 25.15 percent stake as of June 2017.55 Last September, CMPH agreed to buy 90
percent of TCP Participações SA, which operates the container terminal concession in Paranaguá, Brazil’s second-largest containerport, for approximately $924
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million. Financial news media reported that the purchase price valued TCP at
14.3 times the company’s annual earnings before accounting for interest, tax,
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA), higher than the estimated value of
thirteen times EBITDA that had been expected.56
In instances such as the TCP case, Chinese port and shipping SOEs have
acquired assets from Western institutional investors that typically do not own
shipping lines that can be rerouted to improve the economic prospects of the
port assets. For example, as noted previously, COSCO Shipping Ports acquired
51 percent of Noatum Port Holdings, a Spanish-incorporated company, from
Truria Port Investment Holdings, a Spanish-incorporated holding company for
assets principally engaged in terminal operations and owned by institutional
investors; a 67 percent share is advised by JP Morgan Global Alternatives, and
33 percent by APG Asset Management NV. COSCO Shipping appears to have
made a direct investment of equity capital in Noatum and to have provided the
company with additional funding to strengthen its balance sheet, leaving the
pension fund investors with an undisclosed share of the company’s equity.57 APG
is an asset-management entity headquartered in the Netherlands that primarily
advises one of the largest pension funds in the world, Stichting Pensioenfonds
ABP, which invests the pension assets of Dutch public-sector employees. The two
investors acquired the Spanish port assets in 2010 as part of their infrastructureinvestment programs, but financial results were constrained by labor and cost
issues with Spanish stevedores. The assets of NPH include container terminals in
Valencia and Bilbao, Spain, and two associated rail lines that required substantial
investment to change the gauge of their tracks to correspond to EU standards
so they could connect the port terminals to the EU distribution network. One
of the top three containerports in the Mediterranean region, the Port of Valencia serves a hinterland with a 350-kilometer radius that accounts for nearly 50
percent of Spanish GDP and acts as the main gateway for the Iberian Peninsula;
owing to that location, COSCO Shipping Ports believes Valencia is well situated
to serve as a transshipment hub for western Mediterranean markets, and in April
2017 Ocean Alliance ships began to switch from other terminals in the area to
Noatum’s Valencia terminal.58
Financial Considerations of Chinese State-Backed Acquisitions
Some analysts have questioned whether Chinese port and shipping players paid
so much for some of the assets they acquired that those ports or terminals will not
generate market-rate returns. But traditional investment concerns may not carry
as much weight with Chinese state-backed companies when they acquire assets
with capital supplied by China as they do for non-Chinese, non-state-owned
companies, which must deliver competitive financial returns on assets if they are
to obtain capital from private investors.
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Drewry has suggested that COSCO Shipping Ports, COSCO’s port entity, may
have to write down the value of NPH, the Spanish port operator acquired in June
2017. The consultancy’s concern stems from the difference between the cost of
equity capital and the cost of debt. While the acquisition of the 51 percent stake in
Noatum appears to have taken place at a favorable valuation in comparison with
COSCO Shipping’s terminal acquisitions over the past two years, Drewry notes,
the value of Noatum includes a significant amount of goodwill—the difference
between the value the buyer assigns to the acquired assets and the price paid to
acquire those assets. As a result of COSCO Shipping’s purchase, the amount of
equity in Noatum’s capital structure will increase, resulting in a lower value for
the goodwill portion of Noatum’s total value. In effect, the modest valuation of
the port would appear to provide a cushion against adverse business conditions,
but that cushion could be eaten up if the total value of the port must be written
down. According to Drewry, COSCO Shipping Ports targeted a return of 10 percent for its investment in Noatum, assuming the concession for the key terminal
that NPH owns in Valencia is renewed beyond 2031.59
China’s allocations of capital to its port and shipping SOEs illustrate a material
difference in scale between funding for an SOE engaged in a country’s geostrategic expansion and the investment capital for purely financial purposes that is
available to shipping lines and port operators with a purely commercial foundation. In January 2017, the Chinese state provided major financial support to
COSCO to aid the development of its shipping and port network when the China
Development Bank, the country’s main provider of long-term loans, pledged to
extend twenty-six billion dollars in funding through various unspecified financial products for OBOR projects that COSCO has undertaken through 2021,
the period of China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan.60 COSCO previously received
other funding from Chinese state financial institutions, including an eighteenbillion-dollar strategic-cooperation agreement announced in 2016 with CEXIM
to support Chinese shipbuilding yards and accelerate optimization of the fleet
structure to international standards. The agreement encompassed a commitment
to finance construction of fifty ships, as well as to provide financing for mergers,
acquisitions, and equity investments in other companies.61
To put the China Development Bank funding commitment in perspective,
twenty-six billion dollars is nearly two-thirds the amount of money China allotted from its national foreign exchange reserves to fund the Silk Road Fund, and
more than one-quarter of the entire capital of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. For additional perspective on the difference between geostrategic
national funding and the funding available to financial investors in ports or shipping assets, consider that the largest infrastructure funds available to institutional
investors such as pension funds raise between eighteen and forty billion dollars,
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which must be deployed across many different sectors to comply with the diversification requirements of such investors—and therefore cannot be concentrated
in one or two sectors that constitute a strategic national priority.
The 2016 merger of two Chinese shipping companies to create COSCO
amounted to the commissioning of an SOE to carry out China’s ambition to
become a maritime power. The announcement of the equity transfers required
among the several entities to form COSCO affirmed that the sole owner and
controlling entity of the new China COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited was
SASAC, an entity created in 2003 to supervise directly China’s largest industrial
concerns. CMPH, which holds the concession to operate Chinese port facilities in
Djibouti, is 62 percent controlled by China Merchants Group, which, like COSCO,
is wholly owned by SASAC.62 State control was reinforced further during 2017,
with the chairman of SASAC emphasizing the importance of SOEs as a mechanism for the government to direct the economy and achieve political objectives.63
Implications of China’s Emerging Maritime Network
There is little doubt from the observable transaction record that a top priority for
Chinese SOEs operating in the port, terminal, and shipping sectors is to acquire
these assets aggressively and consolidate them into an integrated network that
not only benefits Chinese commercial interests but advances Chinese maritime
influence, in accordance with CPC priorities. The presentation of the 2016 results
of CMPH confirmed three primary goals: to consolidate Asia, consummate Africa, break through Europe, and acquire new exposure in America; to capitalize
on state-directed credit and political cover provided under OBOR to expand the
ports network further; and, finally, to develop the Djibouti free-trade zone and
enhance the company’s “Port-Zone-City” integrated development model.64 The
aggressive expansion since 2016 reflects the objective stated in the official announcement of the creation of China COSCO Shipping, which declared that the
merger was a “measure to materialize the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s
commitment to building a maritime power.”65
Chinese investment in Greece’s Port of Piraeus since 2009 has transformed
the port into one of the most active in the Mediterranean, and has served as
the leading edge of a sustained campaign to acquire port assets in southern EU
countries. Shipping industry analysts warn that, given the importance of ports to
host-country economies, the transactions are not only transport investments but
sources of political leverage and influence that mark the emergence of China as
a global maritime power, and that from this vantage point Chinese port investments must be viewed in the context of geopolitics.66 COSCO’s operations in the
Mediterranean, for example, create the possibility of serving the U.S. East Coast
via the Indian Ocean and Suez Canal instead of the Panama Canal or West Coast
ports that must ship goods east by rail or road.67
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China is supporting its overseas port network with additional investments in
critical infrastructure, as well as communications efforts targeted at promoting
favorable opinions of Chinese involvement. In Brazil, China is contributing fifteen billion dollars of a twenty-billion-dollar fund for infrastructure investment
in the country, which is expected to help finance construction of railroads linking
soy- and corn-producing areas in Brazil’s interior to its ports; although Brazil has
noted that companies receiving financing from the fund will not be required to
buy materials from China, China will maintain a 3 : 1 share of the fund’s capital.68
In Greece, the China Development Bank agreed to an MOU with the Greek Public Power Corporation, the largest power producer and electricity-supply company in Greece, which is seeking to modernize the sector and build geothermal
power plants; the agreement was reached shortly after State Grid Corporation,
China’s largest utility, acquired 24 percent of Greece’s power grid operator for
$356 million, bringing total Chinese investment in Greek port, telecommunications, and photovoltaic assets to $1.3 billion, according to MOFCOM.69 In
summer 2017, Athens News Agency, the Greek state’s media arm, organized a
New Silk Road Forum that characterized Chinese investment in Europe as an
opportunity instead of a threat; the event was attended by twenty-five state news
agencies from countries mostly in southern and central Europe, including Spain,
Italy, Bulgaria, and Greece, where Chinese entities have invested in maritime assets and supporting infrastructure.70
This article has attempted to document that China has made significant
progress in establishing and supporting the development of a maritime network
consisting of ports, terminals, and commercial-shipping capabilities under the
control of a handful of Chinese SOEs. At a time of stress in the container shipping industry, COSCO and CMA CGM—key companies in China’s maritime
network—display some of the best financial metrics in the sector, with both
having reported positive earnings in the first half of 2017 and unit costs below
average freight rates, and COSCO having the most cash on its balance sheet
and the lowest share of debt among its competitors.71 Perhaps the article’s most
significant contribution is to propose that the collective transactions of Chinese
port and shipping SOEs now constitute an integrated network for Chinese maritime power expansion through commercial channels. In addition to fulfilling its
explicit commercial purposes, certain key nodes of this network offer capabilities
that could support noncommercial maritime operations, such as ship repair, specialized terminals to handle vehicles, deepwater berths, and terminals designed
for distribution and refrigeration. COSCO in January 2017 announced a $620
million development plan for Piraeus that prioritizes the creation of the largest
ship-repair yard in the eastern Mediterranean and construction of hotels and
cruise ship berths to cater to Chinese tourists.72 Such Chinese-controlled facilities
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increasingly are being reinforced by electrical, rail, and road infrastructure that is
being built with Chinese funding, in both developing and developed countries.
This combination of ambitious investment in maritime logistics, generous
financial support from state development banks, and powerful political cover
from Beijing has secured China extraordinary public support from port host
countries. Of particular importance is that Chinese entities have shown the
ability to gain control of port assets that include quasi-governmental grants of
power by Western countries over investment decisions in and around strategic
port facilities in those countries. Using techniques more often employed with
developing countries, China has taken advantage of lingering economic stress
in developed countries and overcapacity in container shipping to gain control
of privatized state agencies originally set up to bolster local economic development. The capabilities of the assets China has acquired, and their relationships to
one another and other Chinese initiatives, afford decision makers in Beijing an
unusual amount of control over a fundamental sector of the global economy and
raise questions about the implications for all countries and firms that rely on the
maritime domain. This conclusion suggests that further research into how China
might use this power would be productive.
Any doubt about China’s intent to use the military capabilities of its maritime
network dissolved with the report that the United States had lodged a formal protest with China after an incident in which the Pentagon said Chinese personnel
at the country’s new military base in Djibouti had directed a military-grade laser
beam at U.S. military aircraft flying near the American base in Djibouti.73 Earlier
in 2018, reports emerged that China plans to convert the port it is building in
Gwadar, Pakistan, into a second naval base.74
The military aspect of Chinese maritime expansion now overshadows the development of Djibouti’s commercial port. Concerns about continued access to the
U.S. base increased in early 2018 after Djibouti’s president terminated the contract of DP World to manage a container terminal that the United Arab Emirates–
based company had built at Djibouti Port in 2006. The abrupt move sparked reports that Djibouti intended to grant a contract for a new terminal to CMA CGM,
while buying DP World’s 33 percent share of the terminal and turning operation
of the older facility over to a struggling midsize Singaporean shipping line that
entered a capacity-management alliance with COSCO late in 2017; DP World
claimed it had not received an offer from Djibouti.75
New Headwinds
The tensions in Djibouti demonstrate that China’s commercial maritime ambitions are starting to encounter headwinds as the expansion drive encroaches on
the commercial—and military—interests of other nations. China faces several
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potential challenges, not least whether it will be able to continue to finance the
enormous cost of acquiring, building, and operating a global port network. While
ports in Europe and Latin America have viable commercial operations that help
fund development being undertaken by Chinese companies, few of China’s newbuild ports in the Indian Ocean appear economically viable in light of low port
traffic at sites that are not on existing sea-trade routes, and even in cases such as the
port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, where a Chinese SOE took a ninety-nine-year
port lease in exchange for canceling loans Sri Lanka had taken from China, China
faces the prospect of funding a major maritime installation for decades to come.76
Other signs of resistance to China’s port expansion are emerging. In January
2018, a Swedish town rejected a Chinese SOE’s proposal to build a deepwater
harbor owing to concerns about the environmental and security implications. In
April, the EU and Italy alleged that Chinese criminal gangs are committing tax
fraud by not reporting imports through Piraeus. Also in April, a German business newspaper reported that EU diplomats in Beijing had prepared a briefing
for an EU-China summit that sharply criticized China’s investments in ports and
other strategic assets as a program intended to further Chinese interests, aid Chinese companies, and divide political consensus in the EU by investing in politically unstable countries. The EU had first raised such concerns at the BRI summit
China staged in Beijing in May 2017; China rejected proposed EU amendments
to a draft Sino-EU agreement on Silk Road cooperation, which reportedly was
presented to EU delegates without advance consultation.77
Perhaps the single largest hurdle to China’s port expansion is the linked
questions of whether host countries—most of which are emerging market
economies—will be able to repay Chinese loans and whether Chinese firms,
which are mainly SOEs, can handle the high levels of debt they incurred to acquire port assets.78 Pakistan—the single largest recipient of BRI funding, with
$62 billion invested in projects, including a deepwater port at Gwadar—said in
September 2018 that its new government, which faced a balance-of-payments
crisis on taking office in July, plans to review or renegotiate agreements with
China. Governments in other countries, including Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and
Myanmar, also have expressed reservations about the terms of Chinese financing
for ports and other projects that China is undertaking in their countries.79 These
challenges to Chinese infrastructure investment, while high profile, mainly have
occurred in countries where elections have resulted in a change of government.
While analysts expect such challenges to continue, China’s role in infrastructure
such as ports, roads, and power plants is unlikely to diminish in countries such as
Pakistan, which has close diplomatic ties with China. Chinese state-backed lenders are likely to remain a primary source of funding for other emerging-market
nations that may be unable to attract enough private-sector capital to undertake
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such projects or to meet the stipulations for transparency and project viability
that the World Bank and International Monetary Fund require.80
Despite concerns about debt burdens, the leaders of most African countries
attended the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in early September in Beijing,
where President Xi pledged an additional $60 billion in financing for African
countries and promoted China’s efforts to build ports and related infrastructure
in Africa to enhance “common prosperity.”81 The meeting with these leaders produced numerous new investment agreements, but—perhaps more importantly—
a Chinese state media campaign in the run-up to the event featured Chinese Africa experts extolling the benefit of economic ties with Africa, helping Xi counter
blunt criticism of BRI spending by Chinese scholars who last summer questioned
the cost of the global program.82
Even as some emerging-market countries are raising concerns about how they
will shoulder their share of the cost of Chinese projects, developed countries are
building investment ties with China. The EU’s concerns about transparency appear to have been more formal than substantive, and despite the absence of an
MOU meeting its stated conditions, the EU has deepened the cooperation of its
official financial agencies with Chinese counterparts since the 2017 BRI Summit. At the twentieth EU-China Summit in Beijing, in July 2018, the European
Investment Fund (EIF), part of the European Investment Bank Group, signed an
MOU with China’s Silk Road Fund—one of the financing vehicles established to
advance the BRI—to facilitate joint investments through a program called the
China-EU Co-investment Fund. According to the EIF, the coinvestment fund
aims to develop “synergies between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Investment Plan for Europe,” an EU economic-growth program commonly known
as the Juncker Plan.83 The EIF announced the first coinvestment in August: an
undisclosed stake in a new fund managed by Cathay Capital, a private equity
investment firm that counts as “cornerstone investors” the China Development
Bank, which is directed by China’s State Council, and Bpifrance, the French public investment bank.84 Cathay invests in a wide range of health-care and technology companies, including JD Logistics, which provides logistics and e-commerce
services to its parent company, JD.com Inc.—China’s largest retailer.
There also are signs that the United States is beginning to recognize that
China’s commercial maritime expansion carries strategic implications that warrant a serious response. In late April, the Committee on Foreign Investment in
the United States (CFIUS) raised national security concerns about COSCO’s
planned acquisition of shipping line Orient Overseas International. In addition
to making COSCO the world’s third-largest shipping company and increasing
its influence within the Ocean Alliance—OOIL is also a member of the group—
the acquisition would result in COSCO taking control of a highly automated
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container terminal that OOIL operates under a forty-year lease from Long Beach,
California—the largest port in the United States, in combination with the nearby
port of Los Angeles.85 I argued in 2018 that the transaction presents CFIUS with
an opportunity to slow COSCO’s expansion by requiring COSCO to sell the
Long Beach terminal to a company that neither is financed by Chinese sources
nor is allied with any Chinese shipping or port SOEs, nor to any entity, such as
CMA CGM, that is allied with COSCO through the opaque network of holdingcompany structures and strategic alliances that China is using to build its commercial maritime network.86 In July 2018 it was reported that COSCO had signed
a national security agreement with the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security
and Justice that calls for ownership of the terminal to be placed in a trust whose
principal trustee must be a U.S. citizen and not a shareholder of OOIL, and must
be independent of COSCO.87 The ultimate resolution of the situation could turn
on how the United States determines whether a prospective buyer of the terminal
is “independent” of COSCO.
Presuming that the terminal is sold to an entity independent from Chinese
influence, COSCO’s agreement to sell the Long Beach terminal prevents—for
now—the Chinese SOE that is leading the development of China’s commercial
maritime network from establishing a beachhead on the U.S. mainland. But the
situation illustrates that China’s commercial maritime expansion poses new security challenges. In both developed and emerging nations, China has established
a physical presence in strategically meaningful locations—ports—that provide
a platform for establishing influence over host countries in the economic and
political domains, as well as the capability to support Chinese far-seas operations
in the security domain. Chinese companies, mainly SOEs, have moved inland
from these coastal nodes, gaining control of ground-transportation networks,
power-generation assets, and information-technology systems. In their capacity
of serving commercial as well as military purposes, SOEs play a distinctive role
in ensuring the security of China’s expanding economic and strategic interests,
developing port and basing infrastructure, and providing logistics and maintenance support to military forces deployed abroad; and, potentially, in carrying
out peacetime naval missions, such as intelligence gathering and the replenishment of PLAN warships. In terms of logistics support abroad, COSCO has been
the PLAN’s leading supplier, providing Beijing with built-in shore-based support
for the PLAN through a commercial enterprise structured to align with Chinese
naval strategy, to an extent that leads some naval analysts to refer to COSCO as
the fifth arm of the PLAN.88
China’s commercial maritime expansion already is posing practical risks to
the naval operations of the United States and its allies. At a recent conference
in Haifa, Israel, on the future of maritime warfare in the Mediterranean, former
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USN Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead said that U.S. naval
vessels might not be able to call regularly at ports under Chinese management
because of the risk that commercial port information-technology (IT) systems
could be used to monitor or interfere with military systems and jeopardize U.S.
information and cybersecurity.89
Such concerns have substantial foundation: the Piraeus Port Authority, which
COSCO controls, in early 2018 assigned Huawei Technologies SA to redesign and
replace the port’s IT network and communications infrastructure.90 A new port
at Haifa is expected to open in 2021 under the management of Shanghai International Port Group, which has a strategic alliance with COSCO and PPA.91 Under a
2017 agreement, Huawei is providing SIPG with hardware and software services,
including storage, network hardware and integration servers, and cloud operating systems, for a global IT platform designed by Accenture.92 Huawei, along with
ZTE, was singled out as a U.S. national security threat in a congressional report in
2012, and the 2018 Defense Authorization Act bars U.S. government agencies and
contractors to the U.S. government from using certain Huawei components and
systems, and provided funding to U.S. agencies that need to replace IT equipment
as a result of the restrictions.93
Concerns that port-management technology poses a cybersecurity threat
illustrate how the maritime commercial realm—where the world’s two largest
economies and their naval forces increasingly are coming into close contact—is
becoming a theater for protracted economic conflict. Both the United States
and China are taking steps to organize their state regulatory, financial, and cyber resources to pursue their respective interests. In one of the most significant
changes to the Chinese regulatory structure in the past decade, China elevated
the power of its antitrust and market-competition regulators in March 2018
when it consolidated review and enforcement responsibilities that had been
dispersed across three agencies and consigned them to a single new entity, the
State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR). Under the new structure,
SAMR will be supervised directly by the State Council, placing the power to
direct market structure and competition through antitrust matters at the same
level as the MOFCOM and the NDRC. With its newly consolidated powers and
a reported track record of intervening on China’s behalf to “tip the scales in an
economic dogfight,” according to one major Western law firm, SAMR could
prove a formidable asset for protecting China’s national economic development
going forward.94
The elevation of antitrust enforcement power to the ministerial level reflects
China’s view that counting on free markets to provide sufficient access to required resources is not a reliable strategy for ensuring the country’s economic
or national security.95 To reduce exposure to market forces, Chinese leaders are
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aligning military and commercial resources—along the lines that led to creation
of the Dutch East India Company, when sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
European monarchies began to pursue overseas trade and territorial conquest as
a more rapid path to building the economic strength required to ensure national
security than relying on domestic economic growth alone.96
The latest expansionary move by China’s version of the VOC, COSCO, triggered a national security response from U.S. competition regulators. Whether
China’s commercial maritime expansion triggers other responses by U.S. civil or
security agencies remains to be seen. But in the long term, most of China’s port
and shipping acquisitions will continue to occur outside the United States, and
thus will not be subject to CFIUS review. By creating a global port network for
ostensibly commercial purposes, China has gained the ability to project power
through the increased physical presence of its naval vessels—turning the oceans
that historically have protected the United States from foreign threats into a venue in which China can challenge U.S. interests. Domestic economic challenges
and resistance from disgruntled host countries could slow China’s port-buying
spree and diminish the political influence that comes with economic power. But,
for the moment, China’s maritime expansion is continuing despite headwinds.
With China’s ships of state, both commercial and military, calling at Chinesecontrolled ports around the world, the United States no longer can assume that
its maritime supremacy will remain unquestioned forever.
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OPER ATION RHINE EXERCISE, MAY 18 –27, 1941
Milan Vego

T

he pursuit and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941
constituted one of the largest fleet-versus-fleet operations in European waters during World War II. Between May 24 and 27, 1941, the British used five
battleships, two battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, four heavy and seven light
cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, eight submarines, and fifty aircraft to hunt the
Bismarck combat group.1
The Bismarck combat group’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to attack British convoys in the northern Atlantic—Unternehmen RHEINÜBUNG (Operation
RHINE EXERCISE)—was, for the Germans, an operation; in U.S. terms, a major
operation. Although the main German forces
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STRATEGIC SETTING
For most of the interwar years, the Germans considered France and Poland, and possibly Soviet
Russia, to be their most likely opponents in a future war; they did not consider war with Britain a
serious possibility. In April 1933, the new chancellor, Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, stated that Britain’s
Royal Navy never again would be considered a
potential adversary of the German navy. In line
with this, Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960),
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commander in chief (CINC) of the Kriegsmarine (German navy) from 1928 to
1943, built a fleet that was not intended to challenge Britain again unilaterally, but
instead to complement Germany’s policies on the continent.2
By 1937, however, German naval strategy had shifted toward the offensive.
Raeder envisaged energetic employment of German naval forces to exert strategic pressure on the enemy’s superior forces; a more favorable balance of forces
was to result. This became the basis for the Kriegsmarine’s operational thinking.3
On February 3, 1937, in his meeting with Hitler and Field Marshal Werner von
Blomberg (1878–1946), the then minister of war and CINC of the armed forces,
Raeder explained the Kriegsmarine’s strategy in the case of a war. He stated that
what he called Atlantikkriegführung (Atlantic warfare) and war in distant ocean
areas would be part of the larger war effort. The objective would be to secure control of sea communications by hitting the enemy decisively, thereby contributing
to the overall strategic objective.4
A major change in German foreign and military policy came on May 24, 1938,
when Hitler reversed his earlier, more benign views on Great Britain.5 He issued
instructions to consider the country a possible enemy, in addition to France and
Soviet Russia.6 In June 1938, Raeder directed his staff to explore the implications
of a war with Britain.7 This staff study on German naval warfare then served as
the basis for combat instructions issued later in 1938.8 In the summer of 1938,
the Seekriegsleitung (Naval Warfare Directorate) (SKL) produced a memorandum that concluded that, in a future war with Britain, owing to Germany’s
unfavorable geographic position and the likelihood of British naval superiority,
Germany should focus only on commerce warfare on the high seas. Such a war
would be conducted with Panzerschiffe (armored ships popularly referred to
as “pocket” battleships), cruisers, and U-boats. The Germans harbored some
doubts that a successful outcome was even possible.9 High naval officials also
studied the employment of battleships, with contradictory results: all participants
agreed that battleships were necessary, but reached no consensus regarding their
employment.10
Admiral Raeder believed that if a major war broke out, Germany should
concentrate all its forces against Britain. The construction of U-boats and the
production of aircraft must receive unconditional priority. In his concept, the
Luftwaffe would mine the approaches to British ports and destroy transportation facilities, so the Kriegsmarine could conduct trade warfare using U-boats
and surface ships, supported by naval aircraft. Raeder also believed that trade
warfare could not be limited to belligerents but must include attacks on neutral
shipping.11
The Germans were aware that, as things stood, in the case of a war at sea with
Britain their position would be inferior. But Hitler wanted Germany to have
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a much larger navy, one that could be used as a global instrument of power.
So early in 1938, Hitler directed that a formidable force of battleships be built.
Raeder therefore revised the existing naval construction program. The result was
the so-called Plan Z, which envisaged a Kriegsmarine that was numerically and
qualitatively much larger. Hitler formally approved Plan Z in January 1939. The
projection was that by 1946 the Kriegsmarine would have in service six new-class
fifty-thousand-ton battleships (with diesel engines and 406 mm guns), three newclass ten-thousand-ton pocket battleships, four twenty-thousand-ton aircraft
carriers, five ten-thousand-ton heavy cruisers, sixteen eight-thousand-ton light
cruisers, twenty-two five-thousand-ton scouting cruisers, sixty-eight destroyers,
and ninety torpedo boats. Initially, Plan Z envisaged construction of around 250
U-boats (twenty-seven of two thousand tons, sixty-two 750-ton Type IXs, one
hundred five-hundred-ton Type VIIs, and sixty 250-ton Type IIs).12 In the summer of 1939, the number of U-boats planned was increased to three hundred.13
On August 4, 1939, the SKL directed that in the case of a war the Kriegsmarine
was to cut off enemy sea communications by using all available forces. Enemy
naval forces were to be attacked only if that would contribute to the war on enemy
commerce.14 The day before Germany’s September 1 invasion of Poland, Hitler’s
Directive Number 1 ordered that if Britain and France declared war the Kriegsmarine was to concentrate on commerce destruction, especially against Britain.15
The Luftwaffe was directed to prepare to conduct air attacks against shipping
carrying imports to Britain.16
Yet when war began with Britain and France on September 3, 1939, the construction for which Plan Z called barely had started, and the Kriegsmarine was
unprepared to carry out a protracted war at sea, especially on the open ocean.
Britain’s naval power was overwhelming compared with that of Germany. At that
time the Kriegsmarine had in service six heavy surface combatants: two battleships (which sometimes were referred to as battle cruisers), three pocket battleships, and one heavy cruiser. These were the only units capable of conducting
sustained operations on the open ocean. The remainder of the fleet consisted of
six light cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, and twenty torpedo boats. Under construction were four battleships, two aircraft carriers, four heavy cruisers, sixteen
destroyers, and ten (destroyer-size) torpedo boats. Out of fifty-seven U-boats,
only twenty-two were suitable for employment in the Atlantic.17 Raeder later
wrote that the Kriegsmarine was, from the beginning of war, numerically inferior
to the naval services of its enemies. The Kriegsmarine lacked aircraft carriers and
sufficient escorts for its large surface combatants. It did not have an adequate
number of long-range reconnaissance aircraft. Germany also lacked advanced
naval bases overseas. In Raeder’s view, only unity in planning operations and
decisiveness in their execution could neutralize the enemy’s advantages.18
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OPERATIONAL SITUATION
Initially, Germany conducted its war on Britain’s maritime commerce almost entirely with U-boats. June 1940 brought great improvement to the U-boat situation
owing to new bases obtained in Norway and France. Use of the French bases reduced the U-boats’ transit distance to their operating areas by some 450 nautical
miles. At the same time, British antisubmarine (A/S) defenses were weak. But the
Germans could not exploit these advantages, because the number of U-boats at
sea was small. Between June 1, 1940, and March 1, 1941, seventy-two U-boats entered into service, while only thirteen were lost. Yet between November 1940 and
February 1941 only some twenty-four boats were operational, and only about ten
were in the operating area at any time.19 At the end of February 1941 the number
of frontline U-boats was only twenty-two; many of the remaining U-boats were
undergoing training.20 However, despite their numerical weakness, the U-boats
were highly successful in destroying enemy shipping. From June 1940 to March
1941, U-boats sank 381 ships of over two million Bruttoregistertonnen (gross
registered tons) (BRT).21
In March 1940, the Germans started to employ auxiliary cruisers in distant
ocean areas.22 By the end of March 1941, the seven auxiliary cruisers then in
service had sunk or captured some eighty ships, of 494,291 BRT. Yet in contrast
to the U-boats, the tonnage of enemy ships the auxiliary cruisers destroyed was
of secondary importance; their principal purpose was to tie down enemy forces
in distant areas, thereby relieving enemy pressure in home waters.23
Admiral Raeder’s views on employing heavy surface ships were influenced
greatly by his personal experiences during World War I. The leaders of the former
Imperial German Navy had been criticized heavily for their failure to employ the
battle line actively during the war, and Raeder was determined that under no
circumstance would an analogous situation develop in the employment of heavy
surface ships during any new war. The German principal objective in employing
heavy surface ships against enemy maritime traffic was to destroy enemy merchant ships. This required that German heavy surface ships remain undamaged
for as long as possible. Hence, they had to avoid encounters with equally strong
or superior enemy forces.24
The Kriegsmarine was unable to begin using its heavy surface ships against
British shipping during the spring and summer of 1940 because it was focusing
all its attention on supporting the campaign in Norway and preparing to carry
out Plan SEELÖWE (SEA LION), the invasion of England. In September 1940,
the Germans attempted for the first time to employ one of their heavy surface
ships, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, to attack British traffic in the Atlantic.
However, that attempt failed when the ship developed engine problems.25 Engine
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malfunctions also delayed the next attempt, a sortie by the pocket battleship
Admiral Scheer. Finally, on October 29, 1940, Admiral Scheer left Gotenhafen
(Gdynia today) in the Baltic Sea for the Atlantic. It operated in the Caribbean
Sea and the Indian Ocean.26 When it returned to Kiel on April 1 after around 160
days, it had cruised 46,000 nautical miles and sunk seventeen ships of 113,233
BRT.27 Admiral Scheer also forced the enemy to assign large forces to protect his
convoys. In the meantime, Admiral Hipper made a foray into the Atlantic from
November 30 to December 27, 1940. It returned to Brest, France, because of repeated engine problems.28 In its second foray, Admiral Hipper left Brest on February 1 and returned to Kiel on March 28. During this cruise it sank seven ships of
32,896 BRT and heavily damaged two other ships of 9,899 BRT.29
While Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper were at sea on January 22, 1941, the
SKL sent battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau out into the Atlantic to attack
enemy shipping (Operation BERLIN). Their two-month cruise was highly successful. Some twenty-two ships of 115,622 BRT were either sunk or captured.30
This number included sixteen enemy ships, of eighty thousand BRT, that had
been sailing independently. Both battleships returned to Brest on March 22.31
From July 1940 to March 1941, German heavy surface ships sank or captured
forty-seven ships of over 250,000 BRT.32 During that same period, Luftwaffe
bombers sank almost the same tonnage.33 Yet this put the performance of both
categories far behind that of the auxiliary cruisers. However, by the spring of
1941 Germany had battleships, heavy cruisers, and auxiliary cruisers operating
in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans.34 Admiral Raeder believed that good
opportunities existed in 1941 to destroy enemy shipping in the Atlantic by using
surface ships in coordination with U-boats.35 And indeed, British shipping losses
from enemy action rose steadily as 1941 unfolded: during February some 403,600
tons of shipping were lost, 529,000 during March, and 687,000 during April. Most
of these losses occurred in the Atlantic.36
To Admiral Raeder and the SKL, the results from employing heavy surface
ships during the fall of 1940 and the winter and spring of 1941 confirmed that
their concept was valid. They had high hopes for even greater future successes
after the entry into service within a few months of Bismarck and Tirpitz, the
strongest battleships in the world. At the same time, Raeder and the SKL had
no illusions; a day would come when operations with heavy surface ships in the
Atlantic would become prohibitively risky. For instance, they considered it only
a matter of time before the United States entered the war.37 Hence, their intent
was to intensify the employment of their heavy surface forces while it was still
possible to do so.38
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Operating Area
The area in which the opposing forces operated encompassed rather a large part
of the eastern North Atlantic. Prior to combat, the Bismarck group moved from
Gotenhafen across the southeastern part of the Baltic, through the Danish straits,
and along the Norwegian coast up to Trondheim. Almost all the combat actions
took place in the area between latitudes 45 and 67 degrees N and between longitudes 10 and 40 degrees W. This area is bounded by Iceland and Greenland to
the north, Ireland and Scotland to the east, and the Faeroe and Shetland Islands
to the northeast.
The climate in the northeastern Atlantic, the British Isles, and Iceland is influenced greatly by the remnants of the Gulf Stream, the Icelandic Low in winter
months, and the North Atlantic Subtropical High. These factors result in mild,
rainy winters and relatively dry summers.39 The North Atlantic is well known for
its bad weather; fair weather is rare.40 In general, clouds cover the area up to 70
percent of the year, mostly with low-altitude formations.41
In the eastern Atlantic, winds generally blow from the west. While they decrease in the summer, winds higher than force 4 prevail at least 65 percent of the
year.42
In the northeastern Atlantic, storms are fairly frequent, especially north of
the British Isles. The most dangerous are large storms that stall over the central
North Atlantic. They sweep the area with strong southwesterly winds, creating heavy seas for long periods. These extratropical cyclones (large-scale lowpressure weather systems that occur in midlatitudes) are most prevalent during
the winter months. Off the west coasts of England, Scotland, and Ireland, winds
are strongest from October through March, with December and January the
roughest months.43
In the northern part of the North Atlantic, field ice appears in January and
lasts until April.44 Harbor ice may occur from December to May; during the period in question, it generally prevented the use of ports in Greenland, Labrador,
Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia.45 Pack ice and icebergs are carried down the
east coast of Greenland through the Denmark Strait. Between mid-August and
November or December there is little ice in the Denmark Strait; navigation is
more restricted during the rest of the year, especially from March to June, when
ice covers most of the strait. However, ice seldom is found within the hundredfathom line, owing to a warm, northward-flowing current.46
The North Atlantic itself is too deep for laying mines; however, mines could
be laid in the Denmark Strait, off the coasts of Iceland and Britain, and in the
Iceland–Faeroes–Shetlands passages.47 Iceland’s entire coast is fronted by an
extensive 110-fathom shelf that extends forty to sixty miles offshore. In January
1941, the British laid some two thousand mines between Iceland and the Faeroe
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Islands, more mines in February, and 6,100 more in March. On April 26, mines
were laid off the northwest tip of Iceland, with the minefield extending some fifty
miles in a northwesterly direction.48 Reportedly, the Germans were aware of this
minefield.49
The duration of the day in the operating area greatly affected the employment
of guns, torpedoes, and aircraft. Among other things, long, bright nights in the
summer made it difficult to conceal the movement of ships. For example, on
May 24, 1941, sunrise at latitude 67 degrees N and longitude 27 degrees W was
at 0710, sunset at 0419. Thus, the duration of daylight was twenty-one hours,
nine minutes. On the same day, sunrise at latitude 48 degrees N and longitude 42
degrees W occurred at 0258, sunset at 1830; the duration of the day was fifteen
hours, thirty-two minutes. Conversely, long nights encompass a large part of the
area from late fall to early spring. This heavily constrained the effectiveness of
air reconnaissance. Long nights also limited the duration of aircraft contacts and
the employment of torpedo aircraft and bombers from carriers and land bases.
This greatly increased the likelihood of U-boats attacking successfully. At higher
latitudes, long daylight during the summer months made it easy to observe and
destroy supply ships. For the Germans, the most favorable time for breaking out
into the northern Atlantic was from November through February; the most unfavorable, from May through September.50
The area of operations for the German naval forces and the Luftwaffe stretched
from the Polish and German coasts in the Baltic Sea to Denmark and Norway’s
occupied southwestern and western coasts. The most important bases were at
Gotenhafen and Danzig (Gdańsk today) and the Bergen area and Trondheim
in Norway. The British Royal Navy used a relatively large number of naval/air
bases in northern Scotland and the Orkneys. On Scotland’s eastern coast, the
most important naval bases were at Cromarty, Invergordon, and Inverness. The
Firth of Clyde (near Glasgow), Loch Ewe, Liverpool (in northwest England), and
Pembroke (in southwest Wales) were the largest bases on Britain’s western coast.51
Scapa Flow was the main base for the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet. It is the best
anchorage in the Orkneys, offering ships an almost landlocked shelter. Depths
range up to 118 feet, while tidal currents within the harbor are almost negligible.52 The distance from Scapa Flow to Trondheim is 795 miles.
The British ships and aircraft based in northern Scotland operated from a central position in relation to any hostile force trying to break out through the Denmark Strait and the Iceland–Faeroes–Shetlands passages. Hence, they benefited
from divergent and relatively short lines of operation. The distance between the
Pentland Firth (a strait separating the Orkneys from Caithness, in northern Scotland) and Reykjavík is about 790 miles. Similarly, the British forces that patrolled
the Denmark Strait or were based in Iceland were located in a central position
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and hence also had short and diverging lines of operation. In contrast, the German surface ships approaching the British blocking positions had to traverse long
and converging lines of operation.
Operational Command and Control
One of the most critical elements in the planning and successful execution of any
military action is command and control (C2). Sound command organization or
structure is one of the prerequisites for successful C2. Optimally, command organization should be centralized but at the same time allow for sufficient freedom
of action by subordinate commanders. This combination can be accomplished
by having intermediate levels of command and by applying faithfully, at all levels of command, the German-style mission command. Command organization
should delineate clearly the authority and responsibilities among commanders
at all levels.
Germany’s Kriegsmarine was a highly centralized organization. Raeder argued
(correctly) that high headquarters has all the information, the necessary communications facilities, knowledge of enemy radio traffic, and full control of the
supply organization.53
Raeder was CINC of the navy, head of the Oberkommando der Marine (Naval High Command), and chief of the SKL. The SKL was responsible for planning and conducting naval warfare beyond home waters. It consisted of several
departments, with the 1st, or Operations, Department (1./SKL) being the most
important.54
The Flottenkommandant (fleet commander) was a four-star admiral. As in the
Imperial German Navy, the fleet commander was the highest operational commander for surface forces. He was embarked aboard a flagship.55 Subordinate to
the fleet commander were various type-force commanders. The fleet commander’s position was weakened greatly when Marinegruppekommandos (naval group
commands) were established, the first being Naval Group Command East, established in Kiel, Germany, in November 1938. It was disbanded in August 1940 and
merged into Naval Group Command North on August 8, with headquarters in
Wilhelmshaven-Sengwarden.56 Naval Group Command North was responsible
for all Kriegsmarine activity in the Baltic Sea, the German Bight, Denmark, and
Norway.57 Naval Group Command West was established at WilhelmshavenSengwarden in August 1939. Initially it was responsible for operations in the German Bight, North Sea, and Atlantic Ocean. Its headquarters was moved to Paris
in August 1940. The responsibilities of Naval Group Command West for operations in the German Bight and the North Sea were transferred to Naval Group
Command North. Naval Group Command West retained operational control in
the Atlantic and became responsible for operations in the English Channel, Bay
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of Biscay, and Southwest Approaches (to the British Isles).58 The establishment
of naval group commands transferred ashore the operational control of seagoing
forces, in essence reducing the fleet commander to a tactical commander in combat.59 During the Bismarck operation, the commander of Naval Group Command
North was Admiral Rolf Carls (1885–1945), while Naval Group Command West
was commanded by Admiral Alfred Saalwächter (1883–1945).60
The German U-boat arm was established officially on September 27, 1935.
After January 1936, U-boats were led by the Führer der Unterseeboote (leader of
U-boats), with a rank of navy captain; on October 17, 1939, the position was elevated to Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (commander of U-boats) (B.d.U.), with
a rank of rear admiral.61 At the time of the Bismarck foray, the B.d.U. was Admiral
Karl Dönitz (1891–1980). He was directly subordinate to the SKL.
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, led by First Lord of the
Admiralty Albert V. Alexander (1885–1965). (His position was the equivalent of
today’s Secretary of the Navy in the United States.) The Admiralty itself consisted
of five sea lords plus four other high officials. The First Sea Lord and Chief of
Naval Staff was Admiral Dudley Pound (1877–1943). He was the highest naval
official responsible for naval operations. In contrast to the Air Ministry, the Admiralty’s responsibilities included operational planning and execution. The most
important Admiralty divisions were Plans, Operations, Trade, and Intelligence.
The work of the Plans and Operations Divisions was coordinated closely with the
Intelligence Division.62
The Naval Staff was created in 1917. The Plans Division was responsible for
making strategic and operational decisions. The Operations Division controlled
deployed naval forces in home waters and overseas. It was also responsible for
worldwide naval dispositions and day-to-day, even hour-to-hour, movements.
Naval area commands and overseas commands enjoyed almost total independence. Yet the Admiralty remained a focal point for the direction of fleet operations. The principal maritime theater for the British was the northern Atlantic.63
The Home Fleet, created in 1902, represented the largest operational level of
command in the Royal Navy. Its operating area was the waters around the British Isles. The Home Fleet was organized into a number of type-force commands,
with a flag officer leading each one. In September 1939, the main components of
the Home Fleet were the 2nd Battle Squadron; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
(BCS 1); the 18th Cruiser Squadron (CS 18); Rear Admiral, Submarines (2nd
Submarine Flotilla, 6th Submarine Flotilla); Vice Admiral, Carriers; 6th and
8th Destroyer Flotillas; and the Orkneys/Shetlands force. Another element that
played a significant role in the operation in question was Force H, established
in June 1940. It was based at Gibraltar and operated mainly in the western
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Mediterranean. It consisted of one carrier (Ark Royal), one battle cruiser (Renown), one light cruiser, and six destroyers.64
Another major element was Western Approaches Command, which was led
by a CINC, a four-star admiral. It was established in Liverpool, England, on
September 9, 1939. The Combined Operations Headquarters was moved from
Plymouth, England, to Liverpool on February 17, 1941. The main responsibility
of Western Approaches Command was the defense and protection of the transatlantic convoys and coastal shipping in the Western Approaches.
The Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command was established in 1936. It
became the RAF’s only maritime arm after the Fleet Air Arm was transferred to
the Royal Navy in 1937. The main responsibility of the Coastal Command was to
defend the British (and later Allied) convoys from U-boat and Luftwaffe attacks.
In 1941, the principal subordinate commands of the Coastal Command deployed
on the British Isles were Number 15 Group, with headquarters in Liverpool;
Number 16 Group, at Chatham, in Kent, southeast England; and Number 18
Group, at Pitreavie Castle, near Rosyth, Scotland.65
The Opposing Commanders
The two highest commanders of the opposing seagoing forces in the operation
were the German fleet commander, Admiral Günther Lütjens (1889–1941), and
the British CINC of the Home Fleet, Admiral John Tovey (1885–1971).
Lütjens was considered to be one of the ablest German admirals: highly intelligent, deliberate, and levelheaded in his assessment of situations and people.66 He
was dedicated, single-minded, stoical, and austere. There was no doubt that he
was a man of great personal courage and integrity.67 He was not a Nazi believer.68
Lütjens entered the Imperial Navy in April 1907 and graduated from its naval
academy. During World War I, he spent most of his time in torpedo boats, took
part in a series of raids against Dunkirk, and by 1917–18 was a torpedo flotilla
leader. During the 1920s, Lütjens commanded a battleship and a torpedo boat
flotilla.69 He was promoted to captain in July 1933 and served in the Naval Personnel Office. Through the rest of the 1930s, Lütjens commanded a light training
cruiser, served as chief of the Naval Personnel Office, and was Commander of
Torpedo Boats (which included destroyers).70 He was promoted to rear admiral
in October 1937 and vice admiral in January 1940. He was Commander, Scouting Forces and deputy to the fleet commander, Admiral Wilhelm Marschall
(1886–1976). In March 1940, Lütjens commanded the battleships Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau during the invasion of Norway in April–June 1940.71 He also was
briefly acting fleet commander during the campaign in Norway, when Marschall
fell sick.72 In July 1940, Lütjens became fleet commander. On September 1, 1940,
he was promoted to four-star admiral.73 Lütjens led a highly successful foray with
two battleships (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) in January–March 1941 (Operation
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BERLIN). Admiral Raeder had high confidence and trust in Lütjens, greatly valuing his broad and diverse professional experience.74
Admiral John Tovey entered the Royal Navy at the age of fifteen. He was commanding officer of the destroyer Onslow in the battle of Jutland in 1916, during
which Onslow “single-handedly” attacked the German cruiser Wiesbaden; Tovey
successfully brought his badly damaged ship back to port.75 He spent most of
his subsequent career in destroyers. Tovey served as Rear Admiral, Destroyers,
Mediterranean Fleet in 1938, and then as Vice Admiral, Light Forces in 1940. He
was considered a natural leader.76 He was aggressive and acted with a great deal
of initiative. Admiral Andrew Cunningham (1883–1963), CINC of the Mediterranean Fleet—known as a strict disciplinarian—had a high opinion of Tovey’s
professional abilities; however, Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, had
a more ambiguous, if not a negative, view. Pound considered Tovey “difficult at
times and not overburdened with brains.”77 Tovey did what he thought was right;
he refused to kowtow to superiors; and he hated yes-men.78 Tovey had an awkward initial interview with Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965)
that almost cost him the job, but in the end he became CINC of the Home Fleet
largely because of the support of First Lord Alexander and Admiral Pound.79
Later Churchill found Tovey stubborn and wanted to get rid of him.80
Tovey took command of the Home Fleet on December 20, 1940. His appointment broke with tradition because he was a junior vice admiral; normally, the
CINC of the Home Fleet was a senior four-star admiral or admiral of the fleet.81
Tovey immediately began intensive training in night fighting, both in conducting
air attacks and in defending against enemy air attacks.82
Vice Admiral Sir James F. Somerville (1882–1949) was in command of Force
H. His naval career as a commissioned officer began with service in the armored
cruiser Sutlej. He became a specialist in wireless telegraphy. During World War
I, Somerville served in the battleship Marlborough, battleship Queen Elizabeth,
battle cruiser Inflexible, and cruiser Chatham. He was promoted to captain in
1921. Throughout the 1920s, he served as Deputy Director of Signals at the Admiralty, next commanded the 4th Battle Squadron and the battleship Benbow,
and then returned as Director of Signals. In 1931, Somerville commanded the
cruiser Norfolk in the Home Fleet. Somerville was promoted to commodore in
1932 and a year later to rear admiral. He served as Flag Officer, Destroyers in
1936. After being promoted to vice admiral in September 1937, he became CINC,
East Indies in July 1938. Because of illness Somerville retired in early 1939, but
was recalled to active duty late in the year. He was deputy to Admiral Bertram
Ramsay (1883–1945) during the Dunkirk evacuation. Somerville was appointed
commander of the newly established Force H on June 22, 1940.
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Operational Intelligence
In 1941, British signal intelligence (SIGINT) was not yet fully developed, and
the penetration of German codes was still in its infancy; in 1940, priority had
been given to cracking the Luftwaffe’s codes because they were readily accessible.
Also, the Battle of Britain, not war in the North Atlantic, was the most immediate
threat. The Kriegsmarine was very careful in coding its radio messages, and used
a very sophisticated, almost impenetrable version of the Enigma machine. The
British did not achieve even isolated breakthroughs in Kriegsmarine radio traffic
until 1940, and the most important breakthrough was achieved in June 1941—
after the sinking of Bismarck. Until then, British SIGINT contributed only direction finding (DF) of German naval radio transmissions and some traffic analysis.83
This SIGINT was supplemented with air reconnaissance of German naval
bases and shipyards. The Royal Navy did not have land-based reconnaissance
aircraft to reconnoiter German naval bases in the Baltic such as Gotenhafen, so
it depended on the RAF to perform that function. However, the RAF generally
was reluctant to divert any resources from its strategic bombing efforts; it did not
want to risk its aircraft on naval targets. Therefore photoreconnaissance contributed little to the operational intelligence available.84
The British Special Intelligence Service (SIS) had an extensive network
of agents, mostly resistance fighters and Western sympathizers in Germanoccupied countries. SIS agent reports provided critically valuable information on
enemy naval movements.85 The British apparently had many agents in Norway
who reported on German military activities. They used shortwave transmitters
to communicate with their contacts in London.86
The Germans’ principal sources of information on British forces and their
movements were the Kriegsmarine’s naval intelligence radio-intercept service,
known as B-Dienst, and the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance aircraft. B-Dienst teams
also were deployed aboard major surface combatants, including those of the
Bismarck group. By September 3, 1939, B-Dienst had broken the major British
merchant and naval operational codes, and thus was able to track British naval
movements. However, changes to the British codes in August 1940 reduced BDienst’s effectiveness in this area. Still, by October 1940 B-Dienst could read
some 30 percent of British signals, and by January 1941 it again had mastered the
British code system.87
Photo and visual air reconnaissance was the responsibility of the Luftwaffe;
however, it generally was not very receptive to Kriegsmarine requirements. Its
aircraft lacked the endurance to conduct long-range missions—few Luftwaffe
aircraft could fly over British bases. Luftwaffe personnel also lacked the training
necessary to conduct visual recognition of naval targets.88
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THE GERMAN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The SKL and Naval Group Commands North and West prepared a number
of studies on the employment of heavy forces in the conduct of Atlantikkriegführung. These studies served as the basis on which the SKL and naval group
commands drafted operative Weisungen (operational instructions); a fleet commander issued Operationbefehle (operations orders).
On April 2, 1941, Admiral Raeder issued operational instructions to the fleet
commander, the commanders of Naval Group Commands North and West, and
the Commander of U-boats on the conduct of war in the Atlantic. He pointed
out how tactical successes in the North Atlantic could have strategic effects on
the war in the Mediterranean and the southern Atlantic. The most decisive effect
on the war in the Atlantic would come from cutting off traffic between North
America and Britain across the North Atlantic.
Raeder recognized that the numerically inferior German forces could not
achieve sea dominance over the North Atlantic readily; however, he hoped the
Germans could obtain local and limited control, and thereby gain sea dominance
gradually. Raeder believed the enemy would be forced to strengthen significantly
the defenses of his convoys, at the price of weakening his position in home waters and the Mediterranean or reducing the frequency of convoys.89 Employing
Germany’s heavy ships over a wide ocean area would force the enemy to fragment
his naval strength. This, in turn, would allow the Germans to mass forces against
enemy weak points.90
However, Raeder’s concept was deeply flawed. Even if the Germans were able
gradually to obtain sea control in the North Atlantic, they could not maintain it
for very long.
German Plans
In his operational instruction issued on April 2, Raeder envisaged the employment of four battleships against enemy shipping in the Atlantic: Bismarck and
Tirpitz from Gotenhafen and Gneisenau and Scharnhorst from Brest.91 They
would join up in the North Atlantic and operate against convoys. The assumption was that the British would be forced to suspend convoys, and even might be
forced to withdraw their battleships from the Mediterranean.92 These hopes were
crushed when Gneisenau was torpedoed on April 6 and Scharnhorst experienced
such serious machinery problems that it would not be available until the end
of June. The British air raids on Kiel led to further delays in repairs to Admiral
Scheer and Admiral Hipper; Admiral Scheer would not be available until the
end of July, Admiral Hipper until August. The first German aircraft carrier, the
33,550-ton Graf Zeppelin, was eight months away from completion.93 Tirpitz was
undergoing sea trials and would not be operational by May 1941.
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Raeder made a difficult decision: to employ Bismarck and the heavy cruiser
Prinz Eugen alone. As a result, instead of being a part of a much larger effort,
Bismarck’s foray became an isolated operation. This, in turn, greatly increased the
risk, because the enemy would be able to concentrate all available forces against
the Bismarck group.94
The SKL issued the final operational instruction for RHEINÜBUNG on April 14,
1941. At his meeting with Hitler on April 20, Admiral Raeder pointed out that
the first, similar operation in the North Atlantic, conducted by the battleships
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in January–March 1941, had been a significant tactical success. Moreover, it had considerable strategic effect in the Mediterranean
and South Atlantic.95 He also claimed that commerce warfare was proceeding
successfully.96 Raeder informed Hitler that the next battleship operation, by
Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, would be conducted in late April. The Pan-American
Security Zone would be respected.97 Hitler, while not rejecting the plan, had great
misgivings about it; yet he left it to Raeder to make the final decision.98 Raeder
emphasized to Hitler that dangerous conditions existed at Kiel and Wilhelmsha
ven, and at Brest as well, where German ships went for repairs after their forays
into the Atlantic. Hence, Brest shipyard would be used only in exceptional cases;
it was important to acquire use of the Spanish port of El Ferrol. Hitler promised
to secure that port for German ships in the fall of 1941. He also asked Raeder to
explore whether Organisation Todt could be used to build a large dry dock at
Trondheim quickly.99
Admiral Lütjens issued his operations order on April 22, 1941. Four days
later, Lütjens had a meeting with Raeder to discuss the timing of the operation.
Lütjens argued that the operation should be delayed until the damages Prinz
Eugen had suffered when it ran into a mine were repaired.100 He also suggested
that Bismarck might sail out alone, to be followed by Prinz Eugen, or that both
ships delay sortieing until the next new moon.101 Lütjens further believed that
the operation’s chances of success would be much greater if the combat group’s
sortie was delayed until either Scharnhorst was repaired or Tirpitz became fully
operational; the latter had been commissioned in February but, as mentioned,
was still undergoing sea trials. He presciently told Raeder that any employment
of Bismarck alone would trigger a massive response from the enemy, reducing the
chances of success. Lütjens and Raeder also discussed the use of Brest after the
completion of the operation, with Raeder stating that any stay at the French port
should be short, only to embark munitions and supplies. If Bismarck were heavily
damaged, it should steer to Saint-Nazaire instead; for a longer pause or overhaul,
Bismarck should head directly for home port. Lütjens stressed the importance of
air reconnaissance of the Denmark Strait to locate the ice boundary and any enemy patrols. He also requested that Raeder assign a larger number of aircraft and
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U-boats, plus fishing steamers, to support the operation. Raeder concurred, and
gave corresponding orders to his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Otto Schniewind
(1887–1964).102 Raeder later praised Lütjens for being so open with him, even
though the fleet commander did not accept Raeder’s reasoning entirely.103 Lütjens
had a premonition that Bismarck’s foray would end badly. After meeting with
Raeder, he stopped briefly in the office of the future rear admiral Hans Voss and
reportedly said, “I’d like to make my farewells. I’ll never come back.” He added,
“Given the superiority of the British, survival is improbable.”104
Raeder’s operational instruction of April 14 stated that the aufgabe (task) of
the fleet commander was to attack the enemy supply traffic in the Atlantic north
of the equator.105 The situation would determine the duration of the operation.106
The primary aim was to destroy the largest volume of enemy shipping, particularly that destined for British ports.107
The operations order that Lütjens issued on April 22 stipulated that the group’s
tasks were to sail through the Belts (the Danish straits) and the Arctic Ocean into
the Atlantic, then attack shipping traffic in the northern Atlantic. Afterward, the
group was to sail to a French port to replenish ammunition and supplies. If longer
repairs or an overhaul were needed, the ships were to return to home port in Germany.108 Originally, the operation was planned to start on April 28, to coincide
with the new moon; however, it was delayed until May 18 because of the mine
damages to Prinz Eugen and to conduct crane repairs on Bismarck.109
The forces initially assigned to support the operation consisted of several Luftwaffe squadrons and several U-boats, plus a number of logistical support ships.
The commander of the 5th Air Fleet, General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1889–1968),
was informed about RHEINÜBUNG, and that all available aircraft in Denmark
and Norway were to provide continuous fighter cover and a close A/S defense
screen, as well as reconnaissance of the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean to the
limits of the various aircrafts’ effective ranges. They also were to reconnoiter the
British naval base at Scapa Flow. Air Leader Stavanger assigned the responsibility for reconnaissance to 1st Squadron, 120th Aufklärungsgruppe (Reconnaissance Group) (designated 1. / F 120), reinforced by one squadron of the 121st
Reconnaissance Group (F 121), which flew Junkers (Ju) 88s. Also deployed in
support of the Bismarck group were naval flying boat squadrons and Heinkel
(He) 115 squadrons; these were based in Norway, concentrated in the Skagerrak–
Trondheim area. Two reconnaissance squadrons of Ju-88s and 1. / F 120 monitored Scapa Flow continuously. They also provided continuous coverage of the
North Sea and the Arctic. Parts of the 30th Kampfgeschwader (Battle Wing) (KG
30), flying Ju-88s, and the 26th Battle Wing (KG 26), flying He-111s and based in
Denmark and Kristiansand and Gardermoen, Norway, were put in combat readiness. Fighter protection was provided by Fighter Leader Norway.110
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GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE (PLANNED), APRIL 22, 1941
(F = flagship)
MAIN FORCES
Fleet commander: Admiral Günther Lütjens
1 battleship: Bismarck (F)
1 heavy cruiser: Prinz Eugen

SUPPORTING FORCES
6 U-boats (2 operating on north–south route, 4 operating on HX route [Halifax, Nova Scotia–U.K. ports])
2 reconnaissance ships (Gonzenheim, Kota Penang)
2 supply ships (Ermland, Spichern)
4 requisitioned tankers (Lothringen, Belchen, Esso-Hamburg, Friedrich Breme)
4 weather-observation fishing steamers (Freese, München, August Wriest,
Lauenberg)
2 mine breakers (Sperrbrecher 13, Sperrbrecher 31)
5th Minesweeper Flotilla (M-4, M-23, M-31, M-201, M-202, M-205, M-251,
M-252, M-253)
6th Destroyer Flotilla (Z-23, Z-24, Hans Lody [Z 10], Friedrich Eckheldt [Z 16])

5TH AIR FLEET, AIR LEADER STAVANGER
2 reconnaissance squadrons (1. / F 120 [Ju-88s] Stavanger, 1. / F 121 [Ju-88As])
2 battle wings (KG 30 [Ju-88As] Eindhoven, KG 26 [He-111Hs] Stavanger-Sola)

3RD AIR FLEET, AIR LEADER ATLANTIC
5 battle wings (II. / KG 1 [Ju-88As] Rosières-en-Santerre, I. / KG 28 [He-111s]
Nantes, KG 40 [FW-200s/Ju-88As] Bordeaux-Mérignac, II. / KG 54
[Ju-88As] Bretigny, I. / KG 77 [Ju-88As] Juvincourt)
1 combat group (KG 100 [He-111Hs], Vannes-Meucon)
2 coastal air groups (KG 406 [He-115s] Hourtin/Brest, KG 506 [Ju-88As]
Westerland)
Sources: Operationsbefehl des Flottenchefs für die Atlantikoperation mit “Bismarck”
und “Prinz Eugen” (Deckbezeihnung: “Rheinübung”), April 22, 1941, pp. 40–41; Jürgen
Rohwer and Gerhard Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945, 2nd ed.
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 63–64.

But air support of the Bismarck group during its movement from Bergen to the
Denmark Strait turned out to be very inadequate. The Luftwaffe lacked sufficient
numbers of reconnaissance aircraft to provide comprehensive coverage in an area
as distant as the Denmark Strait or the Iceland–Faeroes passage. In contrast, the
Luftwaffe provided gap-free reconnaissance of the central and northern parts
of the North Sea. It also envisaged full air cover for the Bismarck group during
its operational deployment from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord (an inlet in the
Korsfjord, near Bergen).111 The North Atlantic west of longitude 30 degrees W
was free of German aircraft, except for sporadic reconnaissance aircraft; however,
Luftwaffe aircraft covered the entire sea area east of longitude 30 degrees W.112
Generally, on a daily basis one or more Focke-Wulf (FW) 200s from Bordeaux or
Stavanger conducted reconnaissance of the sea area northwest of Ireland out to
approximately longitude 20 degrees W.113 Coastal reconnaissance was conducted
from bases at Brest and Hourtin, France (some thirty-two miles northwest of
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Bordeaux), out to longitude 11 degrees W, or variously out to two hundred nautical miles, with He-111s; extension out to longitude 20 degrees W using He-111s
and Blohm & Voss 138s was in preparation. Additionally, two reconnaissance
ships (Gonzenheim and Kota Penang), plus some U-boats, were deployed some
three hundred nautical miles south of Cape Farewell, Greenland, the southern
entrance to the Denmark Strait.114
Initially, four U-boats were assigned to cooperate with the Bismarck group.115
One was assigned to conduct weather observation in the area between latitudes
55 and 60 degrees N and between longitudes 20 and 25 degrees W.116 Admiral
Lütjens’s April 22 operations order stated that activity in the operating area
would include some U-boats operating on the north–south convoy route and
four others on the HX convoy route (which ran from Halifax, Nova Scotia,
Canada, to U.K. ports) after the end of May, plus two reconnaissance ships and
five tankers.117
Available to Naval Group Command West were one supply ship; three requisitioned tankers carrying fuel, munitions, and food; and three tankers in reserve.118
Assigned for logistical support of RHEINÜBUNG were two supply ships (Ermland
and Spichern) and four (originally five) tankers (Lothringen, Belchen, EssoHamburg, and Friedrich Breme).119 The support ships were deployed in waiting
positions in the North Atlantic: one supply ship (Ermland) between the Azores
and the Lesser Antilles, and the other (Spichern) four hundred nautical miles west
of Faial, Azores; and the tankers Belchen and Lothringen some 120 and 200 nautical miles, respectively, south of Cape Farewell. One tanker (Esso-Hamburg) was
deployed some 450 nautical miles (nm) northwest, and another (Breme) about
seven hundred nautical miles southwest of Faial.120
Naval Group Command North would exercise control over the Bismarck
group until it crossed a line running from the southern tip of Greenland to the
northern tip of the Hebrides, when control would pass to Naval Group Command West.121 Thereafter Naval Group Command West would control the entire
operation, with tactical control residing in the hands of Admiral Lütjens aboard
Bismarck.122
Admiral Lütjens was responsible for the movement of reconnaissance ships,
supply ships, and tankers during their presence in the operating area. If breakout
into the Atlantic was detected too early, the operation was to be shortened or
aborted, depending on the situation. In such a case, either Naval Group Command West or the fleet commander would issue the order. If a sudden change in
the situation required withdrawal to the Arctic, Naval Group Command North
would make preparations for the arrival of the Bismarck group.123
Several U-boats (two at a minimum) would be deployed off Freetown, Sierra
Leone. Beginning in mid-June, up to four U-boats would be employed along
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the eastern part of the HX route between longitudes 30 and 45 degrees W. Both
groups would be subordinate to B.d.U., but if an opportunity arose for direct
cooperation, the fleet commander had authority to give orders directly to the
U-boats.124
RHEINÜBUNG was to consist of five distinct phases: (1) movement from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord; (2) movement from Grimstadfjord to the Denmark
Strait; (3) breakout into the North Atlantic; (4) attack on enemy shipping; and
(5) return to home base. The SKL instruction issued on April 14 directed the
Bismarck group to sortie from Gotenhafen in the afternoon of April 28. It would
advance through the Belts/Skagerrak, then to the Arctic.125 During the transit of
the Belts, defense against mines would be provided by Sperrbrecher (mine breakers) and the 5th Minesweeper Flotilla.126 During the group’s transit through the
Skagerrak, several destroyers would provide A/S protection.127
Lütjens’s operations order provided a very precise timeline for transiting the
Skagerrak and the Kattegat. This was necessary to coordinate properly the mine
countermeasures, A/S support, and Luftwaffe air cover. During the transit of
Arkona and the Skagen barrier, in addition to mine breakers / minesweepers,
four destroyers (Z-23, Z-24, Hans Lody [Z 10], and Friedrich Eckheldt [Z 16])
would provide the A/S screen for the Bismarck group.128 By 1900 on April 30, the
Bismarck group was to reach Kristiansand; at 0230 on May 1 it would reach the
latitude of Stavanger; at 0630 the same day, that of Korsfjord/Bergen; and on May
2, that of Trondheim.129
In operational terms, the planned movement of the Bismarck group from
Grimstadfjord to the Denmark Strait was an operational maneuver, followed by
a tactical penetration into the North Atlantic. The breakout was considered the
most difficult part of the entire operation. The aim was to enter the Atlantic unobserved by enemy patrols, but if the Bismarck group were sighted the mission
still was to be carried out to some extent, in accordance with the operational
instructions.130
The German leadership incorrectly assumed that enemy patrol forces in the
Denmark Strait would consist of auxiliary cruisers.131 However, it assumed correctly that enemy aircraft also would patrol the Denmark Strait. The Germans
knew that a bright night would make unobserved breakout more difficult,
whereas low visibility would facilitate breakout. They also assumed that the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance of the northern part of the North Sea would be sufficient
to provide an overview of the enemy situation.132
The ice boundary also influenced planning. Naval Group Command North
suggested to Lütjens that he execute the breakout between Iceland and the
Faeroes because those waters were ice-free. In contrast, the Denmark Strait is
narrow to begin with, and the width of the passage available varies with the
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position of the ice boundary, which had the potential to make it easier for enemy
ships to obtain and maintain contact with the Bismarck group. The enemy also
could draw on more-southward-deployed units. Another advantage of transiting
the gap was the shorter transit time, which saved fuel, whereas use of the strait
would require refueling. Unfortunately, Lütjens was bound to follow SKL instructions, which stipulated an undetected breakout through the Denmark Strait into
the Atlantic. Refueling would be provided by one tanker (Weissenberg), which
would wait at latitude 70 degrees N, longitude 01 degree W.133
After the successful breakout, searching for and destroying the largest volume
of enemy shipping would be the Bismarck group’s primary mission. In his operational instructions, Raeder directed that combat with an equally strong enemy
should be avoided.134 The only exception was if such an engagement would contribute to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective and the risk was low.135
The Gneisenau/Scharnhorst foray in January–March 1941 had shown that,
even when B-Dienst provided the departure date and route of an enemy convoy,
detecting those convoys in the broad spaces of the ocean depended on luck;
if it happened, it might be only by accident. In his operations order, Lütjens
explained that enemy convoys normally were escorted by one battleship, often
with two cruisers and two destroyers in addition. Bismarck would tie up the
battleship, while Prinz Eugen would deal with any other ships in the convoy’s
screen.136
Sailing to a French port would be considered only if no significant repairs were
required; if lengthier repairs were needed, each ship would return to its home
port.137 If needed, the general alternate port of return would be Trondheim.138
German Execution
Bismarck and Prinz Eugen possessed an unmatched power compared with their
respective enemy counterparts. However, the Home Fleet and Force H had an
enormous numerical superiority, plus effective support from RAF Coastal Command. (For details, see sidebars and map 1.)
The majority of supply ships and tankers sortied about a week prior to the
Bismarck group. The first to do so was the tanker Belchen from La Pallice on May
10; two reconnaissance ships sortied from La Pallice on May 17.139 Four tankers
and two supply ships would operate in the area between latitudes 45 and 46 degrees N and longitudes 32 and 35 degrees W. In the same area were deployed four
weather-observation fishing steamers.140 Two tankers sailed into the Arctic.141 If
bad weather delayed the Bismarck group breakout, one tanker was in a waiting
position in the Norwegian Sea, while another tanker was at Trondheim.142
Prior to his arrival at Gotenhafen, Lütjens stopped at Kiel to see his predecessor, Admiral Marschall. Marschall had been removed from his post because of
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MAP 1
BISMARCK COMBAT GROUP’S FORAY INTO THE ATLANTIC, MAY 18–27, 1941
Map 1: RHEINÜBUNG
BISMARCK COMBAT
GROUP’S
FORAY INTO THE ATLANTIC, MAY 18–27, 1941
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differences with Raeder and Naval Group Command West commander Admiral
Saalwächter. During the meeting, Marschall advised Lütjens not to follow instructions received from the SKL too literally. Marschall believed the fleet commander must have a certain freedom of action in case the situation changed.143
Lütjens responded in a tragically resigned tone: “No! Two fleet commanders
have already been relieved of their commands due to the displeasure of the Naval
[High] Command. I do not wish to be the third. I know what the Naval Command desires and will carry out their orders.”144
About one week prior to his arrival at Gotenhafen, Lütjens also visited his
friend and former “crew member” (classmate) Rear Admiral Conrad Patzig
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(1888–1975), the chief of the Personnel Office. Patzig asked why Lütjens had to
go on board as the fleet commander, because the operation was minor in scale,
yet the risk of losing his life was acute. Lütjens agreed with Patzig, but believed
there was no alternative.145 He did not want to question Raeder’s decision. As
mentioned, Lütjens apparently had a premonition of what would happen to him.
He told Patzig: “I shall have to sacrifice myself sooner or later. I have renounced
my private life and I am determined to execute the task which has been entrusted
to me in an honorable manner.”146
On May 12, Hitler met with Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht),
and several high-ranking members of his staff visited Bismarck at Gotenhafen.
Raeder was not present. Hitler inspected the ship and attended gunnery exercises. He had a long talk with Lütjens. He asked the admiral about the Scharnhorst/
Gneisenau experience. Lütjens mentioned to Hitler the threat that enemy carrierborne torpedo aircraft posed to Bismarck.147
Phase I: Gotenhafen–Grimstadfjord (0000 May 18–0900 May 21). In operational
terms, the movement of the Bismarck group from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord
represented the operational deployment.148 At about 0600 on May 18, Admiral
Lütjens received from naval intelligence the latest status of the enemy heavy
ships. The Germans estimated that in home waters were deployed three battleships (Prince of Wales, King George V, and Rodney), one battle cruiser (Hood),
and only one carrier (Victorious). One damaged carrier (Illustrious) was probably on the way to the United States. For a long time, there was no information
on the whereabouts of another carrier (Argus). Force H was in Gibraltar. On the
north–south convoy route were deployed one battleship (Repulse) and one carrier
(Furious) (used for ferrying aircraft from Britain to Gibraltar and the Gulf of
Guinea). One battleship (Nelson) and one carrier (Eagle) had left Durban, South
Africa, on May 10, but it was unclear whether they were organized as a group.149
During the forenoon of May 18, Admiral Lütjens issued his Absicht (intent)
for the pending operation. He stated that if the weather situation were favorable
for breaking out (i.e., it was bad), his intent was not to stop at Korsfjord but to
proceed directly to the Arctic, refuel from the waiting tanker Weissenberg, then
break out into the northern Atlantic through the Denmark Strait at high speed.
He hoped that if reduced visibility and fog prevailed, an encounter with the enemy cruisers or auxiliary cruisers in the Denmark Strait could be avoided. In the
case of an encounter with light forces, Prinz Eugen might use its torpedoes, on
order from Lütjens.150
At about 2130 on May 18, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sailed from Gotenhafen.
They proceeded separately until they reached Arkona, where they joined up at
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1100 on May 19.151 On the order of the Befehlshaber der Sicherung der Ostsee
(Commander, Security Forces, Baltic), traffic in the Great Belt and Kattegat was
stopped for the night of May 19/20 and the morning of May 20, to enhance the
secrecy of the Bismarck group’s movement.152
During the morning of May 20, Luftwaffe photoreconnaissance ascertained
the presence in Scapa Flow of two battleships (King George V and Rodney), one
battle cruiser (Hood), one carrier (Victorious), six light cruisers, four destroyers,
and two submarines. In the northern Scotland area were probably twelve cruisers
that were nonoperational—under repair.153 No enemy forces were sighted in the
North Sea or the Arctic.
Around noon on May 20, the Bismarck group was in the vicinity of the Skagerrak mine barrier, to be escorted by the minesweeper flotilla; around 1600 it was
escorted through the mine-free area in the Kattegat. It then was mixed with
commercial vessels waiting to pass through the mine-free area in the reverse
direction.154 By evening, the Bismarck group was south of Kristiansand.155
At about 0620 on May 21, the 18th Air Group transmitted a message to the
British Admiralty concerning the presence of two enemy battleships and three
destroyers.156 B-Dienst decrypted this message almost immediately, and Naval
Group Command North and the SKL agreed that enemy agents had observed the
Bismarck group in the Great Belt.157
The original source of the information to the Admiralty about Bismarck’s transit was the Swedish cruiser Gotland.158 Major Törnberg (assistant to Major Carl
Petersén [1883–1963], head of Sweden’s C-Bureau, a unit for secret-intelligence
collection) passed the information to the British naval attaché in Stockholm,
Captain Henry Denham (1897–1993).159 In his message the naval attaché stated:
“Kattegat today 20th May (a) This afternoon eleven German merchant vessels passed Lenker North (b) at 1500 two large German warships escorted by
three destroyers, five escort craft, and ten to twelve aircraft passing Marstrand
[in the Bohuslän archipelago, in the northeastern Kattegat] course northwest
2058/20.”160 Raeder knew from Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (1887–1945), chief of
the Abwehr (Military Intelligence), that the signal from Stockholm was sent to
the Admiralty on the morning of May 21; Canaris had proof positive that British
agents had reported the Bismarck group’s movement.161
German naval intelligence learned that the report on the sighting of the Bismarck group had prompted intensive reconnaissance by the 18th Air Group. This
group, with headquarters near Rosyth, cooperated with CINC, Rosyth and the
Orkneys/Shetlands Naval Command. The B-Dienst intercepts located enemy
aircraft in the northern part of the North Sea, off the Norwegian coast, and in the
Faeroes area. Yet at the same time, monitoring of the radio traffic of the Home
Fleet revealed no sign of special activity.162
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At 0900 on May 21, the Bismarck group entered Korsfjord. Bismarck anchored
at Grimstadfjord, at the entrance to the Fjøsanger fjord. Prinz Eugen refueled at
Kalvanes Bay from a tanker.163 Surprisingly, Bismarck did not refuel, even though it
had burned some two thousand tons of oil since Gotenhafen.164 From enemy radio
transmissions, it was clear to the Germans that the enemy knew about the presence of the Bismarck group, although as noted no reaction had been detected.165
Coincidentally, the RAF planned to attack the Bismarck group during the night
of May 21/22. It also intended to conduct reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast
from Trondheim to Kristiansand on May 22.166 However, in both instances low
clouds prevented aircraft from finding their targets.167 In the evening on May 21,
British air reconnaissance ascertained that the Bismarck group had left Bergen.168
On May 21, Admiral Tovey decided to strengthen cruiser patrols in the
Denmark Strait and between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands.169 When the heavy
cruiser Suffolk arrived at Hvalfjord, Iceland, after being relieved by Norfolk in the
Denmark Strait, it was directed to rejoin CS 1 after refueling.170 To save fuel, Suffolk would join the patrol just before the earliest arrival of the enemy. The cruiser
Arethusa, due to arrive at Reykjavík, was directed to remain at Hvalfjord at the
disposal of Commander, CS 1.171 BCS 1 (Hood and Prince of Wales), plus a screen
of six destroyers (Electra, Anthony, Icarus, Echo, Achates, and Antelope), sailed
from Scapa Flow to Hvalfjord.172 Vice Admiral Lancelot E. Holland (1887–1941),
Commander, BCS 1, was instructed to cover patrols in the Denmark Strait and the
Iceland–Faeroes passage, operating north of latitude 62 degrees N.173 Tovey issued
orders recalling Repulse from the Clyde (where it was waiting to escort a convoy
to the Middle East) to Scapa Flow.174 The cruisers Birmingham and Manchester,
then patrolling the Iceland–Faeroes passage, were directed to refuel at Skaalefjord
in the Faeroe Islands, then resume patrol.175 Their assigned patrolling line was between latitude 61 degrees N, longitude 10° 30ʹ W and latitude 64 degrees N, longitude 15 degrees W. Five fishing trawlers were on their routine patrols west of this
line. Arethusa was directed to join Manchester in the Iceland–Faeroes passage.176
During the evening of May 21, Admiral Max K. Horton (1883–1951), Rear
Admiral, Submarines, directed Minerve, then on patrol southwest of Norway, to
move to a position at latitude 61° 53ʹ N, longitude 03° 15ʹ E, while P-31 sailed out
from Scapa Flow to a position off Stadlandet (Selje, in the northwestern part of
Sogne Fjord).177
Phase II: Grimstadfjord–Denmark Strait (2200 May 21–2000 May 22). The
Bismarck group left Grimstadfjord at 2200 on May 21. Several hours afterward,
enemy aircraft searched for Bismarck in the skerries (small, rocky, uninhabited
islands) off Bergen. On the basis of this enemy activity, the Germans concluded
that the movement of the Bismarck group was known, but apparently the enemy
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was uncertain about the group’s exact location. At 0510, after the Bismarck
group reached the latitude of Kristiansund, Lütjens released the accompanying destroyers, which would proceed to Trondheim. On the basis of reports he
received, Lütjens believed that the major part of the Home Fleet was still at
Scapa Flow at noon on May 22. Even if the Home Fleet sailed out on May 22, it
would have to transit some 1,200 nautical miles to reach a position near Cape
Farewell.178
At 1200 on May 22, Lütjens directed the Bismarck group to increase its speed
to twenty-four knots and steer for the Denmark Strait.179 The group was then
some two hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast.180 On the evening
of May 22, the sky was covered with clouds and the atmosphere was misty. The
meteorologist aboard Bismarck predicted that the weather would be favorable for
a breakout. Lütjens intended to steer for Cape Farewell.181 Possibly he was influenced by information he had received while at Korsfjord in the forenoon of May
21, from a Luftwaffe officer who told him there was no sign that the Home Fleet
had sailed from Scapa Flow. Lütjens probably believed that he must stay ahead of
the enemy. He was aware that the enemy knew about his sortie from Gotenhafen
and his stay in the skerries off Bergen.182
At 1939 on May 22, RAF aircraft reported that the enemy battleship and
cruiser, but not the merchant ships, had left Bergen. Three destroyers and one
catapult ship were sighted at Trondheim. Most of the Norwegian coast was then
under fog.183
After receiving a report at 2000 that the enemy warships had departed from
Bergen, Tovey believed there were four possibilities regarding enemy activity.
The first was that the convoy was carrying important military stores to northern
Norway and would sail through the Leads; for some weeks there had been reports
of movements of German troops to Kirkenes. The second possibility was that the
convoy was carrying a raiding party, perhaps to capture an airfield to support an
attack on Reykjavík or Hvalfjord. Third, the enemy battleship and cruiser might
try to break out through the Denmark Strait to reach the trade routes, as German
ships had done in the past. However, breaking out through the passage between
Iceland and Scotland could not be ruled out, especially because the enemy had
stopped at Bergen. The fourth possibility was that the enemy ships already had
covered an important German convoy as far as the Inner Leads, and now might
be returning to the Baltic. Tovey considered the third scenario to be the most
likely, and made his dispositions accordingly.184
At 2043 on May 22, Tovey requested air reconnaissance of all passages between
Greenland and the Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, as well as any enemy forces
approaching Iceland. The aim was to detect enemy ships breaking out westward.
The Admiralty responded to Tovey’s request by directing subordinate commands
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to conduct reconnaissance of the Iceland–Faeroes gap, the Denmark Strait, the
Faeroes–Shetland gap, and the Norwegian coast.185 An additional air-patrol line
about 250 miles west of the Iceland–Faeroes passage also was established by
CINC, Western Approaches, Admiral Sir Percy Noble (1880–1955).186 The 15th
Air Group units on Iceland were directed to provide A/S cover for Hood and
Prince of Wales and to keep a close watch on the Denmark Strait.187 The Admiralty canceled the sailing of the carrier Victorious and battleship Repulse, which
had been assigned to protect pending Convoy WS8B, and put these warships at
Admiral Tovey’s disposal. Victorious was then at Scapa Flow, while Repulse was
directed to sail from the Clyde to Scapa Flow.188
Phase III: Breakout to the Northern Atlantic (2000 May 22‒1922 May 23). On
May 23, the Bismarck group continued on a course to transit the Denmark Strait.
The weather was favorable for penetration: an easterly wind, overcast skies,
moderate-to-heavy rain, and moderate-to-bad visibility (650 feet or less).189
Overall, the situation for a breakout was considered favorable. However, that
same bad weather prevented Luftwaffe aircraft from reconnoitering Scapa Flow
on May 23.190 The Germans also did not have aircraft available to reconnoiter the
area between Iceland and the Faeroes.191 Lütjens ordered an increase in speed to
twenty-seven knots.192 In the meantime, Tovey’s Battle Force proceeded northward to latitude 60 degrees N—far enough to be in a position to deal with either
an attack on Iceland or a breakout.193
Also on May 23, Headquarters RAF Iceland received a message from CINC,
Western Approaches via Flag Officer in Charge, Iceland to give priority to reconnoitering the Denmark Strait, especially the Akureyri area of Eyja Fjord, in
north-central Iceland. A crossover patrol of the Denmark Strait from Iceland to
the limit of the ice already had been ordered.194 But only two air sorties of the
Iceland–Faeroes gap were carried out, because of the bad weather, and there was
no air reconnaissance of the Denmark Strait; however, Admiral Tovey did not
become aware of this until much later.195 Tovey directed Suffolk to patrol within
RDF range of the ice-edge boundary in the Denmark Strait.196 When conditions
were clear inshore, Norfolk would patrol about fifteen miles abeam of Suffolk;
when thick inshore, Norfolk would patrol to cover the inshore passage.197
Repulse and three destroyers from Western Approaches Command joined the
Battle Force northwest of the Butt of Lewis, Outer Hebrides, during the forenoon of May 23.198 Tovey intended to detach two cruisers to patrol the Faeroes–
Shetlands passage; however, in the end he decided to keep all four cruisers with
him.199
By noon, the Bismarck group reached the ice boundary.200 At 1427, the weather
forecast for the area north of Iceland was for southeasterly-to-easterly winds,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

Winter2019Review.indb 113

119

12/4/18 11:13 AM

114

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1

wind force 6 to 8, mostly overcast, rain, and moderate-to-poor visibility; in the
area south of Iceland, it was for winds of force 5 to 7; cloudy to overcast; a lowpressure system east of Iceland; and warm air moving toward the Denmark Strait
and the area south of Iceland.201
At 1700, the weather in the vicinity of the Bismarck group was snow showers,
with visibility of around five thousand yards.202 The Bismarck group sailed near
the ice boundary. On its starboard side there was good visibility, while to port
there was fog.203 After entering the Denmark Strait shortly before 1900, the Bismarck group moved into an area of pack ice, with some floating icebergs, a few of
which were of enormous size. Thus, on May 23, the width of the ice-free passage
in the Denmark Strait was only about twenty nautical miles.204 Both Bismarck and
Prinz Eugen were zigzagging.205
German knowledge of the situation in the Denmark Strait and its approaches
was very spotty because of the lack of sufficient FW-200 aircraft. The last report
that Lütjens received was provided on May 19 by a single FW-200. The aircraft reported the ice boundary to be seventy to eighty nautical miles away from Iceland.
The same day, at a distance of some fifty nautical miles northwest of North Cape,
Iceland, another FW-200 had aborted its flight after encountering dense fog.206
At 1922, Suffolk sighted Bismarck and Prinz Eugen at a distance of 12,320
yards and steering on a southwesterly course. The Bismarck group’s position was
then some sixty miles northwest of North Cape.207 At the same time, Prinz Eugen
sighted what it believed to be an auxiliary cruiser at a distance of 14,200 yards.
Bismarck fired five salvos but scored no hits. The enemy ship disappeared.208 Suffolk used mist as a cover and maintained contact with Bismarck.209 At the time of
initial contact, Tovey’s Battle Force was at latitude 60° 20ʹ N, longitude 13 degrees
W. It turned to course 280 and increased speed to twenty-seven knots. Tovey’s
intent was to reach a position from which he could intercept the enemy east of
the Denmark Strait and at the same time support BCS 1. As more information
was received, it became clear that the enemy intended to break out through the
Denmark Strait.210
At 2028, Suffolk sighted Bismarck again near the ice boundary, at a distance of
twelve thousand yards. Four minutes later, Norfolk also made contact with Bismarck at a distance of 10,560 yards.211 The Admiralty received Norfolk’s message
at 2103, before it received Suffolk’s.212 Bismarck opened fire, but Norfolk retired
safely behind a smoke screen.213 The Bismarck group’s repeated attempts to break
off contact failed.214 The B-Dienst personnel aboard both Bismarck and Prinz
Eugen deciphered Suffolk’s signal (“one battleship, one cruiser, bearing 330°, distance 6 nautical miles, course 240°”) within minutes.215 However, they mistook
Norfolk’s call sign for that of King George V.216

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/1

Winter2019Review.indb 114

120

12/4/18 11:13 AM

Naval War College: Winter 2019 Full Issue

VEGO

115

Lütjens was surprised at encountering enemy cruisers in the Denmark Strait.
However, for some reason he did not draw the proper conclusion: that the enemy
would try to block his foray into the Atlantic. He believed the British ships were
not equipped with advanced search radars; however, Suffolk had been fitted with
advanced artillery radar (Type 284/285).217 Suffolk’s radar now had an effective
range of 26,250 yards.218 In contrast, Norfolk had the older-model artillery radar
(Type 286M).219 Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were fitted with search radar; however, they lacked the accurate gunfire director, and hence were unable to drive off
shadowers using “blind” fire.220
At 2200 on May 23, the B-Dienst intercepted a message sent by a British unit,
probably a heavy cruiser, reporting that it had detected in the Denmark Strait, at
a distance of six nautical miles, one enemy battleship and one cruiser, both sailing
in a southwesterly direction.221 The B-Dienst also learned that CINC, Western
Approaches had issued a radio warning to three convoys about the possibility
of encountering enemy ships.222 These German radio intercepts revealed urgent
messages being sent to the enemy heavy units.223
Norfolk and Suffolk shadowed the Bismarck group throughout the night of May
23/24. The weather was characterized by rain and mist and the visibility was as low
as two miles. The ships “shadowed by sight and/or RDF according to visibility.”
Norfolk kept farther south and east “to cover move of enemy away from ice.”224
Phase IV: Encounter in the Denmark Strait, 0538‒0613 May 24. BCS 1 (Hood
and Prince of Wales) and its screen arrived at their assigned position at about
0205—sooner than Tovey had anticipated. Both ships turned to a course parallel
to that of Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.225 At 0200, Admiral Holland detached his
destroyers because CS 1 had lost contact with Bismarck. This was a serious error,
though, because he lost the opportunity to launch torpedo attacks on the German
ships.226 During the rest of the night, Prince of Wales obtained positions by using
RDF information from Norfolk and Suffolk.227
At 0538, Suffolk again regained contact with the Bismarck group.228 At 0545,
the Bismarck group’s B-Dienst detachment identified two enemy units: Hood
and a battleship of the King George V class (actually Prince of Wales). The enemy
ships were at a distance of 31,700 yards and sailing at high speed. At 0552, Hood
opened fire at a range of 25,000 yards. Two minutes later both German ships
responded.229 They concentrated their fire on Hood.230 The running combat distance varied from 19,650 to 22,750 yards.231 The fire of both Bismarck and Prinz
Eugen was excellent. Hood was hit by the second or third salvo, which started
fires aboard that spread rapidly.232 At 0600, Hood was straddled again. There was
a huge explosion and Hood blew up.233 It sank in three to four minutes.234 Hood
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had been able to fire only five or six salvos.235 Out of a ship’s company of ninetyfive officers and 1,324 men, only three survived.236
After the sinking of Hood, Prince of Wales engaged Bismarck. Both Prinz Eugen
and Bismarck shifted their fire onto Prince of Wales. The firing range was reduced
to eighteen thousand yards. Within two minutes, Prince of Wales was hit with
four 15-inch shells and probably three 8-inch shells. Its salvos now were falling
short and had a very large spread. Hence, Captain John Leach, the commanding
officer of Prince of Wales, decided to break off the engagement.237 By then the
range had been reduced to only 14,600 yards.238 At 0613, Prince of Wales turned
away under a smoke screen.239 The ship had two guns out of action and considerable damage to its bridge.240 Yet it had performed well, even though its crew was
only partly trained.241 Bismarck had received two heavy and one light hits. It left
a trail of oil from one of its tanks.242
At 0632, Lütjens sent a signal to Naval Group Command North informing it
that one battle cruiser, probably Hood, had been sunk, while one battleship, either
King George or Renown, was damaged and had withdrawn. Two enemy heavy
cruisers maintained contact with Bismarck. In the meantime, B-Dienst decrypted
a series of messages sent by Suffolk and Norfolk.243
Lütjens’s Fateful Decision. Admiral Lütjens made the decision not to pursue the
damaged Prince of Wales. Perhaps the main reason was that continuing the engagement would have required sailing at higher speed, resulting in higher fuel
consumption. This would have had an especially negative effect on Prinz Eugen,
because of its shorter range. Lütjens also was probably unsure whether he could
destroy Prince of Wales as quickly as he had Hood. Moreover, his principal mission was to destroy enemy shipping, not the enemy’s heavy surface ships.244
After sinking Hood, Lütjens could steer to Bergen, Trondheim, or SaintNazaire to attend to the damages he had suffered in the Denmark Strait. The
route to Bergen ran between the Faeroes and the Shetlands, with a transit distance of 1,150 nautical miles. This was the shortest route and the fastest way to
reach an area where the Luftwaffe could provide effective cover. Its major drawback was that the Bismarck group would have to sail within the effective range
of many enemy aircraft and naval bases. The possibility existed that the Home
Fleet, based at Scapa Flow, might appear. These reasons made this route the most
dangerous for the Bismarck group to take.
The route to Trondheim ran either south of Iceland (approximately 1,300 nm) or
through the Denmark Strait (approximately 1,400 nm).245 The major advantage of
the route through the Denmark Strait was that the Bismarck group would sail into
an area of extensive low visibility and close to the ice boundary, making the threat
from enemy aircraft much smaller than on the other routes. However, the threat
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of encountering enemy heavy ships could not be excluded entirely. The Bismarck
group needed to make only seven hundred nautical miles good toward Trondheim
for the Luftwaffe to protect it effectively. This route also offered the best chance
of avoiding the main body of the Home Fleet if it made a foray into the Arctic.246
The route to Saint-Nazaire was about 1,700 nautical miles long—making it
the longest route—and more than two thousand nautical miles if the Bismarck
group made a temporary swing westward. A major disadvantage of this route was
that Bismarck would run the risk of encountering a large concentration of enemy
forces. But the advantage of this route was that the vast expanse of the North Atlantic might make it possible to shake off the shadowers. Another advantage was
that reaching Saint-Nazaire would offer Bismarck a much more favorable position
for conducting war in the Atlantic.247 A major disadvantage of this route was that
the enemy could use land-based and carrier-based aircraft to detect and attack
the Bismarck group, then concentrate his heavy surface ships to prevent Bismarck
from actually reaching Saint-Nazaire.
Lütjens chose to steer for Saint-Nazaire. We only can speculate about his
reasons. In any case, it is clear that once the element of surprise was lost the best
option was to cancel the entire operation and return home.248 Some SKL staffers
and the commanders of Naval Group Command North and Naval Group Command West argued that Lütjens should have been directed to return home, but
Raeder believed that such a decision should be left to Lütjens to make.249 A better
option for Lütjens would have been to pursue Prince of Wales, destroy it, then sail
for Trondheim via the Denmark Strait.
THE BRITISH OPERATIONAL REACTION
Operational Concentration, May 24‒25
The Admiralty broadcast CS 1 sightings of the Bismarck group on May 24.
Among other things, it directed Admiral Somerville to sail from Gibraltar with
Force H to join the convoy that Repulse was to have brought south of the Clyde,
which now had only the cruiser Exeter as an escort. At the same time, the Admiralty added that “should reconnaissance today (24th) indicate that one or
both German battle cruisers have left Brest it will be necessary you alter these
instructions.” The Admiralty also ordered CS 18 (Manchester, Birmingham, and
Arethusa), which had been patrolling the Iceland–Faeroes passage, to join northeast of Langanes, Iceland, “in readiness to form a patrol line in event of enemy
breaking back.” It also arranged for air patrols with the same purpose.250
At 0800, the Battle Force was about three hundred miles away to the southeastward of the Denmark Strait and sailing at twenty-seven knots.251 Tovey believed
that the enemy, having sunk Hood, was unlikely to turn back. Hence, the best
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hope was to intercept Bismarck with the Battle Force. Tovey ordered a course
change to 260, then 240. The most unfavorable situation for the Home Fleet
would be if the enemy hugged the eastern coast of Greenland, then sailed toward
Norway’s western coast to take fuel from a waiting tanker. If that happened, Bismarck would be able to escape the pursuit by King George V.252 The Admiralty
directed Rear Admiral William F. Wake-Walker (1888–1945), commander of CS
1, to “continue to shadow Bismarck even if you run out of fuel, in order that the
commander in chief [Tovey] may catch up in time.”253
At 0801, Lütjens sent a repeat message to the SKL and both naval group commanders about the encounter in the Denmark Strait. He also reported that the
free fairway in the Denmark Strait was some fifty miles wide and contained
floating mines.254
After the engagement with Prince of Wales, the Bismarck group sailed on a
southwesterly course. Bismarck tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to shake off
the shadowers. Suffolk masterfully used RDF to maintain contact.255
In the meantime, the Admiralty made a series of tactical decisions to direct a
number of ships in the Atlantic to take part in the pursuit of Bismarck. Collectively these decisions resulted in an operational concentration. Rodney had sailed
from the Clyde on May 21 en route to Boston for refit, accompanying the troop
transport Britannia. The Admiralty gave the position of Bismarck and directed
Rodney to close in, leaving Britannia behind, with one destroyer to screen it.256
At 1022, Rodney, then some 520 miles west of Bloody Foreland, county Donegal,
Ireland, was directed to steer best course to close the enemy. Ramillies, which
was escorting Convoy HX127, was then a thousand miles south of the Bismarck
group; at 1144, it was ordered to leave the convoy and proceed to contact the enemy from the west.257 At 1234, the Admiralty ordered Revenge to sail from Halifax
and overtake Convoy HX128. The cruisers Edinburgh (then cruising near latitude
45 degrees N and longitude 21 degrees W) and London (escorting the 19,000-ton
troopship Arundel Castle from Gibraltar) received orders to “give up their task
and steer toward the enemy, husbanding fuel against future needs.”258
At 1340, the SKL and both naval group commanders received Lütjens’s message sent at 0801 on May 24. This was when they first learned about the outcome
of the encounter in the Denmark Strait, the extent of damage to Bismarck, and
Lütjens’s intent to sail for Saint-Nazaire.259
At 1400, the Bismarck group’s position was about 240 nautical miles northnortheast of Cape Farewell.260 Lütjens sent a signal to the SKL and the naval group
commanders that the battleship King George was maintaining contact with his
group. If there were no combat, his intent was to break off from the shadowers
during the night of May 24/25.261 At 1420, Lütjens directed Prinz Eugen to maintain its present course until three hours after Bismarck’s maneuver to the west to
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BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE, MAY 18, 1941
(F = flagship)
HOME FLEET
CINC, Home Fleet: Admiral Sir John C. Tovey
2 battleships: King George V (F) (at Scapa Flow), Rodney (en route from the
Clyde to Boston with Britannia)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (825 Sqdn) (at Scapa Flow, to escort Convoy
WS8B)

1ST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON (BCS 1)
Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron: Lancelot E. Holland
2 battle cruisers: Hood (at Scapa Flow), Repulse (at the Clyde, to escort
Convoy WS8B)
1 battleship: Prince of Wales (at Scapa Flow)

1ST CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 1)
Rear Admiral Commanding, CS 1: William F. Wake-Walker
2 heavy cruisers: Norfolk (on Denmark Strait patrol), Suffolk (refueling at
Reykjavík)

2ND CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 2)
Rear Admiral Commanding, CS 2: Neville Syfret
4 light cruisers: Aurora, Galatea, Kenya, Neptune (at Scapa Flow)

18TH CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 18)
Commodore C. M. Blackman
4 light cruisers: Manchester, Birmingham (on Faeroes–Iceland passage patrol);
Arethusa (en route to Reykjavík); Edinburgh (on patrol off the
Azores)

DESTROYERS
Inglefield, Intrepid (en route to Scapa Flow); Achates, Active, Antelope, Anthony, Echo, Electra, Icarus, Nestor, Punjabi (at Scapa Flow); Jupiter
(at Londonderry); Eskimo, Mishona, Somali, Tartar (at sea with Rodney and Britannia)

WESTERN APPROACHES COMMAND (Liverpool)
1 light cruiser: Hermione (en route to Scapa Flow to join CS 2)
5 destroyers (escorts for Repulse): Lance (at Scapa Flow); Assiniboine, Legion,
Saguenay (at the Clyde); Columbia (at Londonderry)

PLYMOUTH COMMAND
4th Destroyer Flotilla: Cossack, Maori, Sikh, Zulu; Piorun (Polish) (at the Clyde,
as escorts for Convoy WS8B)

NORE COMMAND
1 destroyer: Windsor (at Scapa Flow)

FORCE H (at Gibraltar)
Flag Officer Commanding, Force H: Vice Admiral Sir James F. Somerville
1 battle cruiser: Renown
1 aircraft carrier: Ark Royal (810, 818, 828 Sqdns)
1 light cruiser: Sheffield
5 destroyers: Faulkner, Foresight, Forester, Fury, Hesperus

AMERICA AND WEST INDIES COMMAND
2 battleships: Ramillies (escorting Convoy HX127), Revenge (at Halifax, Nova
Scotia)

SOUTH ATLANTIC COMMAND
1 heavy cruiser: Dorsetshire (escorting Convoy SL74)

SUBMARINES
Rear Admiral, Submarines: Max K. Horton (Aberdour / north London)
P-31 (at Scapa Flow); Sealion, Seawolf, Sturgeon (in English Channel); Pandora (en route from Gibraltar to United Kingdom); Tigris (at the
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Clyde); H44 (at Rothesay); Minerve (Q185) (French) (off Norway’s
southwestern coast)

RAF COASTAL COMMAND
No. 15 Group (Liverpool)
No. 16 Group (Chatham, Kent)
No. 18 (Pitreavie Castle, Scotland)
Sources: Training and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section), Naval Staff, Admiralty,
London, “Appendix A: Bismarck Operations; List of H.M. Ships, C.B. 3081 (3),” in Battle
Summary No. 5, pp. 38–40; Schofield, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 72–75; Air Marshal,
CINC, Coastal Command, “Dispatches of CINC Home Fleet on the Sinking of the Bismarck,” September 3, 1946, app. A, AIR 15/204, TNA; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship
Bismarck (1980), pp. 264–67; Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea,
pp. 63–64.

shake off the shadowers. Prinz Eugen then would refuel from a tanker (Belchen
or Lothringen). After receiving the signal “Hood,” it would operate independently
and conduct commerce raiding.262
At 1440, Dönitz issued an instruction to the U-boats to establish a patrol
line southeast of Cape Farewell. The aim was to lure enemy ships approaching
from the north. At that time, Lütjens’s intent was to operate in the area halfway
between Greenland and Newfoundland. The Bismarck group would carry out a
swing and lure pursuing enemy forces over the U-boat patrol line. The distance
of the U-boat patrol line from the British coast was about 1,400 nautical miles.263
The depth of the patrol line would be ten nautical miles. Dönitz ordered the Uboats to reach their assigned positions by 0600 on May 25.264
At 1445, the Admiralty requested that Admiral Wake-Walker provide information on the percentage of fighting effectiveness Bismarck retained and about
his intent to have Prince of Wales reengage. In his response at 1545, Admiral
Wake-Walker stated that he had no evidence that the damage the enemy had
received had reduced his speed at all. Wake-Walker also believed that the enemy
would not reengage but would try to avoid any combat.265 Wake-Walker also
stated that Prince of Wales “should not reengage until the other heavy ships are in
contact and unless interception fails; doubtful if she has speed to force action.”266
The reason for not reengaging Bismarck was that the cruisers of CS 1 might be
damaged and thereby forced to reduce their speed. This would make it impossible to maintain contact with Bismarck. Admiral Tovey believed that, under the
circumstances, Wake-Walker was justified in his decision. Tovey believed that his
forces were more likely ultimately to destroy Bismarck if he used the cruisers to
maintain contact until the approaching reinforcements arrived.267
At 1455, Tovey reported that Victorious, escorted by CS 2 (Galatea, Aurora,
Kenya, and Hermione), was detached to launch an aerial torpedo attack at about
2200, when within a hundred-mile range of the enemy.268 The aim was to reduce
Bismarck’s speed. Tovey believed that keeping Victorious with the Battle Force
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until the morning of the next day (May 25) would not be helpful in locating Bismarck if it had slipped away during the three hours of darkness. The remainder
of the Battle Force (King George V and Repulse) and its escorts steered an intercepting course. The aim was to bring the enemy to action soon after sunrise.269
At 1800, Tovey was with King George V, Repulse, Victorious, and two cruisers.270 CS 18 (Manchester, Birmingham, and Arethusa) was returning from a point
northeast of Iceland to Hvalfjord to refuel. The battleship Revenge left Halifax at
1505 to overtake Convoys HX128 and SC32. Admiral Somerville, with his Force
H (Renown, Ark Royal, Sheffield, and a half dozen destroyers), was directed to
join Convoy WS8B after daylight on May 26.271
In the meantime, the shadowers shortened the distance to Bismarck. At 1830,
Bismarck opened fire on Suffolk. Prince of Wales fired several salvos at Bismarck
from thirty thousand yards. However, this brief encounter did not result in damage to any of the ships.272
At 1842, Naval Group Command West sent a radio message in which it agreed
with Lütjens’s intent to release Prinz Eugen to operate independently. It informed
Lütjens that preparations were under way at Saint-Nazaire and Brest to receive
Bismarck. It also suggested that if Bismarck successfully broke away from its
shadowers it should remain in its present isolated area.273 However, Bismarck’s
reduced speed made breaking off contact more difficult. Neither Raeder nor the
two naval group commanders knew whether Lütjens had considered the possibility of avoiding the enemy by moving northward, or which factors he had
considered when he selected Saint-Nazaire.274
At 2210, nine Swordfish torpedo bombers took off from Victorious; at 2300,
they were followed by three Fulmar fighters; at 2400, two more Fulmars took off.
The weather was showery with squalls, good visibility, and a northwesterly wind.
Sunset was at 0052.275 At about midnight on May 24/25, twelve aircraft (seven
Swordfish and five Fulmars) from Victorious carried out a torpedo attack on Bismarck; however, they claimed just one hit on the ship. This first air attack failed
to inflict any serious damage on Bismarck.276
In the meantime, at 2331, the Admiralty sent new orders to Force H “to steer
so as to intercept Bismarck from the southward. Enemy must be short on fuel, and
will have to make for an oiler; her future movements may guide to this oiler.”277
Loss of Contact with Bismarck, 0213 May 25
CS 1 lost contact with Bismarck at 0213 (Prince of Wales claimed this happened
at 0126) on May 25.278 Heretofore, despite frequent and abrupt changes in the
visibility, Norfolk and Suffolk had maintained contact with Bismarck skillfully for
thirty hours.279 When Tovey received the information that contact with Bismarck
was lost, he believed that the German battleship had three options: rendezvous
with a tanker, possibly off the east coast of Greenland or farther south, such as
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near the Azores or Canary Islands; make for a dockyard on the west coast of
France, or possibly an Italian port in the Mediterranean; or return to Germany
for repairs.280
At 0300, Force H was approximately 850 miles west of Porto, Portugal. Heavy
seas had delayed its progress.281 CS 2, with Victorious and four accompanying
cruisers, was directed to organize a search northwest of Bismarck’s last known position. Norfolk and Suffolk, after remaining at the enemy’s last known position for
some time, proceeded westward to cover the southwestern sector. Rodney, with
three destroyers, reported that it was steering to intercept the enemy if it showed
up in the southeastern sector. Repulse had yet to be detached to Newfoundland
to refuel, while Prince of Wales was directed at 0620 to join Tovey’s Battle Force.
The Admiralty directed London to search the area around latitude 25° 30ʹ N, longitude 42° W, where an enemy tanker was believed to be located.282
At 0800 on May 25, Bismarck was some one hundred miles astern of King
George V, sailing southeast.283 At 0854, Lütjens sent a message in which he erroneously stated that the enemy ships still were shadowing Bismarck. The sending
of this signal gave away his position to the British radio-intercept operators. At
1030, Tovey received from the Admiralty a series of DF fixes. They indicated that
the signals appeared to come from the same ship that had transmitted several
signals soon after the torpedo attack by aircraft from Victorious the previous
night (i.e., Bismarck). When these fixes were plotted incorrectly on King George
V, they showed a position too far north. This provided a misleading indicator
that the enemy was retreating northward toward the North Sea. This information confirmed Tovey’s existing belief that Bismarck was heading north.284 This
is why Tovey directed the entire Home Fleet to search to the north. King George
V changed course to 055, increased speed to twenty-seven knots, and headed
toward the Iceland–Faeroes passage.285 But Tovey’s decision was unsound.
The Admiralty, for its part, apparently was not entirely convinced that Bismarck was sailing northward. So at 1023 the Admiralty directed Admiral Somerville and CS 1 to proceed “on assumption that enemy turned towards Brest.”286
In another signal sent at 1100, the Admiralty signaled to Somerville to “act as
though the enemy is proceeding to a Bay of Biscay port.” The Admiralty had great
difficulty obtaining accurate information about the position of Bismarck. A DF
fix at 1320 located Bismarck at a position within fifty miles of 55° 15ʹ N, 32° W.
The Admiralty transmitted this information to Tovey at 1419, and he received
it at 1530. At 1428, the Admiralty directed Rodney to ignore the signal sent at
1108, which had directed the battleship to proceed in the direction of Brest, and
to comply with Tovey’s instructions that assumed Bismarck was proceeding to
Norway via the Iceland–Scotland passage. At 1621, Tovey sent a query to the
Admiralty: “Do you consider that enemy is making for Faroes.”287
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However, by the late afternoon and early evening of May 25 the Admiralty’s
view about Bismarck’s movements had changed in favor of the Bay of Biscay
destination. At 1805, the Admiralty canceled the signal it had sent to Rodney at
1428 and directed the ship to act on the assumption that the enemy was proceeding toward a French port. Finally, at 1924, the Admiralty informed Tovey and all
other forces that it believed Bismarck was heading toward a French port. Tovey
already had come to the same conclusion at 1810, when he decided to turn his
force onto a southeasterly course, heading toward the Bay of Biscay.288
Final confirmation came in the evening and from an unlikely source. General
Hans Jeschonnek (1899‒1943), the Luftwaffe chief of staff, sent a message to the
Naval High Command asking whether Bismarck would be coming into a French
port for repairs. (The reason for this might have been personal: Jeschonnek’s son
served in Bismarck.) This message was sent in the Luftwaffe’s Enigma code, and
hence was readable to the British decoders. Jeschonnek’s message was deciphered
quickly and passed on to the Admiralty, and at 1812 was sent to Tovey as well.
Tovey’s error had given Bismarck a chance to escape.289
In the meantime, at 1320 on May 25, Raeder briefed Hitler on Bismarck’s
situation. He reported that during the night of May 24/25 the enemy had maintained contact with Bismarck. Because the enemy used advanced radar, Bismarck
had not been able to break off contact. Near Bismarck were one battleship (King
George V), two heavy cruisers, and one carrier. Lütjens reported around midnight
on May 24 that Prinz Eugen had been detached for refueling in the mid-Atlantic.
This maneuver went unobserved by the enemy. Lütjens intended to reach SaintNazaire. All available U-boats and light naval forces would be used to support
Bismarck.290
At 1932, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens about pending
actions in support of Bismarck. Air units would be used during the approach
phase to a French port. Luftwaffe aircraft would conduct reconnaissance out to
longitude 15 degrees W. Bombers would be used out to longitude 14 degrees W.
Long-range reconnaissance would be conducted out to longitude 25 degrees W.
By 1313 on May 25, six U-boats had deployed to their assigned positions (see
map 1). The approaches to Brest and Saint-Nazaire would be strongly controlled.
There also was a possibility that Bismarck could return to the port of La Pallice.291
In the evening on May 25, Tovey still had Repulse in company with King
George V. Rodney was sailing on a southeasterly course toward the Bay of Biscay.
The Admiralty recalled Ramillies to rejoin Britannia and sail to Boston. At 2100,
CS 1 was at latitude 55° 50ʹ N, longitude 31° 28ʹ W. It sailed on a southeasterly
course (120) at twenty-six knots. It was some one hundred miles behind Tovey’s
Battle Force. However, it was low on fuel, with only fifty percent remaining. The
cruiser London proceeded to search for an enemy tanker halfway between the
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Azores and the Leeward Islands. On the morning of May 26, the cruiser Edinburgh’s fuel was at only 13 percent of capacity. That evening, Prince of Wales was
directed to sail to Iceland for refueling.292
At 0053 on May 26, Naval Group Command West reported that four FW-200s
would provide loose coverage between latitudes 43° 30ʹ N and 54° 25ʹ N and out
to longitude 25 degrees W. With additional aircraft they would provide heavier
coverage out to longitude 19 degrees W in the northern part and to longitude 14
degrees W in the southern part. Despite bad weather, the four FW-200s covered
their assignment. Because of the stormy weather it was not possible to send German destroyers to the area to relieve the enemy pressure on Bismarck.293
Bismarck’s situation worsened on May 26. That morning Bismarck was some
seven hundred nautical miles away from the French coast. Some thirty-one
hours had passed since the British cruisers had lost contact with Bismarck, but
now three British forces were converging on Bismarck, plus several single large
surface combatants. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla (Cossack, Sikh, Zulu, Maori, and
Piorun) was detached from Convoy WS8B. The ships were directed to join and
screen King George V and Rodney. One destroyer (Jupiter) at Londonderry was
directed to join the same screen. After receiving the first enemy report on the
morning of May 26, the cruiser Dorsetshire left Convoy SL74 and proceeded to
join the Battle Force.294
In the meantime, other British forces that were unable to reach Bismarck’s
most probable track moved to cover its alternative possible movements. Two light
cruisers (Manchester and Birmingham) of CS 18 patrolled within the Iceland–
Faeroes passage, while another light cruiser of the same squadron (Arethusa)
patrolled the Denmark Strait. Victorious and CS 2 were positioned to prevent
the enemy from gaining access to the Iceland–Faeroes passage. If necessary,
CS 2 would be detached to fuel at Hvalfjord. Prince of Wales was on the way to
Hvalfjord and destroyers were directed to screen both Prince of Wales and CS 2.295
Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic was instructed to arrange air and
submarine patrols to prevent passage of the Strait of Gibraltar. The battleship
Nelson was recalled from Freetown to Gibraltar to reinforce the forces converging on Bismarck. The cruiser London was recalled from its search for the enemy
tanker between the Azores and the Leewards and was directed to escort Convoy
SL75, which was approaching the Bay of Biscay. Suffolk was sent to search in
the Davis Strait (between Greenland and Canada’s Baffin Island) for the enemy
supply ships and tankers believed to be in the area and from which Prinz Eugen
might refuel.296
The Admiralty’s arrangement on May 25 provided for RAF commands to
cooperate by conducting reconnaissance from Iceland and the Faeroes to and
including the coast of Norway. Canadian aircraft conducted six-hundred-mile
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searches from Newfoundland. One of the American air squadrons based in Newfoundland also took part in the searches.297 Coastal Command established two
patrols across Bismarck’s probable track, from latitude 52° 19ʹ 30˝ N to 48 degrees
N, out to longitude 23° 30ʹ W.298
Contact with Bismarck Restored
Finally, at 1030 on May 26, Bismarck was detected some six hundred nautical
miles west of Land’s End, by a Catalina seaplane of Coastal Command based at
Plymouth.299 However, the Catalina lost contact because of antiaircraft (AA) fire
from Bismarck.300 Ark Royal launched two long-range aircraft to search for Bismarck.301 At 1114, an aircraft from Ark Royal reestablished contact with Bismarck.
Bismarck’s position was latitude 49° 20ʹ N, longitude 20° 50ʹ W, or forty miles
from the position the Catalina had reported some forty-five minutes earlier.302
After this point, Bismarck was kept under almost continuous surveillance for
the rest of the day.303 Visibility in the area was variable, the wind northwesterly
at force 7–8.304 Bismarck steered a southeasterly course at twenty-two knots. The
distance between Bismarck and Tovey’s Battle Force was too great to close unless
Bismarck’s speed could be reduced. This could be accomplished only by a torpedo
attack by Ark Royal’s aircraft. At 1052, the Admiralty directed Admiral Somerville not to have Renown engage unless Bismarck already was engaged heavily
with King George V or Rodney.305
A major and increasingly critical problem for the Home Fleet was the fuel
situation, especially regarding the battleships. King George V had only 1,200 tons
of fuel remaining, or 38 percent. Rodney had to part company at 0800 on May
27. When these ships joined the Battle Force, they had to share the A/S screen
provided by only three destroyers (Somali, Tartar, and Mishona)—and those destroyers had to leave that night for lack of fuel. The British suspected that there
were several U-boats in the area. They also assumed that every available enemy
destroyer and U-boat in western France would be ordered to sail out as well. The
Admiralty warned Tovey to expect heavy air attacks.306
Tovey considered it essential to have fuel reserves sufficient to allow battleships to return to their home bases. After the loss of Hood and the damage inflicted on Prince of Wales, King George V was the only effective battleship in home
waters. Tovey was not willing to expose King George V unscreened and sailing at
low speed to almost certain attack by U-boats unless there was a good chance to
achieve results that were commensurate with the risk. Tovey’s decision was that
unless Bismarck’s speed was reduced, King George V would leave the pursuit at
2400 on May 26 and proceed to refuel.307
At 1115, Bismarck reported its position some six hundred nautical miles west
of Brest. In the afternoon Lütjens was directed that if the bad weather in the Bay
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of Biscay prevented him from proceeding to Saint-Nazaire he should steer toward
Brest. Reichsmarschal Göring directed the Luftwaffe to make all efforts with the
aircraft available to support Bismarck’s return.308
At 1315, Somerville detached the cruiser Sheffield.309 The Admiralty also
directed Somerville not to engage Bismarck until other battleships arrived in
the vicinity; Force H’s Renown was no match for Bismarck.310 In the afternoon,
Sheffield obtained contact with Bismarck. The first aerial striking force from Ark
Royal flew at about 1450.311 Sheffield vectored the attack in.312 The aircraft reached
Bismarck at about 1550 and carried out their torpedo attack.313 However, all the
torpedoes missed their target.314
At 1630, an aircraft from Ark Royal reported Bismarck’s position at latitude
47° 40ʹ N, longitude 18° 15ʹ W. Bismarck was steering a southeasterly course
(120) at twenty-two knots. Somerville directed Sheffield to maintain contact with
Bismarck, while he kept Ark Royal and Renown outside the effective range of
Bismarck’s heavy guns.315
In one message from Lütjens, the SKL learned that Bismarck’s loss of fuel from
its ongoing leak was more serious than hitherto believed. Naval Group Command West considered sending one supply ship (Ermland) during the night of
May 26/27 to refuel Bismarck.316 By the evening the situation was considered very
serious, but the SKL expected that Bismarck would be able to defend itself against
torpedo attacks and in the early morning would be within the effective range of
Luftwaffe aircraft.317
Six U-boats were concentrated not far away from Bismarck; four had torpedoes, while two were without. At 1900, one U-boat (U-48) was directed to sail at
highest speed toward Sheffield, yet it never established contact.318 At 2000, one
U-boat (U-556) obtained contact with a battleship of the King George class, and
the carrier Ark Royal passed within effective range, but the U-boat had no torpedoes, and it lost contact.319
At 1910, fifteen Swordfish aircraft flew off from Ark Royal.320 Sheffield directed
them to Bismarck.321 Weather conditions were bad: skies 7/10 covered by low
rain clouds; winds force 6; seas rolling, with a northwesterly swell; and daylight
fading.322 The first wave of aircraft attacked at 2053.323 The British attack was
not synchronized, spreading over thirty-eight minutes, and only two of thirteen
torpedoes fired scored a hit. One torpedo hit the armor belt and had little effect.
But the second torpedo sealed Bismarck’s fate: it damaged the ship’s propellers,
wrecked its steering gear, and jammed its rudders.324 This severely affected Bismarck’s ability to maneuver, and therefore to continue sailing toward a French
port.325 The German AA fire was intense and accurate; Bismarck’s AA guns shot
down seven British aircraft.326
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The Germans intercepted many of the British radio messages to the destroyers and Force H.327 Observation and radio intercepts indicated that Bismarck was
surrounded by at least three, possibly four, battleships; the carrier Ark Royal; two
heavy cruisers; one light cruiser, and possibly a second; and the 4th Destroyer
Flotilla, with many modern destroyers.328 This spelled a situation that was hopeless for Bismarck. It was also tragic, because, except for being unable to maneuver,
the ship retained its full striking power.329 At that time, Bismarck was only four
hundred nautical miles from Brest, but enemy forces in the vicinity made it impossible to bring tankers to refuel.330 Very bad weather prevented the Germans
from using their destroyers or bringing out tugs to take Bismarck in tow. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were undergoing repairs. Bismarck’s only support would
come from the Luftwaffe and the U-boats operating in the Bay of Biscay.331
Admiral Tovey decided to detach from the Battle Force all five destroyers of
the 4th Destroyer Flotilla. They were directed to shadow and attack Bismarck.
Their reports to Tovey throughout the night were invaluable. Tovey requested
that Force H, with Ark Royal and Renown, withdraw southward to clear the way
for his battleships to close with Bismarck in the morning. The heavy cruiser Norfolk also arrived in the area.332
At about midnight, Lütjens sent a message to Naval Group Command West:
“Ship is able to defend itself and propulsion plant intact. Does not respond to
steering with engines, however.”333 The weather conditions were unfavorable. The
horizon was clear from northwest to northeast, but other sectors experienced
rainstorms and poor visibility. Bismarck made frequent changes of course between southwest and northeast. Its speed was only ten to twelve knots.334 Between
0122 and 0146 on May 27, three British destroyers (Cossack, Zulu, and Maori)
carried out torpedo attacks on Bismarck. Each destroyer achieved one hit.335 Bismarck’s speed was reduced to only eight knots and its movements became even
more erratic. Yet Bismarck still was able to deliver heavy and accurate fire.336
At 2400, Lütjens sent a message to Hitler: “We fight to the last in our belief
in you, my Führer, and in unshakable confidence in Germany’s victory.” At the
same time he also sent a message to Naval High Command and Naval Group
Command West: “Unable to maneuver. We fight until the last grenade. Long live
the Führer.” At 0153, Hitler sent a message to Lütjens: “Thank you in the name of
the entire German people.” He also addressed Bismarck’s crew: “All of Germany
is with you. What can still be done will be done.”337
At 0542, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens that two FW-200s
had taken off at 0330 to conduct reconnaissance from 0445 to 0515, with another three bomber groups taking off at 0530.338 This was despite the fact that
the weather was highly unfavorable for air operations.339 Some German aircraft
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established contact with enemy cruisers and destroyers, but their effect on the
Bismarck situation was negligible.340
At 0835, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens that at about 1100 on
May 27, the Spanish cruiser Canarias and two destroyers would leave El Ferrol
en route to Bismarck’s position, to be available to render assistance. They would
proceed at twenty to twenty-two knots.341
The End
In the morning on May 27, weather conditions were winds northwesterly at force
8, skies overcast, rainsqualls, and visibility of thirteen miles or so. Sunrise was at
0702.342 Bismarck sailed on course 330 at ten knots (see map 2). At 0755, Tovey’s
force had the enemy on bearing 120 at twenty-one miles. Tovey directed a course
change to the east (080) to close with Bismarck.343 At 0900, King George V and
Rodney turned to a southerly course (170) and opened fire with their main guns.
By 0930, Bismarck was on fire and virtually out of control; however, its speed was
not reduced, and its main guns still were firing. It also used its secondary armament.344 At 0954, Norfolk joined the action. All three ships fired independently at
ranges as short as 3,300 yards. By 1000, Bismarck’s main guns were out of action,
and ten minutes later the secondary guns stopped firing. Bismarck was now a
wreck, on fire fore and aft and wallowing heavily.345 Tovey ordered a stop to the
action, and all firing ceased at 1022. The cruiser Dorsetshire (which had left Convoy SL74) had just arrived at the scene of the action.346 Tovey ordered Dorsetshire
to close in to finish off Bismarck by torpedoing. So perhaps it was Dorsetshire’s
torpedoes that sank Bismarck, although German sources maintain that the ship
was sunk by activating scuttling charges.347 Bismarck sank at 1037, at latitude 48°
10ʹ N, longitude 16° 12ʹ W. Its colors still flew.348
Out of 2,200 men aboard the ship, only 115 were saved.349 The cruiser Dorsetshire took aboard eighty-five survivors and the destroyer Maori twenty-five. Then
the British ships stopped their efforts because of their concern that U-boats were
in the vicinity. U-74 saved three men and one weather steamer (Sachsenwald)
picked up two men on May 28.350
Bismarck showed a remarkable resilience. Out of seventy-one torpedoes fired,
at least eight, if not twelve, hit the ship.351 The number of hits by 16-inch shells
is unknown, but must have been very large. World War I had demonstrated the
Germans’ ability to build tremendously stout ships, and apparently they had not
lost it during the interwar years.352
Withdrawal of the Home Fleet
The ships of the Home Fleet returned to their bases in northern Scotland. King
George V and Rodney, with three destroyers (Cossack, Sikh, and Zulu), proceeded
northward. Dorsetshire and Maori rejoined them at 1230 on May 27, and nine
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other destroyers rejoined at 1600 on May 28. They received several signals warning of heavy enemy attacks on that day, but only four enemy aircraft appeared.
However, at 1200 on the 28th, one hundred miles to the south, destroyers Mishona and Tartar suffered heavy attacks, and Mishona was sunk. Rodney, screened by
Maori, and Columbia were detached to the Clyde at 1700 on May 28. Dorsetshire
was detached to the Tyne at 2316. Fog delayed the battleships, but they entered
Loch Ewe eventually, at 1230 on May 29.353
In his after-action report, Tovey wrote: “She [Bismarck] had put up a most
gallant fight against impossible odds, worthy of the old days of the Imperial
German Navy.” He opined that it was unfortunate that “for political reasons”
this fact could not be made public.354 Tovey praised the cooperation, skill, and
understanding that all forces had displayed during the prolonged chase of Bismarck; flag officers and commanding officers invariably acted as “I would have
wished before and without receiving instructions from me.”355 The Admiralty
exercised excellent strategic control. The coordination of the movements and
actions of the many disparate forces across a large part of the northern Atlantic
was superb. Admiral Tovey wrote that “the accuracy of information supplied by
the Admiralty and the speed with which it was passed were remarkable, and the
balance struck between information and instructions passed to the forces out of
visual touch with me was ideal.”356
The failure of RHEINÜBUNG and the sinking of Bismarck had a major effect
on the future employment of German heavy surface combatants against British
and Allied shipping in the North Atlantic. Admiral Raeder wrote later that prior
to May 27, 1941, he had considerable freedom of action in determining the employment of heavy surface ships, as long as there were no negative effects on the
actions of other services of the Wehrmacht. But because of the loss of Bismarck,
Hitler in his subsequent instructions greatly limited that freedom. Among other
things, he prohibited the sending of heavy ships to conduct commerce warfare
in the Atlantic, and the Kriegsmarine attempted no such operations for the remainder of the war.357
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The main reasons for the failure of RHEINÜBUNG were as follows: the German
surface ships’ base of operations was extremely unfavorable in multiple ways; the
plan was overly reliant on the ships breaking out into the North Atlantic undetected; and—perhaps most important—air reconnaissance was inadequate, and
the ships were operating beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe aircraft.
The deployment and combat employment of the forces opposing R HEIN
ÜBUNG took place over the vast space of the North Atlantic. The harsh weather
conditions significantly affected the employment of surface ships and aircraft
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and the effectiveness of their weapons and sensors. Bad weather in the Denmark
Strait favored the Germans because it greatly enhanced the chances of an undetected breakout into the North Atlantic.
The German surface ships and aircraft operated from a very long and fragmented base of operations. Gaining access from the Arctic to the open waters
of the North Atlantic was extremely difficult. The British not only controlled
Iceland and all three passages to the Atlantic but also kept under surveillance the
southern part of the Arctic and southern Norway. Any German attempt to break
out to the North Atlantic was inherently a high-risk endeavor. Although the
Germans were well aware that British monitoring of the northern passages had
improved steadily over the course of 1941, they apparently were overconfident
in their ability to use bad weather to make an unobserved breakout through the
Denmark Strait.
Success in a war at sea is difficult and sometimes impossible to achieve without
favorable positions for basing one’s naval forces and aircraft. Disadvantages of
geography can be reduced but not eliminated by having highly capable ships and
aircraft. One of the key responsibilities of operational commanders and their staffs
is to evaluate realistically all aspects of the operating areas. In planning a major
naval/joint operation, it is critical to maximize the advantages and minimize the
disadvantages of one’s base of operations.
Both the Kriegsmarine and the Royal Navy were highly centralized organizations. Admiral Raeder was generally reluctant to allow full freedom of action
to subordinate operational commanders. The operational, and in many cases
the tactical, organization of the Kriegsmarine underwent frequent—and sometimes unnecessary—changes. The establishment of naval group commands did
not simplify but instead considerably complicated the C2 of German seagoing
forces. Naval group commands should not have been entrusted with operational
command of fleet forces. Raeder made an unsound organizational decision by
directing Lütjens, a four-star admiral, to command a single combat group at sea;
by doing so, Lütjens became subordinate in some matters to a junior admiral
(Saalwächter, the commander of Naval Group Command West). Perhaps such a
decision would have been appropriate if the entire operation had been carried out
using four battleships, as originally envisaged. The Kriegsmarine failed to move
the fleet headquarters ashore. If that had been done, the fleet commander would
have been a supported commander, while the naval groups’ commanders would
have been supporting commanders.
In the Royal Navy, the Admiralty exercised strategic, and in some cases operational, control over all seagoing forces and shore commands. It also often usurped
the responsibilities of subordinate commanders by making purely tactical decisions. The Home Fleet was the largest and most important seagoing force in
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home waters. Like the Kriegsmarine’s Fleet Command, the Home Fleet consisted
of several type commands. Each of these was responsible for both administration and operations. In combat, it is far more flexible and effective to organize
diverse forces into task forces/groups subordinate directly to the respective fleet
commanders. Type commanders should be responsible solely for combat training
and administration.
A major factor in the successful outcome of a major naval/joint operation is
sound operational command organization. Optimally, unity of effort should be
based on unity of command. A single operational commander should have full authority over and responsibility for subordinate tactical forces. Such authority should
not be shared among two or more commanders. Prior to the planning process,
higher authority should designate a single supported commander. All other commanders should support the supported operational commander fully.
Both British and German operational and tactical intelligence relied primarily on information obtained via air reconnaissance. Especially useful was
photoreconnaissance. At this time the British ability to penetrate and read the
German Enigma messages was not as effective as it would be later in the war. In
contrast, the German B-Dienst seems to have been highly effective in decrypting
British radio messages. One of the German advantages was that B-Dienst teams
embarked in major surface combatants, and they usually were very quick in decrypting enemy messages. The major advantage the British enjoyed over the Germans was their establishment of a highly effective network of agents in Norway
and other Scandinavian countries; perhaps the most effective of these was the British naval attaché in Stockholm and his helpers within the Swedish secret service.
Operational intelligence is one of the key elements for preparing sound plans for
a major naval/joint operation. It combines strategic and tactical intelligence. Operational intelligence should be based on information collected from diverse sources.
Human intelligence is a critical and irreplaceable source for obtaining an accurate,
timely, and relevant operational picture of the situation.
German naval operational planning was methodical and thorough. Normally, plans for a major operation were based on a relatively large number of
staff studies and critical comments on these studies by the SKL and naval group
commanders. The SKL and naval group commanders usually would issue broad
instructions, while tactical commanders would draft operations orders for subordinate commanders. The SKL’s objective was to employ the Kriegsmarine’s
heavy surface forces and auxiliary cruisers to complement the U-boats in their
war on the British transatlantic convoys. Raeder’s intent was to weaken British
naval strength in either home waters or the Mediterranean, and either to increase
convoy defenses or to reduce the number of convoys.
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For the Germans, an almost insurmountable problem was their numerical inferiority in surface forces and a lack of adequate and reliable air support. Hence,
the loss of any major surface combatant such as a battleship would have a much
greater negative effect than such a loss would have on the Royal Navy. For all the
high quality of its staff studies and the solid planning it conducted, the SKL made
some very unrealistic assumptions about the effect that employment of battleships would have on the naval situation in the North Atlantic. Perhaps the single
most important reason they were unrealistic was geography. Even if the Germans
incrementally had achieved sea control in the North Atlantic, they were not in a
position to maintain that control for any length of time; both the Kriegsmarine
and the Luftwaffe lacked sufficient strength and favorable bases of operations to
control such a vast area of ocean.
Sea control cannot be achieved by focusing on destroying the enemy forces defending convoys. Doing so invariably will result in a protracted war of attrition. Sea
control is accomplished primarily by destroying a major part of the enemy forces in
a major naval/joint operation in the initial phase of the war at sea. The obtaining
of sea control aims at accomplishing an operational or strategic objective; however,
consolidating one’s operational/strategic success by maintaining sea control also is
critical—otherwise the fruits of victory will be lost.
There is no doubt that the decision Raeder faced—whether to employ the
Bismarck combat group by itself in a new major operation against enemy convoys in the Atlantic—was a difficult one. The original intent—employing four
battleships—probably had a much greater chance of success. Another good
option would have been to delay the operation until Tirpitz, at least, was fully
operational. The employment of both Bismarck and Tirpitz jointly would have
compounded greatly the British problem in terms of preventing their breakouts
and their subsequent attacks on the transatlantic convoys. In using the Bismarck
group alone, Raeder took a high—and imprudent—risk. Everything depended
on the Bismarck group breaking out undetected; otherwise, it was reasonable to
expect (and not just in retrospect) that the British would make an all-out effort
to destroy the Bismarck group. Even if Bismarck successfully avoided detection
and subsequently attacked the convoys, it was almost certain the British would
do everything possible to prevent its return either through the Denmark Strait
or into a French port in the Bay of Biscay. Raeder’s concept of employing heavy
cruisers and auxiliary cruisers to attack enemy ocean shipping was essentially
sound; however, battleships—especially those of the Bismarck class—were another matter. The risk involved in employing such major surface combatants
beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe aircraft was simply too great, and hence
unacceptable. The Germans were well aware of the air threat to their surface

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

Winter2019Review.indb 133

139

12/4/18 11:13 AM

134

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1

ships, yet apparently their faith in their ability to break them out into the North
Atlantic undetected was too strong.
The operational deployment of the Bismarck group from Gotenhafen to Korsfjord, Bergen, proceeded uneventfully. But after the Admiralty and Home Fleet
received information from the naval attaché in Stockholm about the passage of
the Bismarck group through the Great Belt, they acted quickly. The cruise patrol
in the Denmark Strait was strengthened. A part of the Home Fleet then in Scapa
Flow was put into a state of increased combat readiness. Air reconnaissance of
the Norwegian ports and Arctic waters was intensified. Admiral Tovey properly
evaluated the situation and made sound decisions for the subsequent disposition
of his forces. Prior to the encounter in the Denmark Strait, Tovey’s dispositions
of the Battle Force and cruiser patrols covered all three northern passages, while
keeping his Battle Force centrally positioned and able to intervene in a timely
fashion toward the west or east.
The Germans suspected that British agents had sighted the movement of the
Bismarck group, but Admiral Lütjens made no major changes to his plans despite
his suspicions. Perhaps the chances of a successful breakout into the North Atlantic would have been greater if the Bismarck group had sailed to Trondheim
instead of Korsfjord, and had remained there for several weeks. This would have
kept the British in suspense about the direction and timing of the group’s next
movement.
Tactically, Lütjens handled the Bismarck group much better than his counterpart, Admiral Holland, handled his forces. The gunnery of both Bismarck and
Prinz Eugen was superior to that of the British ships. Holland made a mistake in
detaching his destroyers prior to the encounter, thereby missing the opportunity
to use them for a torpedo attack on the Bismarck group. Lütjens made a sound
tactical decision in not pursuing the damaged Prince of Wales; his main mission
was to attack enemy convoys, not to engage enemy heavy surface ships. Bismarck
had suffered damages in the encounter with Prince of Wales and their extent was
not precisely known at the time he had to make his decision. Reengaging Prince
of Wales might well have resulted in additional damage to Bismarck.
Why Admiral Lütjens decided on the morning of May 24 to steer for SaintNazaire instead of turning north and heading for Trondheim or Bergen is not
known. He probably had good reason to believe that it would be possible to break
away from his pursuers and make a westward swing into the open spaces of the
North Atlantic. Yet he was well aware that once his group was discovered the
British would make an all-out effort to destroy it. He also was much concerned
with the threat that enemy carrier-borne torpedo planes posed. At the same time,
the Bismarck group would operate well beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe
bombers. In retrospect, it seems that after the encounter with BCS 1 the sound
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decision would have been to withdraw back through the Denmark Strait. If
Lütjens had made the decision to do so quickly, he would have had a very good
chance of not encountering enemy heavy forces on his way to Trondheim or Bergen. In addition, the Bismarck group would have reached the protective cover of
Luftwaffe aircraft much sooner than on the route to Saint-Nazaire.
The British cruisers’ masterful use of their search radars made it impossible for
the Germans to shake off their pursuers. This was a major reason the Admiralty
and Admiral Tovey eventually were able to concentrate an overwhelming force
against Bismarck. The Admiralty took a high but prudent risk in detaching so
many ships from convoy duty to take part in the pursuit. In the final phase of the
operation, Bismarck’s chances diminished steadily. Perhaps if Bismarck had not
unluckily received the torpedo hit that disabled its rudder there would have been
some chance for the ship to reach the safety of a French port. Whether that would
have allowed Bismarck to survive is a question no one can answer for certain.
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dent Trump they will throw away all they built
Federalist Papers, and the Future of Liberal World
Order.
from the rubble of the Second World War. This
quasi-religious terminology seems appropriate,
© 2018 by Karl Walling
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that—whatever partisan differences Americans may have—American grand
strategy depends on a consensus akin to what Abraham Lincoln called a “political religion” about what the strategy is for. Both authors agree on something
fundamental, made famous at the dawn of the Cold War by the journalist Walter
Lippmann: that the grand strategic dimension of foreign policy entails “bringing
into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power” (Brands, p. 128; Hendrickson, pp. 172–75).
As Brands discusses the issue, there are three generic solutions to this problem: (1) “decrease commitments, thereby restoring equilibrium with diminished
resources”; (2) “live with greater risk,” either by gambling that adversaries will
not test vulnerable commitments or by employing riskier approaches, such as
nuclear escalation or cyber warfare, to “sustain commitments on the cheap”; or
(3) “expand capabilities and thereby restore strategic solvency” (Brands, p. 128).
Moreover, both writers express some admiration for Richard Nixon and Henry
Kissinger for attempting a grand strategic reassessment meant to correct American overextension by reducing some commitments and shifting some burdens to
American allies during the Vietnam War (Brands, pp. 115, 118, 140; Hendrickson, pp. 175–80). The difference is that Hendrickson stresses reducing commitments, while Brands stresses increasing capabilities, to close what can be called
the Lippmann Gap. In theory, either solution might work; but which is best?
That depends, in part, on how one understands what grand strategy is for.
Hendrickson is emphatic: Americans have lost their way. Like an Old Testament
prophet, he tries to recall us to the original covenant. Primacy, or empire, was
never the ultimate purpose of the American republic. The purpose of the American regime is to secure republican liberty, not everywhere—however much one
might wish well to those who seek it elsewhere—but at home, with the survival
of liberty in America a beacon of hope to those other places. So Hendrickson
stresses the primacy of domestic policy. All grand strategic decisions must be
evaluated not merely in terms of how well they secure life and material prosperity
but, ultimately, and most fundamentally, in terms of how well they secure liberty
for ourselves and our posterity.
Like Brands, Hendrickson is aware that the pursuit of continued primacy, or
the ability to dominate in any conflict, has animated the grand strategic visions
of every American president since the end of the George H. W. Bush administration. Both agree that there is far more continuity than change in this pursuit;
usually disagreements occur over different emphases. These include soft versus
hard power; with allied support or not; and through forward presence in Europe,
Asia, and the Middle East, at the risk of encouraging free riders, or by some light
footprint meant to limit American liability and avoid local and international
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blowback. For Hendrickson, however, the primary issue is how well these approaches serve liberty at home and American principles of liberty abroad.
Hendrickson is damning in his critique of primacy as a threat to just about
everything the American republic is meant to stand for. Empires tend to need
emperors—which leads to imperial presidencies. Since September 11, 2001,
presidents have used the original authorization to use military force against Al
Qaeda to justify interventions, well, almost everywhere in Northeast Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa, and Congress has failed to provide a serious check.
And the increasing growth of the national security state—what Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was no liberal, called the military-industrial complex—constitutes an
enormous transfer of power to unaccountable elites. Drunk on the ideology of
spreading democracy everywhere, Americans, as John Quincy Adams long ago
warned might happen, have gone abroad in search of monsters to destroy but
have become monsters themselves, wreaking havoc with unnecessary wars and
creating anarchy in Libya and Iraq in the name of regime change.
So Hendrickson advocates restraint, although it looks a lot like retrenchment.
Fearful of aggravating conflict further, he suggests that American grand strategy
focus on avoiding giving unnecessary offense. It would be prudent, he thinks, for
the United States to adopt a policy of self-limitation—which others might see as
accepting spheres of influence, for Russia and China especially. War with a resurgent Russia and a rising China would be less likely if the United States changed
its policy, and also its strategy. Forward deployments of American military forces
give unnecessary offense and should be minimized. Maritime strategies to fight
anywhere near the coast of China are unduly provocative and probably doomed
to fail, while attritional strategies on the high seas have better odds of success.
Consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, the United States should shift the burden
of defense and deterrence as much as possible onto regional allies, and hold its
forces in reserve until required. Hendrickson’s approach, by limiting American
reach, might prevent strategic overextension, which he sees in political more than
military or economic terms. The more the United States acts like an empire, the
greater the threat to the republic, so restraint is essential to the true purposes of
an American grand strategy.
Not so fast, says Brands, to all advocates of restraint today. Yes, the Iraq War was
almost certainly a mistake, but the New Testament in American grand strategy
has accomplished unprecedented good. The American-led liberal international
order has prevented great-power war—the greatest killer in history—since 1945;
that is, for over seventy years. In Europe and Asia especially, this has produced a
security community with a degree of wealth and liberty almost unimaginable a
hundred years ago. It is based on two premises: the reality of security, economic,
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and other forms of interdependence; and the continuing indispensability of the
United States as the hegemon (not to be confused with emperor) of a voluntary
and usually cooperative network of alliances, in Europe and Asia especially, and
more problematically in the Middle East.
Of course, Hendrickson, like many other advocates of restraint, does not want
to throw this extraordinary accomplishment away; he supports preserving the
American network of regional alliances, but at the lowest possible level of cost,
risk, and effort, to minimize the dangers the national security state might pose to
liberty at home. In contrast, Brands warns against attempting to hold the liberal
international order together on the cheap. Prudence requires understanding that
as Americans retrench, allies may not pick up the slack, or even might “bandwagon” over to the side of challengers. And Brands is at his best critiquing theories
of offshore balancing and limited liability as ways of closing the Lippmann Gap.
Maybe retrenchment might lower short-term costs, but it also might increase
the risks that other powers will fill a vacuum, which would lead to higher costs
later if Americans decided to reintervene, as they did in Iraq after the rise of ISIS.
Costs might be lower with a sustained, minimal presence in theaters deemed strategically vital to the United States—but only maybe. So Brands is unapologetic
in insisting that the best grand strategy for our time is to increase capabilities
substantially—on the level of the increase of the Carter and Reagan administrations, that is, by 50 percent, although he insists this would amount to no more
than 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), much lower than during the
hottest periods of the Cold War. So, ironically, he too seems to think there are
cheap solutions to America’s grand strategic problems.
In truth, both Hendrickson and Brands are living in semi-ideal worlds. Even
in the age of President Trump, the option of Lippmann’s that Americans are most
likely to pick—deliberately or through inertia—is the one about which neither
Hendrickson nor Brands talks much: accepting higher risk. Americans do not yet
wish to downgrade commitments to the level Hendrickson advises, nor to pay
the cost of increased capabilities at the level Brands advocates. This is obviously a
dangerous predicament, but not unlike those of the Cold War, when, to cut costs,
Americans accepted greater risks by threatening massive nuclear retaliation and
the escalation that might ensue.
But, as Clausewitz teaches, strategy, even grand strategy, is about the imaginative search for options, and then selecting the best, according to such criteria as
cost, risk, theory of victory, and probability of success. Brands is so much a part of
the New Testament orthodoxy, and so fearful of the heresies of the 2016 election
and its aftermath, that he says nothing—absolutely nothing—about the dangers
to the American republic arising from the quest for primacy. And Brands is too
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facile on the subject of “democracy promotion” as an end of American grand
strategy. As a student of John Quincy Adams, Hendrickson is all too aware that
this can lead, and often has led, to a form of democratic imperialism incompatible with American principles, rightly understood. Yes, the Old Testament is old,
but it is not “overcome by events.” It is still worth reading precisely because it calls
us back to first principles.
Are there any other grand strategic options? Of course. One such might split
the profound difference between Hendrickson and Brands. It would accept
the necessity of primacy, but not at all times and all places against everyone—
a recipe for strategic overextension and moral decline, with the United States
risking emulating the Roman Republic in becoming a new Roman Empire. It
would suffice for the United States to be primus inter pares (first among equals)
within the liberal order, which it built, not altruistically, but to serve American
security and principles. Limited primacy—to lead a coalition, not to dominate
the globe—might preserve the liberal international order, so long as burdens are
adjusted more equitably.
Hard military power is largely a function of economic power. Today, the United States produces 24 percent of global GDP; the European Union 23 percent;
Japan 4.1 percent; and South Korea 1.8 percent—the latter the same as resurgent
Russia’s! China has 18.5 percent, and its share is growing; but, given its demographics and other problems, how long that will remain true is unclear. Throw
in some other possible allies, such as India or Vietnam, and the United States
and its current allies—sometimes called the West, even when some reside in the
East—are still in the catbird seat.
These countries just have to work together as members of a team—a questionable proposition in current political circumstances, but not inconsistent with
practice since the end of the Second World War. It just requires the United States
to lead, rather than divide, its own team.
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sea power does europe still get it?

Martin N. Murphy

The Decline of European Naval Forces: Challenges to Sea Power
in an Age of Fiscal Austerity and Political Uncertainty, by
Jeremy Stöhs. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018. 290
pages. $36.95.

This is a lucid tour d’horizon of a dispiriting subject: Europe’s navies. With the
partial exceptions of the British and French navies, and the peculiar exceptions
of Norway and Sweden—which exist under the dark shadow of Russia—all other
European navies have suffered from deliberate neglect, wishful thinking, and
poor decision-making. Furthermore, they appear to view the world as Europe’s
politicians want it to be rather than as it is.
Underpinning all this credulity is the assumption that America will ride to
Europe’s rescue; most of Europe’s navies could not operate without at least some
degree of U.S. support. President Donald J. Trump’s harsh warning that North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies—Germany especially—need to increase their defense spending should be repeated regularly until they do. They
should not see the U.S. Defense Department’s recent actions—deliberations
about whether to maintain a carrier regularly in the Mediterranean to counter
an increasingly assertive Russian naval presence in the region and the announcement from the Chief of Naval Operations that the Second Fleet will be reestablished because of the marked rise in Russian submarine activity in the North
Atlantic—as excuses to believe that things have returned to some faux–Cold War
normal and they once again can shelter under a U.S. umbrella.
To be sure, Russia is breathing down Europe’s neck, but it is China that pre
sents the real danger. The world’s seas are gaining importance: for trade, fish,
energy, minerals, and, of course, great-power confrontation. Key to all these is sea
control underpinned, from a Western perspective, by a freedom of the seas that
China is seeking to deny to others except on its own terms. The front line lies in
the waters around Taiwan, stretching down into the South China Sea and slowly
extending into the eastern Indian Ocean.
Martin N. Murphy is a research fellow at the Corbett
So far, the only state standing in China’s way
Centre for Maritime Policy Studies at King’s College
is
the
United States, with Japan in support. The
London and an associate fellow of the Royal United
Services Institute.
United States already is concentrating its forces
in the Indo-Pacific theater and making it clear
© 2018 by Martin N. Murphy
Naval War College Review, Winter 2019, Vol. 72, No. 1
that it is looking to other states to join it and
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internationalize the pushback against the fundamental threat that China presents
to the existing global maritime order. Europe’s problem, in other words, is that
not only is the United States largely leaving Europe to fend for itself in its own
waters, but it is expecting its allies to join the only fight that counts (pp. 18–19,
23, 27).
Britain and France alone are taking steps to support the United States and
Japan. However, the help they can provide is largely moral, given the damage
that a quarter century of cuts has imposed on their fleets and absent a substantial
recommitment to their naval capabilities. Unless other navies join this effort and
their political leaders support it, then, as Stöhs writes, Europe will have “relegated
itself to the outer fringes of a world centered on the Pacific” (p. 8).
Stöhs, who is an analyst at Kiel University’s Institute for Security Policy and
an adjunct at its Center for Maritime Strategy and Security, describes his main
objective as giving readers an insight into the developments and changes that
have occurred in Europe’s navies since the end of the Cold War. He succeeds admirably. He examines all of Europe’s principal naval powers comparatively from
a platform-centric point of view, using graphs to illustrate the steep declines in
their military expenditure and warship numbers.
Stöhs shows how little Europe’s current navies resemble their Cold War predecessors. Britain and France remain powerful, but even they are no longer in the
first rank of naval powers. The disappearance of the Soviet threat after 1991 left
politicians across the continent eager to spend the so-called peace dividend and
their navies scrambling for something to justify their existence.
Like the U.S. Navy, they mostly found that justification in power projection
and expeditionary operations, first in Iraq and later in support of humanitarian
assistance and the war on terror. However, each of these functions sacrificed
the skills and equipment to fulfill traditional naval missions, a decline that is
most noticeable at the upper end of the conflict spectrum. Germany is the most
egregious example; effectively, it is taking advantage of its neighbors’ sea power
as Europe collectively takes advantage of the sea power of the United States. As
Stöhs puts it, numerous indicators suggest that “Germany will remain unwilling to conduct any form of high-intensity warfighting in the foreseeable future”
(p. 129). In other words, although naval forces across Europe look powerful on
paper, that strength—with the partial exceptions of Britain and France—is concentrated at the lower level of the intensity scale.
This stands in stark contrast with Indo-Pacific navies that are configured for
war fighting. Europe’s smaller navies, moreover, have continued the Cold War
practice of niche specialization as an answer to inadequate funding. To make that
work, great strides have been made to improve interoperability. However, what
was justifiable and practical as part of NATO in the face of the relatively narrow
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range of Cold War threats looks imprudent now in the face of challenges that are
less predictable and more distant. Many European states rely on the naval forces
of neighbors (and the United States) to fill capability gaps to make them relevant
at all (pp. 187–89).
This is an important and timely book. Europe lies on the periphery of America’s vision. It catches our eye largely because of Russia’s newfound adventurism.
Yet it remains important to us, not least because of the growing confrontation
with China that is driven by rival values as well as by rival power. Europe should
be our ally. Given the importance of the sea in future power balances, economic
as well as geopolitical, and Europe’s reliance on the sea for its own economic wellbeing, our mutual interest should be obvious across a continent whose history is
so rooted in sea power.
But it is not. As Stöhs notes, it is difficult to persuade any nation’s taxpayers
of the sea’s importance, especially in the absence of clear political leadership,
and across Europe that leadership, political and military, cannot agree on common goals (pp. 182, 192). These divisions well may widen when Britain leaves
the European Union (EU) and the European Commission attempts to boost its
much-vaunted “defense union” at the expense of NATO.
NATO operates on consensus, which it is hard to believe will extend to the
East Asia littoral absent a clear and present danger, a recognition that is muddied
by the economic leverage that China has gained over powerful political interests
in several member states. The EU, despite its political posturing, is largely irrelevant for the moment. If that changes, from a defense perspective as it already
has from an economic one, Europe is likely to become more insular, less global,
and even less naval in its outlook.
Sea power, both economic and military, will play a critical role in the world’s
future. The question Stöhs raises (p. 6) for Europe is: Whose sea power will it be?
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WHEN ELEPHANTS DANCE
World War II at Sea: A Global History, by Craig L. Symonds. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2018. 792
pages. $34.95.

Craig Symonds evidently believes in
taking on roles that reasonably could be
regarded as tough acts to follow.
He followed the eminent Professor
E. B. Potter at the U.S. Naval Academy
and he is currently Professor John B.
Hattendorf ’s successor as (appropriately) the Ernest J. King Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Maritime
History at the Naval War College.
Consequently, whereas most scholarship
on World War II tends to concentrate
on single geographic areas, such as the
Pacific, the Atlantic, or the Mediterranean, or specific themes, Professor
Symonds has undertaken the daunting
task of describing and explaining in
one volume the complex, interrelated
“impact of the sea services from all nations on the overall trajectory and even
the outcome of the war” (p. xii). True to
his word, Symonds includes, unusually,
not only the major states engaged at sea
(the United States, Japan, Great Britain,
and Germany), but also the Italians,
French, and Russians, who, in other
accounts, usually appear in walk-on
parts or as foils to the main combatants.
In many areas he is, of course, treading
a well-worn, generally familiar path,
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whose main features are hallowed by
decades of specialist scholarship, folk
memory, and innumerable memoirs
and monographs. Having entered the
field with influential contributions to
the scholarship of the maritime history
of World War II, most notably The
Battle of Midway (Oxford Univ. Press,
2011) and Neptune: The Allied Invasion
of Europe and the D-day Landings
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2014), Symonds, in
World War II at Sea, filters a very wide
selection of primary and secondary
sources to provide an authoritative,
comprehensive account that covers
the full range of maritime decisionmaking and combat. His main theme
is that the sea provides the essential
unity and definition to a world war.
Moreover, if you want to win a world
war, first you have to win it at sea.
The challenge for the narrative
historian in emphasizing the seamlessly
interrelated character of a world war
at sea comes in maintaining focus and
balance in the face of a wide range of
parallel issues, simultaneous campaigns,
and geographically dispersed combat
episodes. Happily, the way in which
maritime campaigns unfolded in World
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War II—first in and around Europe,
then across the Atlantic, before spreading to Russia and the Indo-Pacific
region—assists in this regard. After
Pearl Harbor it becomes more difficult,
and Symonds employs a useful device
by regularly reminding the reader what
is going on elsewhere. For example,
he notes that D-day in Normandy in
June 1944 virtually coincided with the
amphibious assault on Saipan. Indeed,
the fact that “the Allies could mount
two major invasions on opposite sides
of the world only nine days apart
underscored the global character of
the war as well as the depth of Allied
resources” at that stage of the war (p.
538). Elsewhere, the simultaneous fates
of Malta and Guadalcanal are linked in
a single chapter, while another entitled
“Landing Ships, Tank (LSTs)” provides
a useful unifying thread for amphibious
campaigns in the Pacific (the Gilbert and
the Marshall Islands), the Mediterranean
(Anzio), and D-day in Normandy.
In three dispersed chapters on “the war
on trade,” he neatly combines several
disparate themes and underlines how
the Allies’ ability to access the sea for
their own use and to deny its use to
their enemies was critical to victory.
The Japanese, Italians, and Germans
progressively were deprived of the raw
materials, food, and, most importantly,
fuel to sustain their fighting power and
populations, while the Allies’ eventual
control of the sea enabled them to secure
their home countries from attack,
maintain their populations, and project
decisive combat power at and from
the sea. In particular, Symonds details
how the highly destructive antishipping campaign against the Japanese
by American submarines and aircraft,
the British interdiction of German and
Italian supplies to North Africa, and the
effective blockade of the European Axis
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powers were decisive in this regard, even
as Axis naval forces were destroyed at
sea. Conversely, he describes how the
Germans and Italians in the Atlantic
and beyond were unable to—and the
Japanese, in the Pacific, did not care to—
interdict Allied supply routes decisively.
In this carefully researched and elegantly
structured account, Symonds combines a
highly engaging narrative style with the
rare ability to describe both complex issues and potentially confusing maritime
campaigns and actions in a concise and
lucid way. A tiny scattering of technical
inaccuracies will distract only the deep
specialist or pedant. Meanwhile, both
professional and armchair historians will
recognize and appreciate his well-judged,
finely drawn—if conventional—
characterizations of the major politicians
and commanders, distinctively illuminated by entertaining anecdotes and asides.
There are also plenty of lessons for the
discerning practitioner, particularly
in reminding the twenty-first-century
navy, by implication, about the realities
and exceptional demands of high-end
maritime combat, most of which have
been forgotten or discarded. The
most striking strategic lesson is that
in a global conflict at sea, choice and
priorities really count; one cannot be
strong everywhere simultaneously,
whether in landing craft, antisubmarine
escorts, or merchant shipping. In a
faint echo at the tactical level, I recall
serving on a destroyer under heavy air
attack in San Carlos Water near the
Falklands in 1982, earnestly wondering
(complaining) why it was that the
Royal Navy had not laid smoke screens,
maximized the number of machine guns
on deck, and deployed barrage balloons.
Another lesson that applies today
is that none of the Allied powers
could have prevailed in World War II

161

12/4/18 11:13 AM

156

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1

against Germany or Japan without the
industrial muscle, logistical support,
and fighting power of the United
States, even before Pearl Harbor. This
dependent relationship against major
opponents persists today and links to the
evidence in this book that a continental
power cannot expect to prevail against
a major power on another continent
without the ability to use the sea to
its advantage and to deny its use to an
opponent. One might be forgiven for
thinking that an industrially charged
China has absorbed these lessons.
CHRIS PARRY

Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life, by Thomas Alexander Hughes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Press, 2016. 544 pages. $35.

Fleet Admiral “Bull” Halsey was the
object of wide-ranging publicity during
the Second World War. After the war,
Halsey published his memoirs, and since
then half a dozen biographers have told
his story and many have visited his campaigns in thematic approaches. With so
much already done, readers might tend
to overlook this volume as just more of
the same. Doing that would be a mistake. Thomas Hughes’s well-researched
study of Halsey is a masterfully crafted,
revisionist work that brings new insights
to the understanding of one of the most
complex and controversial commanders in American naval history. In this
volume, Hughes draws a clear distinction between “Bull” Halsey, the wartime
leader whom the press celebrated and
made into a larger-than-life caricature,
and the real Bill Halsey, whose story
the author tells in this volume.
Halsey’s wartime career is well-known
and continually debated, but few readers
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have known much about his family
background and earlier years. Hughes
describes these aspects of life with great
insight. Fleet Admiral Halsey liked
to boast that he was descended from
generations of hard-drinking, rowdy
sailors and adventurers; this hardly
was the case. The Halsey family had a
distinguished heritage. On his father’s
side, his ancestors had arrived in Puritan
Massachusetts in 1638 and soon became
large landowners on Long Island, New
York. In the early nineteenth century,
one of them, Charles Halsey, married the
granddaughter of Rufus King, a signer
of the Constitution, one of America’s
first ambassadors to Great Britain,
and a very wealthy man. Rufus King’s
son Charles King married a daughter
of Archibald Gracie of New York,
whose stately home became the official
residence of New York’s mayor. Charles
King was publisher and editor of New
York newspapers and became president
of Columbia University. Charles Halsey’s
son William married Anne Brewster,
a direct descendant of Elder William
Brewster, the primary author of the
Mayflower Compact and the leading
religious figure of the Plymouth colony.
Their son was Admiral Halsey.
Before William Jr. joined the U.S. Navy,
only a few of his Brewster ancestors
had been seafarers, and none were of
the swashbuckling variety. Admiral
Halsey’s father and namesake entered
the Naval Academy in 1869 and
graduated in 1872. He retired as a
captain in 1907 but continued to work
for the Navy’s Bureau of Construction
and Repair until 1919. While he was
at sea in 1882 aboard USS Iroquois
on the Pacific station, his son—the
future admiral—was born at his wife’s
family home in Elizabeth, New Jersey.
During his career, William Sr. attended
the summer course at the Naval War
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College in 1897 and heard Theodore
Roosevelt speak as Assistant Secretary
of the Navy; but for the future admiral,
the Naval War College became a much
more important aspect of his career.
In the early part of his career, William
Jr. served under William S. Sims in the
destroyer flotilla, along with Dudley
Knox and others. Knox may have been
the key to the younger Halsey’s assignment to the Office of Naval Intelligence
in 1920 and six months later as naval
attaché in Berlin, where he reported
extensively on German naval developments in the early years of the Weimar
Republic. In 1932–33, Captain Halsey Jr.
followed his father’s earlier example by
attending the Naval War College. One
of his classmates was another future
five-star admiral, Captain Ernest J. King.
Halsey and his wife lived in Jamestown
and commuted daily across the bay to
the College. Although no star student at
the Naval War College, he was initially
considered as a choice for the faculty.
After some false starts with other orders,
Halsey eventually went on in the next
year to the Army War College, then
located in Washington, DC, where
his classmates included Jonathan
Wainwright and a future Army five-star
general, Omar Bradley. Again he did not
distinguish himself academically, but his
time there gave him unusual perspective
as one of the very few to graduate from
both the Army and Naval War Colleges.
However, that may well have been
Washington’s way of putting him
in a holding pattern preparatory to
going on to the aviation positions that
Admirals Leahy and King had been
recommending for him. In 1934, Halsey
went to Pensacola for training as a flight
observer, but soon bent the rules of the
system to earn his pilot’s wings as the
oldest newly qualified naval aviator,
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at the age of fifty-two. Thus, Halsey
cleared the way for a series of aircraft
carrier commands that eventually led
to his wartime career in the Pacific.
Hughes has researched Halsey’s wartime
career carefully and writes judiciously
and with great authority using his
extensive new research. Among many
interesting points, Hughes finds an
explanation for the mysterious skin
ailment that forced Halsey out of
commanding the Enterprise Task Force
just before the battle of Midway in
1942. While a fungal infection probably
caused dermatitis, it likely was related
to a bacterial infection in five of his
teeth, all of which Dr. Warren Vaughan,
a noted dermatologist from Richmond,
Virginia, brought under control in
early 1943 so that Halsey could return
to command in the Pacific theater.
Controversies about Halsey as a combat
commander undoubtedly will continue,
and Hughes’s excellent book will not be
the last word on the subject, but there is
no doubt that it should be the first book
on the subject that one should consult.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense
and American Strategy in Asia, by Ian Easton.
Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2017. 406
pages. $20.

Ian Easton examines and discusses
in fair detail the difficulties that the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) would face during an invasion
of Taiwan. He provides overall orders
of battle for both Taiwan and China;
explains which beaches on Taiwan are,
or are not, suitable for invasion; provides
monthly historical estimates of the

163

12/4/18 11:13 AM

158

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 1

weather with which an invasion likely
would have to contend; and describes
the defenses and policies Taiwan has
created to deter, or defeat, such an
invasion. Easton also describes, albeit
to a lesser degree, some of the aspects of
the Chinese bombardment and blockade
campaigns that likely would precede
or accompany an invasion of Taiwan.
The author builds a case that China’s
military is well aware of the many
problems and issues that would have
to be overcome if the PLA were to
invade Taiwan successfully, and that
Taiwan is well positioned, trained, and
equipped to repel such an effort. He
concludes that “Taiwan has little to fear
of invasion for right now” (p. 272).
A strength of the book is that the
author uses current and authoritative,
or at least well-situated, Chinese and
Taiwan sources in making his estimates.
Consequently, the bibliography is a
valuable resource for anyone devoted to
studying the military balance across the
Taiwan Strait. Also noteworthy is the
fact that the author of this volume works
at the 2049 Institute. Furthermore,
he acknowledges Mark Stokes as a
long-term mentor and thanks Randal
Shriver, until recently the 2049 Institute’s
director, for his leadership and support.
Stokes, of course, is as knowledgeable
about many aspects of the PLA as any
Westerner, and Shriver currently serves
as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Readers therefore can assume that the book
offers insights into some of the current
administration’s potential inclinations
regarding defense support to Taiwan. In
those important ways, the book is impressively informed and worth reading.
Despite those strengths, the author’s
sincere sympathy for Taiwan leads to a
tendency to overreach, which sometimes
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results in unsubstantiated assumptions.
For example, while demonstrating
that Taiwan will have ample strategic
warning of a Chinese invasion, he
asserts that in the immediate run-up to
an invasion “farm animals, especially
pigs, would be gathered in huge herds
to feed the troops” (p. 76). One wonders
why the invading forces would require
substantially more fresh pork than they
consumed beforehand. On the next page
he writes, “Shipyards would probably
be operating at breakneck speeds for at
least three months prior to the invasion,
working on 24 hour shifts and brightly
lit up at night. Light and noise travel
great distances over water, making them
easy to pickup with submarines and
surveillance ships.” That any such increases in noise and light could correlate
definitively to landing ship construction,
from miles offshore, and through a periscope, is at best doubtful. This tendency
toward inconsistent logic is repeated on
page 97, where he asserts, “China cannot
effectively blockade Taiwan without
bombarding it and Taiwan cannot be
bombed until it has been blockaded.”
Another example occurs on page 259,
when in a discussion of the perils of
mirror imaging he states, “It is too easy
to forget that reality and facts are things
that are arbitrary and subjective.” Better
editing would have helped this volume.
More significantly, the author’s bias for
Taiwan sometimes leads to dubious
conclusions. An example occurs when
the author states that “Taiwan’s spycatchers have discovered and arrested
traitors soon after China has recruited
them, ensuring that security breaches
were short lived” and that “experts point
out that Taiwan has done an extraordinary job in recruiting well-placed agents
in China who can provide early warning
information to the Presidential Office
(and the White House)” (p. 70). One
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hopes that Taiwan’s counterintelligence
efforts are indeed that good, but readers
probably recall that the John Walker spy
ring operated for over fifteen years in the
United States during the Cold War, causing enormous harm. Doubtless, Taiwan
works hard to catch spies—as did the
Federal Bureau of Investigation during
the Cold War—but it just does not
seem credible that Taiwan is immune
to effective Chinese espionage efforts.
Readers also might be forgiven for
doubting the author’s claim of Chinese
counterintelligence ineptitude if recent
reports in the press describing Beijing’s
destruction of Central Intelligence
Agency networks in China are accurate.
The perils inherent in the book’s
analytical tilt in favor of Taiwan extend
to other areas, perhaps most critically
to the author’s assessment (which relies
on some of his previous, similar work)
that the threat that China’s conventional
missile force and counterair systems
pose to Taiwan’s air force and navy is
manageable. This is important because
if this conclusion is wrong Taiwan’s
exposure to Chinese bombardment
and blockade, and even invasion, is
far higher than the author asserts.
This vulnerability—which depends on
whether Chinese long-range precision
strikes can be effective against Taiwan’s
defenses—will remain a critical factor
in Taiwan’s ability to deter or withstand
Chinese uses of force. The implications
of this competition extend far beyond
Taiwan. This work would be better
if it had addressed this issue more
thoroughly. Another subject that falls in
this category of insufficient treatment
is China’s ability to use its maritime
militia during an invasion of Taiwan.
Nonetheless, there is value in this
book. Its sources, and the author’s
background and experiences, provide a
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basis for optimism regarding Taiwan’s
ability to resist an invasion, which
the author relates enthusiastically.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY

Congress Buys a Navy: Politics, Economics, and
the Rise of American Naval Power, 1881–1921, by
Paul E. Pedisich. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2016. 304 pages. $39.95.

The subject of Paul E. Pedisich’s newest
work, Congress Buys a Navy: Politics,
Economics, and the Rise of American
Naval Power, 1881–1921, is apparent
from its title. Pedisich proposes that it
was Congress—rather than the executive branch—that was most directly
responsible for funding and building
the U.S. Navy during this pivotal period.
This well-researched work considers
four decades of presidential actions,
congressional legislation, and USN
policy and their role in the buildup of
U.S. naval power and capabilities.
These four decades (1881–1921) are
in many ways the most important in
U.S. naval history and development,
spanning the aftermath of the Civil War
through the end of the First World War.
At the beginning of this period, Pedisich
demonstrates the relative feebleness of
the U.S. Navy in comparison with European naval powers, most notably Great
Britain. However, this study demonstrates how the efforts of nine presidents
and their cabinets, sixteen Secretaries
of the Navy, and innumerable members
of Congress were able to transform the
U.S. Navy from a neglected, presteel,
and defensively focused organization
into—in the aftermath of World War
I—the world’s premier naval power.
Pedisich’s study is notable for its focus
on the legislative branch’s central place
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in developing the nation’s maritime
power and naval war-fighting capabilities. Consequently, it should be noted
that this work is not a study of naval
warfare, tactics, or strategy. Rather,
Pedisich’s extensive research of the
congressional sources explores the
personal and political negotiations and
decisions, and the attendant legislation
and congressional appropriations,
that in essence “built” this new Navy
over the course of four decades.
Perhaps this book’s greatest strength
is as a catalog of the wealth of
primary-source material from which
Pedisich drew: personal and private
correspondence, political speeches, and
military and congressional records.
The book is also rich in a level of detail
that constitutes a microhistory of the
period’s naval and congressional politics.
One thing readers will not be lacking
after reading this book is information.
Yet Congress Buys a Navy has numerous
weaknesses. Perhaps the most obvious is
a lack of clear purpose. While this work
extensively chronicles naval politics in
Washington—including congressional
appropriations, arguments, voting
records, and political maneuvers—as
well as decisions from the various Navy
Secretaries and the rest of the executive
branch, it falls short in providing the
larger historical contextualization for
making sense of this plethora of specific
information. Furthermore, Pedisich
does not explain the meaning of this
massive data dump in any conclusive
manner. Most significantly, Pedisich’s
overall assessment of this period is
uncertain: Did the Navy (and the
United States) need more funding?
Less? The reader is left uncertain.
Despite Pedisich’s richness of detail,
his assessment of the specific processes that transformed the Navy from
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a weak, presteel force into a premier
fighting force remains ambiguous.
Despite Pedisich’s attention to
consecutive legislatures, congressional
appropriations, funding, and various
Secretaries of the Navy and politicians,
he does not give the reader regular,
intermediate updates regarding the
exact strength and capability of the Navy
for this period. Occasionally, Pedisich
does draw attention to numerical values
of naval forces, but when he does he
offers little in the way of explanation
of the lethality and functionality of the
Navy. As a result, the reader may be
disappointed at the lack of details on
the status of naval forces, such as ships
in use and those under construction.
Absent a consistent and overarching
metanarrative, the book ultimately reads
more as a collection of case studies
on congressional processes and as
an encyclopedic compilation of attendant economic and political facts
and statistics—all perhaps of lesser
interest to armchair naval historians.
However, Congress Buys a Navy is
a thoroughly researched work that
warrants accolades for highlighting
the key role that Congress played
in creating a modern U.S. Navy.
BLAKE I. CAMPBELL

Everything under the Heavens: How the Past Helps
Shape China’s Push for Global Power, by Howard
W. French. New York: Knopf, 2017. 352 pages.
$27.95.

As a journalist who has done his
historical research, Howard W. French
has produced a highly readable book
that probes the Chinese concept of tian
xia, roughly meaning China’s “natural
dominion over everything under
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heaven” (pp. 3–4), and particularly on
its impact on the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) as it drives toward regional
and international dominance. His focus
on the cultural and racial nature of the
traditional Chinese view of the world
evolved from a different direction from
that of other scholars and analysts. It
comes from his years reporting from
Africa for the Washington Post, service
that produced a book on Africa’s development as “China’s second continent.”
Subsequent assignments with the New
York Times brought him to Japan and
China and a familiarity with the written
Japanese and Chinese languages.
Unlike other journalists, who create
books primarily out of interviews and
opinions, French uses interviews sparingly, instead relying on the writings of
noted scholars and experts to contextualize current issues. In addition to
numerous mainland Chinese and other
Asian scholars, French also quotes
Andrew Erickson, a noted China
scholar on the faculty of the Naval War
College. Professor Erickson points out
that, concerning the strategic military
competition among China and its
neighbors and the United States, as
“the PLA [People’s Liberation Army]
approaches leading edge capabilities,
the more expensive and difficult it
will be to advance further . . . [since]
China’s cost advantages decrease as
military equipment becomes less
labor-intensive and more technologyand materials-intensive. The more
sophisticated . . . the less relative benefit
China can derive from acquiring and
indigenizing foreign technologies, and
less cost advantage it will have in producing and maintaining them” (p. 271).
Such assurance may be cold comfort
to those technology companies whose
intellectual capital may have been
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pilfered via Chinese industrial espionage. However, French also uncovers
a critical trend concerning this
long-term competition: because of the
one-child (primarily boys) policy and
other factors, China’s population will
peak in 2025; because of immigration,
America’s population is forecast to
continue to increase. At the existing
rate, the four-to-one population ratio in
China’s favor will shrink to two-to-one,
with an aged Chinese population and
decreasing productivity as the country’s
manufacturing advantage declines.
French quotes Chinese demographer Yi
Fuxian: “People say we [China] can be
two to three times the size of America’s
economy. . . . I say it is totally impossible.
It will never overtake America’s because
of the decrease in the labor force and
the aging of the population” (p. 281).
In assessing China’s historical relationship with the world, French recounts
a continuing Chinese effort to achieve
tian xia through intimidation or
force, not through attraction or mutually balanced economic relationships.
Instead of being enamored of the PRC’s
myth of the peaceful precedent of the
eunuch Zheng He’s trading voyages of
the fifteenth century throughout the
Indo-Pacific (one of the reasons Beijing
claims to own the South China Sea),
French chooses well and relies on the
late Edward L. Dreyer, one of the most
thorough historians of Chinese wars.
Dreyer maintained that the modern
idea of Zheng He as explorer, trader,
and nonimperialist was “a creation of
Western scholarship. Zheng He’s fleet
was actually an armada, in the sense that
it carried a powerful Army that could
be disembarked, and its purpose was to
awe the rulers of Southeast Asia and the
Indian Ocean into sending tribute to
China” (p. 104). Taking twenty thousand
Ming dynasty troops to explore and
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negotiate trade agreements is a little like
using the Third Fleet to achieve adjustments to NAFTA. Frankly, that is exactly
what French sees as the future role of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),
once the PLAN’s growing size helps to
reduce U.S. influence in China’s sphere.
French’s most significant observation—
unique among similar books—is that the
American-centric nature of most assessments of the PRC’s rise blinds us to the
fact that most Chinese do not regard the
United States as its primary, long-term
enemy. Rather, Japan is perceived as the
once-and-future foe that deserves the
most retribution for China’s “century
of humiliation.” French illustrates the
popularity of this mainland view by
examining the composition of the PRC’s
entertainment media. “[T]o turn on
the television in China is to be inundated with war themed movies, which
overwhelmingly focus on Japanese
villainy. More than two hundred
anti-Japanese films were produced in
2012 alone, with one scholar estimating
that 70 percent of Chinese TV dramas
involve Japan-related war plots” (p. 21).
Thus, in French’s estimate, it would not
be tension over islands (some of them
false) in the South China Sea that would
result in inadvertent war, but rather an
escalating dispute over the Senkakus.
French has done an excellent job of identifying the ties between dynastic China’s
open tian xia policies and PRC president
Xi Jinping’s aspirations for the future.
French points out the ironic similarities
between Xi’s rhetoric and that of the
Chinese communists’ greatest enemy,
Chiang Kai-shek, over the rightful dominance of China in Asia. Their desired
rules for international politics resemble
those represented in Thucydides’s
Melian Dialogue. French recounts that
when a Singaporean deputy expressed
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support for a maritime code of conduct
at a recent multilateral conference,
Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi
responded, “China is a big country and
other countries are small countries
. . . and that’s just a fact” (p. 126).
Everything under the Heavens is both
an informative book and an enjoyable
read. One hopes it will make the overly
optimistic think a little bit harder about
future relations between China and the
rest of the world. However, in the end,
French—whether by personal nature or
intellectual predilection—feels compelled to offer only optimistic recommendations. “A China that is treated
as an equal with much to contribute to
human betterment,” he writes, “but met
with understated but resolute firmness
when need be, is a China that will
mellow as it advances in the decades
ahead, and then most likely plateau”
(p. 284). Of course, how to be both
understated and resolute in an increasingly shrill world is the unanswered
dilemma. The problem with hugging
(or scolding) the panda is that it bites.
SAM J. TANGREDI

Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in
Norway, 1940, by John Kiszely. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017. 390 pages. $44.99.

Anatomy of a Campaign by John
Kiszely provides an excellent historical
review of the military campaigns in
Norway in 1940. In his book, Kiszely
takes the reader on an exciting journey
following the British expeditionary
military campaign in Norway. He
asks for and investigates the reason
behind the failure. Was it poor military
performance, lack of intelligence, or just
poor strategy and decision-making?
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This journey takes the reader beyond the
obvious historical causes and looks at
the underlying reasons for the blunders
in operational and strategic decisionmaking. Compared with other books
written about the German and British
campaigns in Norway, this dissection
of the “anatomy” of a campaign is more
applicable to military campaigns today.
Kiszely looks into the structural
functions of the campaign and how they
related to each other to find out what
did and did not work. Since the military
campaign links the political objective to
military ways and means, he claims the
outcome of the campaign was a given—
even before the first shot. The book is
valuable because the lessons from the
Norwegian campaign demonstrate the
relations between strategy and policy
and the effect on the operational and
tactical levels. Modern campaigns build
on experience from the past, and readers
will appreciate this honest dissection as
the author shares his own insight from
joint strategic military and operational
experience. Kiszely is a retired, highly
decorated British officer and a soldier
with operational command experience
in national and international operations,
as well as service on the Joint Staff.
The author examines the challenges
that Great Britain faced in the transition
from peace to war. How does a country
move from a peacetime organization and
optimize the ways and means to achieve
strategic ends? His insight into British
decision-making and the relationship
between military leaders and their
political masters is an outstanding assessment of a strategy-policy mismatch
and shows how a service-oriented
approach to a military campaign utterly
fails. Modern, theater-level campaigns
are orchestrated at the operational level
to synchronize joint-service contributions. Kiszely claims that unique,
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British, service-oriented leadership
contributed to a disconnect between
strategic- and tactical-level objectives.
British military culture at that time was
founded on superior improvisation and
ad hoc adaptation. Services conducted
separate operations driven by German
military initiatives, and those operations
sometimes were counterproductive
to the theater campaign. Today’s
commanders should not overlook the
lessons that his insight provides.
The author makes a convincing argument that understanding expeditionary
operations and campaigns is vital to
managing the strategic and grand
strategic environments. On the grand
strategic level, the British struggled to
formulate common political objectives
with its allies, which had a direct
effect on the conduct of the campaign.
Domestic politics influenced the
national decision-making, and the need
to do something haunted the Allied
coalition. Even as the security situation
obviously required the Allies to build
up forces on the continent to meet
the threat from Germany, forces were
diverted to a secondary front in Norway,
for which they were not prepared.
Those directing multinational
operations need to consider how to
build political and military unity into
a campaign. According to Kiszely, the
Allies and Germany approached strategy
and policy very differently because of
their opposing political orientations: a
democratic coalition on the one hand
and an authoritarian regime on the
other. The German decision-making
in this phase of the war had strategic
advantages, as its policy and campaign
plans were synchronized, whereas the
Allied coalition was not able to adapt
to the operational tempo and unite
around a coherent grand strategy.
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Kiszely provides a convincing argument
that the foundation for German success
was theater-level strategy and management of the campaign. Even though the
Allies had local successes, as demonstrated in the battle of Narvik, their
tactical achievements were not embedded in a grand strategy or theater-level
objective for winning the campaign.
In conclusion, Kiszely claims that the
campaign in Norway was a decisive
victory for the Germans, in that they
achieved strategic surprise and dominating airpower. The main reason for the
British campaign failure is found in
the link between policy and plans. The
ends were not supported by available
means and ways, and policy became
divorced from reality. Such determinations leave the reader to evaluate and
decide where the responsibility for
the failure of the campaign lies.
The book summarizes key military
lessons learned and strategic guidance.
I strongly encourage national security
advisers and military leaders to read it.
LARS SAUNES

The Cold War: A World History, by Odd Arne
Westad. New York: Basic Books, 2017. 720 pages.
$40.

Odd Arne Westad has taken on a
difficult task: providing a one-volume
history of the Cold War. The U.S.-Soviet
confrontation lasted over four decades
and had many episodes. Cramming the
entire story into one book—even one
that is over seven hundred pages long—
is no simple thing. Westad made his task
even harder by taking an international
focus and starting his coverage in the
1890s, with the politicization of the
confrontation between labor and capital.
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However, Westad is certainly up to the
task. He is something of a transnational
man. Although Norwegian, he holds a
PhD from a U.S. school (the University
of North Carolina) and has taught in
both the United Kingdom and the
United States. This book is the product
of research in archives around the planet
(Bulgaria, Egypt, India, Russia, South
Africa, and the United States) and the
reading of other source material published in German, French, Chinese, and
Norwegian. An important advantage to
this book is that it is an easy read, which
is crucial, given its length. It is easy for
historians to get trapped in the details of
their research and skimp on their analysis and writing. That is not the case here.
Westad covers events in a compelling
but concise manner. At times, though,
the reader might wish that he had
provided more documentation of his
arguments, since his footnotes often do
not show from where his evidence came.
The chapter on the ideological elements
of the confrontation before the 1940s
is less than convincing, but fortunately
short. Westad sustains these arguments
better in the body of the text. In World
War II, capitalism and communism
worked together not because of the Nazi
threat but only because of the Germans.
“Some form of postwar conflict was
next to inevitable” (p. 68). Joseph Stalin
was a brutal dictator, but he also was
indecisive and let European affairs
drift, while the United States acted. As a
result, Washington had more to do with
turning the postwar confrontation into
a sustained Cold War than did Moscow.
One of the central arguments of this
book is that the Cold War was about
more than the United States and the
Soviet Union. On this point, Westad is
certainly correct; the question is one
of emphasis. He gives a good deal of
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coverage to China and India; Latin
America and Africa also get attention.
However, the theme of these sections
seems to be impact rather than influence, and while that focus makes sense
for the argument he wants to make,
it does seem to divert attention away
from more-significant developments.
The individuals most responsible
for moving the Cold War away from
dangerous confrontation were Richard
M. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev. Both
wanted détente, but for different reasons.
Westad argues that this period was
basically a truce. In many ways, détente
turned out to be much better for the
United States. The competition did not
go away, but it turned to soft power, in
which global trends ended up favoring
capitalism and the United States. Nixon
also managed to turn China into an ally
during this period. Westad argues that
this development occurred more because
of the incompetence of Mao Zedong as a
statesman than Nixon’s skills as a strategist. Mao had weakened China, and his
policies often brought about situations
that were exactly the opposite of what
he wanted. Rejecting the argument of
most historians, Westad argues that the
Americans rather than the Soviets killed
détente, mostly because of American
domestic politics. These arguments
are well sustained, and although many
might have trouble accepting these
contentions, they are basically correct.
Why did the Cold War end with a U.S.
victory? “Like its enemy, the United
States had its portion of Cold War
successes and failures. It is just that
the balance sheet came out differently,
and better, than that of the other side”
(p. 620). The assets that worked to the
advantage of the United States included
long-term alliances, economic growth
and transformations, technological
change, and diplomatic skill.
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This book is hardly the last word on the
Cold War; given its significance, the
period will be studied for decades to
come. But Westad has given his readers
an important, thought-provoking
account, and that is no small thing.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation and Cooperation with Russia and China, 1945–2016, by
David F. Winkler. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2017. 336 pages. $31.95.

In the summer of 1988, I stepped aboard
USS Yorktown (CG 48) as a young
midshipman during my orientation
cruise and noticed a ship silhouette
painted on the bridge wing. When
members of my class inquired about
its meaning, the crew regaled us with
the story of the shouldering incident
with the Russian frigate Bezzaventnyy
just a few months earlier in the Black
Sea—the incident pictured on the cover
of David F. Winkler’s recently updated
Incidents at Sea: American Confrontation
and Cooperation with Russia and China,
1945–2016. Winkler began studying
the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention
of Incidents on and over the High Seas
(also known as the Incidents at Sea
Agreement, or INCSEA) after experiencing such events firsthand as a junior
officer in the Sea of Japan in the mid1980s. Since then, he has established
himself as an authority on the subject at
the Naval Historical Foundation. With
a foreword by the chief U.S. negotiator
of INCSEA, former Secretary of the
Navy John W. Warner, this edition of
Winkler’s book builds on the original
(published in 2000) by addressing the
expanding influence of China and
the resurgence of Russia as global
competitors in the maritime domain.
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Incidents at Sea takes a chronological
approach to the intricate relationship
between the American and Russian
navies beginning at the end of World
War II, through the growth of the Soviet
navy, into the post–Cold War tensions
with Russia, to the emergence of China
as a global maritime force. Drawing
from oral histories and extensive
personal interviews, Winkler puts a
human face on these interactions by
relating the experiences of junior officers
aboard USN ships, senior naval leaders,
and senior government officials. He also
provides intimate details about the interactions of the members of the American
delegation with their Soviet counterparts
during the initial INCSEA negotiation
and subsequent annual reviews.
No single event precipitated this unprecedented agreement; instead a series
of dangerous, and sometimes deadly,
interactions between the two nations’
navies and air forces reached a tipping
point in 1971, resulting in a Soviet call
for action. American naval leaders had
sought such an agreement in the decade
prior, but senior State Department
officials were wary that these discussions
might derail ongoing American efforts
regarding territorial sea claims. Given
assurances from the Russians that this
would be a navy-only discussion, the
State Department acquiesced, and
then–Under Secretary of the Navy
Warner headed the U.S. negotiating
team for initial talks. After months of
preparation, the American delegation
went to Moscow in October 1971, and
the resulting agreement included all the
points it desired. A follow-on meeting in
Washington, DC, in March 1972 ironed
out remaining details, and Secretary
Warner signed the INCSEA agreement
with the Soviet navy’s commander in
chief, Fleet Admiral Sergey Gorshkov,
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on May 25, 1972, at President Richard
M. Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid
I. Brezhnev’s Moscow summit.
INCSEA marked the first formal
interaction between the two superpowers. Discussions involved more than just
negotiating sessions; they also included a
social agenda, with each side showcasing
the strengths of its culture and economy.
Winkler presents the social agenda
as a key element in the breakdown of
barriers between the two ideologically
different sets of participants. Another
key to INCSEA’s success was its bilateral
and navy-to-navy nature. Limiting the
scope of the agreement created more
common ground for the two parties.
Winkler notes something I also have
observed in bilateral navy staff talks:
naval officers have a common shared
experience of operating at sea that
cuts across the politics of nations.
Since the signing of the historic agreement, U.S.-Russian relations have ebbed
and flowed, but INCSEA remains a
stalwart of international agreement and
cooperation. Winkler illustrates how—
despite other sources of tension between
the two countries—both sides have
maintained civility during the annual
INCSEA reviews. He also describes several tense international situations during
which following INCSEA protocols kept
a cold war from turning hot. Yet despite
its success, INCSEA has not prevented
all unsafe interactions at sea—witness
the Bezzaventnyy-Yorktown incident
in February 1988. More recently, since
the Russian resurgence under President
Vladimir Putin, the number of incidents
between the two nations has increased,
especially as American warships and
aircraft reassert the right to navigate
freely in the Black and Baltic Seas.
The growth of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army Navy in the 1990s
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brought increased interaction with
American warships, naval auxiliaries,
and military aircraft, reminiscent of
the Cold War. The United States and
China signed the Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) in
1998, modeled after INCSEA. Winkler
notes, however, that the MMCA lacks
the level of trust established between
the Soviet and American navies, and
therefore has been less effective.
The high seas and contested littorals
were the front line of U.S.-Soviet interaction during the Cold War. Winkler’s
book provides an intimate look at
the development and execution of a
landmark agreement between adversaries that provided a key mechanism
for ensuring that their interaction at
sea remained professional and kept
the Cold War from becoming hot.
JAMES P. MCGRATH III

The British Carrier Strike Fleet after 1945, by David Hobbs. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2015. 480 pages. $59.95.

This work is the latest in a series
of books from this author about
Royal Navy aircraft carriers, and British
carrier aviation in particular. It takes
the story forward from where his last
work on the British Pacific Fleet left
us—in the misty waters of Tokyo Bay
in September 1945. Hobbs shows how
the ethos of naval strike warfare that
had been developed and honed in the
rigors of World War II survived the
many and varied challenges that the
postwar era threw at it. Most obviously,
perhaps, it is a study of naval retrenchment under that most demanding of
scenarios: demobilization after a world
war coupled with a broader and ongoing
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retreat from global preeminence. It is
no surprise, then, that budgetary issues
take center stage, but Hobbs manages
to make his account much more than
a mere litany of what might have been.
He charts moments of gritty determination and ingenuity mixed with some
unforgivable and almost criminal areas
of waste and abuse—features that are
certainly familiar to anyone involved in
military planning. Above all, though,
an unswerving belief from within the
service about the value of its aviation has
allowed the capability to be resurrected
almost from the dead in recent years,
in the form of two large carriers with
real strike capability. This fact alone
makes this book a compelling read.
It is difficult to imagine a more qualified
individual than Hobbs to guide us
through this story. After a thirty-year
naval career as an aviator that spanned
the last years of the “big deck” carriers,
the “through-deck” cruiser era, and
right up to the “renaissance” after the
Falklands War, Hobbs capped this off
with a period working in naval records
and as the curator of the Fleet Air Arm
Museum. This gave him almost unparalleled access to the necessary archival
material, a resource he has used to
great effect in this volume. The book is
nothing short of exacting in its research.
That said, and although he tries valiantly
to hide it, Hobbs clearly has a message
he is anxious to communicate. It is, as he
freely admits, “in part my own story” (p.
vii). His thesis, which he openly reveals
in the last few pages, is that Britain
would have been better served had it
continued to replace its strike carriers
from the 1960s onward. While an understandable and legitimate viewpoint,
it is just that—a viewpoint—and many
will bemoan this lack of objectivity,
particularly as the broader constraints
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acting on the British government during
this period are given scant attention.
Equally, the work would have benefited
from a deeper dive into the effectiveness
of the military advice to the politicians,
something that the loss of the service
ministries in 1964 did little to improve.
Although broadly chronological, the
book is perhaps best examined in terms
of its three main themes: the carrier
operations themselves, the ongoing
innovations to overcome operating
constraints, and the political considerations surrounding carrier acquisition.
As explained above, the author is
perhaps least successful with the last of
these, where his experiences at the front
line have tended to cloud his objectivity. Where, for example, is a balanced
assessment of any opposing political
constraints? Luckily, though, Hobbs is at
his best with the other two, which makes
the work valuable in its own right and
tends to carry it through any shortcomings elsewhere. The day-to-day coverage
of the main carrier operations is detailed
but easy to follow and clearly fulfills
the need to demonstrate the ongoing
relevance of this capability to a maritime
nation with global interests, such as
Great Britain. Likewise, the coverage
of the British innovations that have
made carrier airpower the formidable
asset it is today is comprehensive. The
angled deck, the mirror landing aid,
the steam catapult, the development
of helicopter carriers, and the ski
jump—all are given the prominence
they deserve, along with some other
ideas that were less successful.
In the end, the ongoing relevance of a
discussion over the viability of carriers,
particularly given the expense of the new
Ford class and their perceived vulnerability to a new generation of antiship
weapons, is sure to encourage a wide
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interest in this book, particularly from
within the U.S. Navy. This is a good
thing, since many of the constraints
that Great Britain had to face are
essentially cyclical in nature and tend
to recur in similar forms over time.
In particular, though, I commend this
book to the acquisition community, if
only to gain an appreciation for how
out of step with each other politicians and operators can become.
ANGUS ROSS

The Law of War: A Detailed Assessment of the US
Department of Defense Law of War Manual, by
William H. Boothby and Wolff Heintschel von
Heinegg. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2018. 479 pages. $150.

Perhaps no recent document published
by the Department of Defense (DoD)
has been more studied, reviewed, and
criticized than its Law of War Manual.
Initially released in June 2015, it already
has received multiple updates. These updates occur partly because of the flurry
of well-considered criticism from both
academics and practitioners. However,
no effort at reviewing the manual has
been more exhaustive than this recently
published book by two of Europe’s most
eminent international law scholars.
The Law of War represents a remarkable
effort and should occupy a spot on the
bookshelf of anyone seriously studying
international law as it applies to military
operations. However, readers also should
be careful to understand what it is. It is
not a traditional treatise on the law of
war; rather, it is a deliberate—
paragraph-by-paragraph—review of
DoD’s Law of War Manual and must
be read alongside that document.
Those readers lacking an existing
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understanding of the law of armed
conflict will find the book difficult and
cumbersome. However, the scholar
trying to place DoD’s manual within the
context of coexisting understandings
will have found an indispensable guide.
This view of The Law of War should
not be understood as a criticism. No
book can be all things to all readers.
Had the authors attempted to craft the
book in such a way that it aided the
reader in learning the fundamentals of
the law of armed conflict, there would
have been little space for their in-depth
critiques of DoD’s positions. Indeed,
the authors are up-front about the
book’s intended audience: “[m]ilitary
lawyers, commanders, specialists
in military doctrine, military staff
colleges, ministry and military policy
staffs, academics,” and those with an
interest or professional involvement
in the subject. Although this list may
be a bit broad, given the nuanced
legal arguments covered throughout
the book, the authors are correct in
identifying the need for previous
experience in the subject matter.
In truth, the study of international law
applicable to military operations can be
a vexing enterprise. In addition to treaties that often vary in interpretation and
applicability, international law places
heavy reliance on legal custom—
that is, the combination of state practice
and that state’s understanding of when
its actions are constrained or required,
as the case may be, by legal obligations.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that widely
divergent views on the law of armed
conflict exist. The book is at its best
when it identifies where the position
stated in the DoD manual is inconsistent
with some—or even most—other
states’ interpretations. The authors
also perform an excellent service in
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pointing out when DoD’s position is
either vague or inadequately sourced.
An example of the strength of The Law
of War is the discussion of the proportionality rule as it applies to conducting
military attacks. The authors correctly
point out the differences between the
manual’s definition of the rule and
that of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions (API). Although
the United States is not a party to API,
the majority of its allies and partners are.
Additionally, the United States does hold
that API’s targeting provisions generally
constitute customary law binding on the
United States. Thus, any study of the rule
limited to examining DoD’s definition
and interpretation would be deficient in
any academic review. By using The Law
of War alongside the manual, researchers easily can avoid such mistakes.
If any criticism of the book is valid, it
is that the work occasionally displays
the same opaqueness and repetitiveness
for which it criticizes the DoD manual.
The authors seem to take such pains to
present a balanced review of the manual
that it becomes difficult to ascertain the
precise parameters of their criticism.
Additionally, much of their criticism
appears to stem from a desire that the
DoD manual be something it is not.
The DoD manual is not an academic
treatise; it is a U.S. practitioner’s guide
to advising on military operations. The
DoD manual continually references U.S.
policy documents that, while perhaps
not relevant to a purely academic view
of the law, are vital to a practitioner
looking to place the law in context.
The Law of War is an invaluable
contribution to scholarship in the
field. The next move of any researcher
studying the DoD manual’s position on
any topic should be to review The Law
of War for analysis regarding where the
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manual is lacking or what additional
wwviews exist. For this herculean effort,
the authors should be commended.
JEFFREY BILLER

Soldiers and Civilization: How the Profession of
Arms Thought and Fought the Modern World into
Existence, by Reed Robert Bonadonna. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 336 pages.
$35.

A former Marine colonel with a
PhD from Boston University and
the retired director of the ethics and
character development program at
the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy,
Reed Bonadonna makes the daring
assertion that the profession of arms
and the culture of Western civilization
are inextricably bound together in a
symbiosis of mutual influence. The
subtitle wittingly captures the central
thesis of his book: how the profession
of arms thought and fought the modern
world into existence. Although it may
seem contradictory to suggest that
military service and civilization are in
any way constitutive of each other in an
interdependent relationship, Bonadonna
carefully illustrates how warriors can be
destroyers yet, ironically, guardians of
civilization as agents of both continuity
and change. Once the book has been
read, Bonadonna’s daring assertion
seems less daring and quite reasonable,
given the skillfully presented historical
evidence. In this respect, Bonadonna
successfully defends his thoughtprovoking thesis and achieves a balance
of overarching generalization and
sufficient detail to deliver a compelling
examination of the role of the military in
the development of Western civilization.
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Whereas Bonadonna furnishes in the
main body of his work a historical
narrative delineating the advance of
the profession of arms, in the conclusion he ventures to offer strategies for
emerging trends in the twenty-first
century. One among the several
fascinating topics explored is the issue
of humanitarian assistance (HA). At the
2005 World Summit, the United Nations
adopted the doctrine of “responsibility
to protect” as a moral imperative for
multinational forces to intervene
in countries where humanitarian
crises are egregious, thus in effect
amending the nation-state sovereignty
established by the Treaty of Westphalia
in 1648. Bonadonna observes that HA
operations have become increasingly
important initiatives for addressing
global problems of hunger, genocide,
and disease in the twenty-first century.
While the need for HA seems apparent, Bonadonna rightly highlights the
complications of intervention: the threat
of imperialistic encroachments on the
territorial sovereignty of nation-states
by “helping” neighboring states; the
resentment of local authorities to the
intrusion of outside aid; the disruption
of the existing, albeit fragile, order; and
miscalculations, as a result of misinformation, that prompt violent resistance.
Bonadonna cites the relief campaign
in Somalia as an HA operation that
backfired and achieved the opposite
of the intended results, pointing to the
Black Hawk helicopter incident in the
battle of Mogadishu in 1993. Since that
time, a number of military leaders have
come to believe that other government
organizations and nongovernment
organizations can take the lead more
effectively on such campaigns,
with limited military support.
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Bonadonna also cautions that humanitarian interventions require subtlety in
the conduct of nonkinetic operations.
Whatever the multinational solutions
are to the humanitarian crisis, coalition
forces must treat the endemic political
and social causes, not only the outward
symptoms of human suffering. Furthermore, transnational forces should be
sensitive to the anthropological customs
and sociological systems that have
cultural meaning and historical value
for the indigenous society being helped.
With those caveats articulated, Bona
donna expresses the viewpoint that the
military will continue HA operations
because of its organic medical and
security capabilities and the mobile and
mission-ready assets it has available
for rapid deployment. Bonadonna
concludes that humanitarian operations
at their best exemplify the central goals
of the military profession through the
maintenance of global stability and the
protection of human rights. The altruistic ethics of HA underscores the eminent
value of nonkinetic missions that foster
and protect the common dignity of every
man, woman, and child, befitting the
highest standards of human flourishing.
Although Soldiers and Civilization may
be criticized for what is not included in
this ambitious historical undertaking,
the reader undoubtedly will be enriched
by this intellectual journey from
classical antiquity to postmodernity.
Warfighter and policy maker alike
will encounter the larger-than-life
personae of legendary heroes such
as Ulysses, Alexander the Great, and
Charlemagne—to name only a few—
accompanied by a keen analysis of their
strategies, operations, and tactics. For
example, the game of chess may seem
like a harmless pursuit passed benignly
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from one generation to the next, but
Bonadonna reveals how the game that
once embodied medieval strategy and
feudal society eventually evolved into
the Prussian Kriegsspiel (war game) in
the nineteenth century for the Prussian
general staff. Here and in many other
places, Bonadonna introduces profound
insights worthy of serious consideration,
and in so doing distinguishes himself
as an exceptional historian, military
strategist, and ethicist. The coverage
of military history and civilization
in the East would prove an excellent
sequel to this outstanding overview of
military professionalism in Western
civilization. Suffice it to say, Soldiers
and Civilization is a significant addition to the study of war fighting as
the basis for the literature, culture,
and politics of Western civilization.
EDWARD ERWIN

Selling War: A Critical Look at the Military’s PR
Machine, by Steven J. Alvarez. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2016. 384 pages. $34.95.

Selling War is a mixed bag. Like the proverbial description of the North Platte
River, it is simultaneously “too thick to
drink and too thin to plow.” Steven Alvarez, an experienced former Army public
affairs officer (PAO), suggests as much
when he describes his work as “part
memoir, part public relations handbook,
part after-action review, part white
paper, part catharsis, and a firsthand
account of [his] yearlong mobilization”
in Iraq from 2004 to 2005 (p. xxi). The
result does partial justice to each of these
perspectives, but full justice to none.
Alvarez is a severe critic of Army public
affairs. He convincingly appraises the
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public affairs efforts of both the military
and the Coalition Provisional Authority
in Iraq as colossal failures. These failures
are all the more painful given that Alvarez was able to produce limited successes
that pointed to what might have been.
For example, the authorities’ refusal to
engage the Arab press, most notably
Al Jazeera, created lost opportunities;
in contrast, Alvarez’s work with the
Saudi television channel Al Arabiya was
so successful that insurgents killed its
personnel when they presented factual
stories pointing out coalition successes.
Selling War is indeed part memoir and,
clearly, part catharsis. Alvarez, a former
enlisted soldier and then a commissioned line officer, is painfully aware of
the difference between the lifestyle he
experienced and that of frontline soldiers and Marines. His writing indicates
a personal level of conflict when he
contemplates not only how much easier
his life was than theirs but also the even
easier lives of other Army personnel
and their civilian counterparts assigned
to duties in Baghdad’s Green Zone.
Further, Alvarez does not shy away
from telling of actions that place him
in a less-than-flattering light. He takes
responsibility for programs that went
wrong and ideas that went astray. He admits to participating behind the scenes
to get an immediate superior removed.
However, even as he often holds himself
accountable for failure, he is equally
or more scathing when looking at the
failings of others. Alvarez’s assignment
involved working extensively with Iraqi
officials, and he details the frustration
of working within a system pervaded by
nepotism and corruption. Yet Alvarez
also is very sensitive to the plight of
Iraqis who sincerely worked to better
the country and the lives of its citizens.
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Alvarez’s account raises the very real
question whether the shortcomings of
the Iraqi government were so great as to
prevent the United States from achieving its victory objectives. In Alvarez’s
experience, the rare Iraqi individual
who worked for the greater good was so
massively outnumbered by those who
worked only for themselves that failure
to reach the Iraqi ideal was guaranteed.
Alvarez served as General David
Petraeus’s PAO, and contends that the
general understood, better than many,
the value of communication in counterinsurgency operations. Alvarez praises
Petraeus as a natural PAO and gifted
communicator. He assiduously refrains
from claiming credit for Petraeus’s ideas
on communication and counterinsurgency; however, Alvarez points out that
he was developing and putting into effect
many of the practices that Petraeus eventually turned into policy and doctrine.
From his service with Petraeus, Alvarez
is able to provide a unique view of
the man. Alvarez also discusses his
interaction with noteworthy journalists,
ranging from Christiane Amanpour,
Dan Rather, and Peter Jennings to
Geraldo Rivera. Somewhat surprisingly,
the senior representatives of the fourth
estate come off well, especially in the
case of Rivera. As Alvarez tells stories
of his personal experiences with these
journalistic legends, he mounts a
passionate argument that dealing with
reporters in an openhanded way will
serve the military far better than keeping
them at arm’s length and treating
them as little better than the enemy.
This is not a scholarly work, nor is it
intended to be, and there are issues
pertaining to style and tone. Words and
phrasing are as much Alvarez’s tools
as the plumber’s pipe wrench or the
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mathematician’s calculator. Word choice
is deliberate and made with intent. Thus,
when Alvarez lavishly employs profanity,
obscenity, and testosterone-laden invective, it is natural to ask why and to what
desired effect. The author is no longer
a salty sergeant or a junior officer of
limited erudition and expression; to the
contrary, he is a professional wordsmith,
valued for his ability to paint a picture
and explain an idea with words. One
presumes the intent was for the reader
to perceive the author as a fighting man
with a pen, but the practice detracts
from a persona as a coolly analytical
observer and participant whose recommendations are rooted in rationality.
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Perhaps this dichotomy reflects the
actual experience of the U.S. communication effort in Iraq. Alvarez
clearly cared about succeeding there.
He employed creative methods and
pursued avidly those that produced
positive results. At the same time, he
encountered organizational timidity,
a lack of professionalism in his field,
venality and indifference from many of
his counterparts, and failure. Perhaps,
under such conditions, frustration and
invective are all that ever remains.
RICHARD J. NORTON
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-

I

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

n each article in this series, we have attempted to encourage sailors at all levels to
develop a habit of reading books related to their profession as maritime warriors
and related to their greater role as informed citizens of our great republic. The
CNO’s Professional Reading Program identifies over 140 great titles to consider.
Reading any one of them will enrich your life.
We also would like to commend to you a “one-stop” menu of books: The
Leader’s Bookshelf, published in 2017 by the U.S. Naval Institute. It can serve as a
gateway to over fifty superb volumes that can help make each reader a better leader. On its website (www.usni.org), the publisher describes the book as follows:
Adm. James Stavridis and his co-author, R. Manning Ancell, have surveyed over two
hundred active and retired four-star military officers about their reading habits and
favorite books, asking each for a list of titles that strongly influenced their leadership
skills and provided them with special insights that helped propel them to success in
spite of the many demanding challenges they faced. The Leader’s Bookshelf synthesizes their responses to identify the top fifty that can help virtually anyone become
a better leader. Each of the works—novels, memoirs, biographies, autobiographies,
management publications—are summarized and the key leadership lessons extracted
and presented. Whether individuals work their way through the entire list and read
each book cover to cover, or read the summaries provided to determine which appeal
to them most, The Leader’s Bookshelf will provide a roadmap to better leadership.
Highlighting the value of reading in both a philosophical and a practical sense, The
Leader’s Bookshelf provides sound advice on how to build an extensive library, lists
other books worth reading to improve leadership skills, and analyzes how leaders use
what they read to achieve their goals. An efficient way to sample some of literature’s
greatest works and to determine which ones can help individuals climb the ladder of
success, The Leader’s Bookshelf is for anyone who wants to improve his or her ability
to lead—whether in family life, professional endeavors, or within society and civic
organizations.
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This book is a true treasure. I hope it will kindle a thirst for reading, writing,
and learning that will be unquenchable. It includes an interview with former
Marine Corps general James Mattis (now the Secretary of Defense), in which he
discusses his personal library of over six thousand volumes and how they traveled
with him from duty station to duty station during his active-duty career (p. 249).
He advises as follows:
So as you think through how to put together a personal library, remember that it is an
intensely personal adventure. You may be entranced with the ability to hold a book in
your hands, scribble in the margins, show the volume to friends who are visiting. Or
you may want an entirely electronic library that resides remotely in the Cloud, available in a moment over your smart phone, tablet, or home computer.
Your personal library may be seven books you deeply value or seven thousand, and
it may be beautifully organized and alphabetized or simply arranged by the color of
the book’s cover. What matters is that it is your library, invested with your intellectual
capital, and serves as a garden of the mind to which you can return again and again.

No matter how busy you may be, finding time to read will pay great dividends.

JOHN E. JACKSON
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